DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 208 550 EA 014 102

AUTHOR Fuhrman, Susan, Ed.; Rosenthal, Alan, Ed.
TITLE Shaping Education Policy in the States.
INSTITUTION Institute for Educational Leadership, Washington, D.C.
SPONS AGENCY National Inst. of Education (ED), Washington, D.C.
PUB DATE 81
GRANT NIE-G-79-0176
NOTE 138p.
AVAILABLE FROM Publications, Institute for Educational Leadership, 1001 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington, DC 20036 ($9.50).

EDRS PRICE MF01 Plus Postage. PC Not Available from EDRS.
DESCRIPTORS Administrative Policy; Decision Making; Educational Policy; Elementary Secondary Education; Government Role; *Government School Relationship; Legislation; *Legislators; *Policy Formation; *Political Influences; Political Issues; Political Power; Politics; Postsecondary Education; Public Policy; *State Officials
IDENTIFIERS California; Florida; New Hampshire; Pennsylvania; Utah; Wisconsin

ABSTRACT

This monograph and its companion, "Legislative Education Leadership in the States," portray the contemporary role of state legislators and map the structure of education leadership in terms of both the characteristics of influential legislators and staff and the nature of influence structures in state legislatures. This volume reports the results of indepth interviews with legislators, staff, lobbyists, state department personnel, gubernatorial staff and other knowledgeable informants in six states--Pennsylvania, California, Florida, Wisconsin, Utah, and New Hampshire. The patterns of state politics that emerged range from the "partisanship" of Pennsylvania's legislative policymaking to the "fragmentation" of that in California. In Florida, the most powerful and respected legislators had first made their names in education. Wisconsin's orientation toward governmental reform affected its legislative policymaking in education. The Mormon Church provided an interesting force in Utah's legislative politics, while New Hampshire's were characterized by a strong tradition of localism, which serves to minimize state intervention. (MSJ)

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Shaping Education Policy in the States

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1981

The Institute for Educational Leadership
Washington, D.C.

EA 014 102

9.50

Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 81-81828

For information address:
Institute for Educational Leadership
1001 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

The research reported herein was performed pursuant to Grant Number NIE-G-79-0176 from the National Institute of Education, U.S. Department of Education, and with additional funding from the Ford Foundation. It is published by the Institute for Educational Leadership. The findings and views expressed in this report are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the positions or policies of the National Institute of Education, the Ford Foundation, or the Institute for Educational Leadership.

Manufactured in the United States of America

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Preface

The decade of the 1970s witnessed a dramatic expansion of legislative power in the policy domain of education. Throughout the nation, state legislatures began to exercise leadership and in many places they became the predominant force on the educational scene.

This volume, *Shaping Education Policy in the States*, and a companion volume, *Legislative Education Leadership in the States*, portray the contemporary role of state legislatures. They are the principal products of the "State Legislative Education Leadership Study," conducted by the Eagleton Institute of Politics at Rutgers University with grants from the National Institute of Education (NIE-G-79-0176) and the Ford Foundation.

Our purpose in this study has been to map the structure of legislative education leadership, both in terms of the characteristics of legislators and staff who exercise influence and the nature of the influence structures in the legislatures of the states. The present volume deals intensively with legislative education leadership in six particular states—Pennsylvania, California, Florida, Wisconsin, Utah, and New Hampshire. The other volume reports on the overall results of our work, which derive largely from surveys of legislators and staff in the fifty states.

One of the editors in this volume is responsible for the New Hampshire study. The other state studies were written by five scholars whose contributions to the planning and execution of the project we acknowledge with appreciation.

Ellis Katz, who wrote the Pennsylvania study, has taught politics and education and law and the judicial process at Temple University since 1962. Presently he is an Associate Professor of Political Science, has a joint appointment in the College of Education, and is a Fellow at the Center for the Study of Federalism. Professor Katz has authored a book on ethnic group politics, a monograph on educational policymaking in the states, and articles on the politics of education and the criminal justice system. As an Associate

of the Institute for Educational Leadership (IEL), he coordinates the Pennsylvania Educational Seminar which brings together leading state-level educational policymakers to discuss issues such as federal-state relations in education and the future of higher education.

The California study was written by Michael Kirst, Professor of Business Administration and Education at Stanford University. Prior to joining the Stanford faculty, he was Staff Director of the United States Senate Special Subcommittee on Manpower and Poverty and worked in the Bureau of the Budget and the U. S. Office of Education. While at Stanford, Professor Kirst served as chief consultant to the Florida Citizen's Commission on Education. He has been Chairman of the California State Board of Education since 1977. He co-authored a basic text on politics and education and has recently been writing on equity in children's services, educational reform, and educational interest groups.

Augustus Turnbull, who chairs the Department of Public Administration and serves as Assistant Vice-President for Public Affairs at Florida State University, authored the Florida study. Professor Turnbull was Assistant Press Secretary to Georgia Governor Carl Sanders for three years and then was a faculty member at the Institute of Government at the University of Georgia before coming to Florida State. In 1975 and 1976, he took a leave from that university to serve as staff director of the Florida House Education Committee where he worked on two major bills, the Basic Skills Act of 1975 and the Educational Accountability Act of 1976. His writing has been primarily in the fields of budgeting and the legislative process.

The Wisconsin study was written by Richard Lehne, who is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Rutgers College, Rutgers University. Professor Lehne teaches courses on politics and education, public finance, and state politics and has authored a major study of the politics of school finance in New Jersey. He also served as Assistant to the Majority Leader of the New Jersey General Assembly from 1976 to 1979, and recently became an Associate of IEL and Coordinator of the New Jersey Educational Seminar.

Roald Campbell, who authored the Utah study, has had a long and distinguished career teaching and writing about educational administration. He has been Dean of the Graduate School of Education and Chairman of the Department of Education at the University of Chicago. He is an Emeritus Professor there and at Ohio State University where he was Fawcett Professor of Educational Administration. His texts on the field have gone into several editions, and he co-authored the most recent large-scale research on state politics and education. Currently an Adjunct Professor at the University of Utah, Professor Campbell is in his third year of service as the Utah Associate of the Institute for Educational Leadership.

The authors join us in gratefully thanking many individuals. Above all, we appreciate the contribution of the forty legislators, twenty-seven staffers, and thirty-five other persons in the six states who graciously permitted themselves to be interviewed for the studies in this volume.

Augustus Turnbull particularly wants to acknowledge the assistance of Ernie Litz, Research Associate at the Policy Sciences Program at Florida State University. Richard Lehne is grateful for the advice of Wisconsonians Robert Lang, Bonnie Reese, Richard Rossmiller, and Dean Bowles. Roald Campbell specially acknowledges the secretarial services of Joyce Gorrell at the University of Utah.

We also wish to acknowledge the people at the Institute for Educational Leadership who have collaborated throughout the project—Samuel Halperin, IEL's Director; Phillip Kearney, who headed The Associates Program; the 38 Associates; and Robert Miller, who is responsible for editing our manuscripts and bringing them to press.

Finally, there are those at the Eagleton Institute who worked on the study. Rod Forth managed the processing of the survey data, devoting considerable skill and time to all of the computer-related tasks. Anine Wagenhoffer and Cindy Schultz typed and proofread draft and manuscript with their customary grace and efficiency. Joanne Pfeiffer also helped out in the crunch.

We appreciate the support of NIE, and of Donald Barnes who heads the Legal and Governmental Studies Team and who served as project officer on the grant, and that of the Ford Foundation, and of James Kelly, a Program Officer in education. Neither NIE nor Ford, Barnes nor Kelly, nor anyone else, however, is responsible for the views and findings that have emerged from our study and which are reported here and elsewhere. The responsibility is ours and that of the authors of the state studies.

Susan Fuhrman
Alan Rosenthal
March, 1981

Chapter 1 Introduction

Susan Fuhrman

State legislatures are asserting themselves in education policy. As institutions, they have been strengthened by the reapportionment and legislative reform movements of the 1960s. In the educational policymaking arena they have little competition from state departments, which often have traditionally deferred to locals, or from interest groups which are increasingly fragmented by teacher militancy and issues like accountability. School finance reform and fiscal stringency have acted to enhance the importance of money issues in education, issues on which legislatures have always had authority. As a result, legislatures have taken on the role of preeminent education policymaker in some states; in many others they are at least coequal partners; and in only a few are they still secondary.

Despite the growing activity, there has been little scholarly attention paid to legislative behavior in education.[1] This book reports on a project—the State Legislative Education Leadership Study—which is aimed at filling some of the gaps in our knowledge. The study's objective was to map the structure of education leadership in the legislatures of the fifty states, to report on who the leaders are, where they are located, where they get information, the functions they perform, and the impact they have.

The most interesting dimensions of legislative education leadership are the state-by-state patterns, the contrasts and comparisons which emerge when the legislators who make educational policy are seen within the policymaking contexts of their individual states. When the State Legislative Education Leadership Study was designed, we knew that questionnaire and telephone surveys of legislator and staff leaders on a national basis would supply only part of the picture. In order to focus explicitly on how leaders function within

their states, we decided to include investigations of leadership in six individual states. This volume contains those studies and may be read as a companion to *Legislative Education Leadership in the States*, which reports mainly on the findings of our mail surveys and telephone interviews.

Our surveys and interviews provided the context for the choice of the six states reported on in this book. Based on informant information, we chose states which would provide not only geographic diversity but also interesting contrasts in patterns of leadership. Thus, we selected Pennsylvania, California, Florida, Wisconsin, Utah, and New Hampshire. The reader will see that each state has its own mode of educational policymaking, distinctive approaches and attitudes which relate to history, political culture, and personality. Much that goes on now is related to a state's past; although the issues change, the fiscal context shifts, and the priorities of individual actors undergo revision, many elements of the process endure.

The States

The states chosen for study are two large ones, Pennsylvania and California; two moderate-sized ones, Florida and Wisconsin; and two small ones, Utah and New Hampshire. The first two have over 10 million residents; the smallest two have under 2 million and Florida and Wisconsin range in between.

The legislatures in these states exhibit a level of development that correlates with size. For example, Pennsylvania and California have large, elaborate staff structures.[1] In both, there are extensive committee staff and year-round staff for most individual legislators. In California the legislature has over 1500 employees including secretaries, administrative assistants, committee consultants, clerks, researchers, sergeants-at-arms and messengers. Florida and Wisconsin have more moderate resources, but they are substantial nonetheless. In those states there are 30 to 40 professionals serving standing committees, with an overall staff that can expand to 400 individuals during the session. New Hampshire and Utah are much less well endowed; individual legislators here have staff only in the session or draw staff from a pool. In New Hampshire, as a matter of fact, not all of the committees have professional staff assistance.

Other indices of legislative development illustrate the same pattern. Utah and New Hampshire are the only two of the six in which senators do not have their own offices. As for House members, only in California and Florida do all of them have offices. Legislators are most professionalized—in that their job is a full-time occupation—in Pennsylvania and California, where legislator compensation exceeds $25,000 per annum. In Florida and Wisconsin legislators earn between $10,000 and $25,000 per year, while those in

Utah and New Hampshire receive only token compensation. In the latter two states, sessions are also relatively short. The legislature meets for approximately 80 days per biennium in Utah, and in New Hampshire legislators can collect expense compensation for a maximum of 90 regular session days. By contrast, California legislators meet for approximately 400 days a biennium.[3]

There are also distinctions between the states in the size and scope of the education sector. Table I shows some selected characteristics of educational finance, demand for educational services, and educational governance in the six states. As the table makes clear, the states make very different efforts in financing education. California picks up the greatest share of state-local costs. Its share increased by almost 40 percentage points after Proposition 13 limited local property taxes. Florida and Utah come next in state percentage of costs for elementary and secondary education. However, while Utah makes the greatest effort relative to personal income, California and Florida make among the least. New Hampshire is a case where there is both low effort and a small state role, the smallest in the nation.

There are also differences in educational demand. The large states, Pennsylvania and California, serve over two million students in public elementary and secondary education. On the other extreme, Utah and New Hampshire educate under half a million pupils each. The contrasts in public higher education enrollments are interesting. Pennsylvania educates fewer students than Florida; it enrolls only a fifth the number of students in California public higher education. The two small states provide public higher education to fewer than 100,000 pupils.

Educational governance arrangements also vary among the states. As the table below shows, three states have appointed state boards of education; Utah has an elected board. In Florida, the state board is composed of the state commissioner of education, the governor, attorney general, secretary of state, commissioner of agriculture, insurance commissioner, state treasurer, and comptroller. In Wisconsin there is no state board for elementary and secondary education. The chief state school officer (CSSO) is elected in California, Florida and Wisconsin; he is appointed in Pennsylvania, Utah, and New Hampshire. The size of the state has little to do with the number of school districts in the state. New Hampshire has many more districts than Florida or Utah. The number of districts often reflects history and custom. For example, in Florida (as well as other southern states), the districts are organized on a county basis and there are relatively few of them.

The number of public postsecondary institutions does relate to size. As is shown in the table, California has the most public postsecondary institutions, 137. Utah, on the other hand, has only 9. The total number of institutions

TABLE 1

Educational Characteristics of the States

Characteristics	Pennsylvania	California	Florida	Wisconsin	Utah	New Hampshire
State and Local Revenues for Schools as a Percent of Total Personal Income**	5.0	4.0	3.9	5.1	6.0	3.6
State Share (percent) of State-Local Revenues for Public Elementary and Secondary Schools**	50	78	62	39	60	10
Total Number of Public School Students (1978–79 estimated)*	2,058,000	4,071,000	1,525,540	886,419	324,568	174,650
Total Enrollments in Public Higher Education* (1978)	280,528	1,467,569	311,071	209,243	55,215	23,099
Selection of State Board of Education*	Appointed by Governor	Appointed by Governor	The Cabinet	No Board	Elected	Appointed by Governor
Selection of Chief State School Officer*	Appointed by Governor	Elected	Elected	Elected	Appointed by State Board	Appointed by State Board
Total Number of Elementary & Secondary School Districts* (1978–79)	505	1,043	67	427	40	168
Number of Public Higher Education Institutions*	61	137	37	30	9	10

* *Book of the States*, 1980–81.

** ACIR, *Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism*, 1980.

does not necessarily indicate the organizational complexity of the postsecondary establishment in these states. For example, Pennsylvania's system is quite complicated. In addition to the state university (Penn State), there are 3 state related universities (Lincoln, Pittsburgh and Temple), 14 state colleges, and the 14 community colleges. In Wisconsin, on the other hand, a 1971 merger created one university system incorporating the old state college system. In the public sector, there are now 13 universities, 14 two-year centers, and a statewide extension service.

The Studies

Each of the six writers reporting in this volume is very familiar with legislative and education politics in his state. Ellis Katz is an Associate Professor of Political Science and Fellow at the Center for the Study of Federalism at Temple University in Philadelphia. As an Associate in the Institute for Educational Leadership's Associates program, he conducts seminars on educational policy issues for leading Pennsylvania policymakers, including state legislators. Michael Kirst is Professor of Education and Business Administration at Stanford University and Chairman of the California State Board of Education. Augustus Turnbull, Chairman of the Public Administration Department at Florida State University, served earlier as staff director of the House Education Committee in Florida. Richard Lehne, Associate Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, is an IEL Associate in New Jersey and has conducted research on school finance in Wisconsin over a number of years. Roald Campbell is a Professor of Educational Administration at the University of Utah and the IEL Associate in Utah. Susan Fuhrman is a Research Associate at the Eagleton Institute of Politics; she also serves as a consultant to the Ford Foundation and in that capacity has monitored grants on school finance in New Hampshire. Four of the six writers live in the states they studied.

The writers conducted their research in the summer of 1980. They held extensive interviews with legislators, staff, lobbyists, state department personnel, gubernatorial staff, and other knowledgeable informants. The interviews were supplemented by documentary materials, reports, and other studies.

The definition of leadership used by the writers is essentially the same as that used for the larger study of which these six cases are a part. Leaders were identified by a telephone survey conducted with three informants in each of the fifty states. The informants included legislative staff directors, Associates of the Institute for Educational Leadership, and others they suggested.[4] Informants were asked to name legislators in the 1979–80 legislature who were leaders in the sense that "they could get something done or keep

something from getting done in the areas both of educational policy and appropriations." They were also asked to name staff who "played an important role in education." The legislators identified in this manner were considered leaders if two out of three informants mentioned them. These leaders and the entire group of staff named were sent mail questionnaires and over 50 were subsequently interviewed by telephone.

Fifty-nine legislative leaders and 35 staffers were named in the six states included here. Only for the Florida case did the method of identifying leaders differ. The writer chose to go beyond current leaders and study leadership over a decade-long period; his method of specifying leaders for that time span is described in Chapter 4.

In order to make the state studies comparative, the writers generally followed a common outline and format. They focused on the following dimensions of legislative education leadership in their states:

- The structure of legislative education leadership, including where leaders are located by chamber, party and position, the concentration of leadership, and the place of staff in the leadership structure.
- The composition of legislative education leadership, including motivations for involvement in education, specialization in and within the field, the continuity of leadership, and the benefits and costs of education leadership.
- The linkages of legislative education leadership, including relationships with state agencies, interest groups, local actors, and organizations outside the state.
- The styles of legislative education leadership, including the methods of exerting leadership, the special skills and talents of leaders, traits which distinguish leaders, and the aggregate style of the legislature in terms of consensual or conflictual approaches to education policymaking.
- The impact of legislative education leadership, including impacts on other education actors as well as on policies and programs.

These dimensions provide the organizational framework for the state studies that follow.

Although these studies focus on current (1979–80) leaders and patterns of leadership, the writers paid particular attention to changes and trends. They were interested in variations in factors—such as leadership structure and composition—over time, and they also examined distinctions related to particular education issues. For example, they considered whether leadership differed by sector, elementary and secondary as opposed to higher education, or whether differences related to the handling of policy matters as opposed to fiscal issues.

The Findings: State by State

The differences in the size and scope of the legislative and educational establishments in the six states would lead us to expect that the dimensions of leadership would vary significantly. Indeed, they do. A summary characterization of legislative educational leadership in each state indicates some major points of contrast.

In Pennsylvania the education leaders all hold a formal position, as party leader or committee chairman. Party leaders have enormous power by virtue of their office; a committee chairman, on the other hand, must work to make the most of his position. Five of eight education leaders here are former school teachers. While there are former teachers among the education leadership in virtually every legislature, this proportion is very large. In addition to background, legislators are attracted to education because of their particular philosophies and because of constituent interest in a greater state educational role. They find that serving as an education leader can have significant benefits, which derive from the visibility of the educational enterprise and the fact that the Pennsylvania State Education Association (PSEA) has enough grassroots strength and money to provide important help with reelection campaigns. Legislator linkages to the State Department of Education are strongly dependent on party. Democrats are critical of the Republican administration, while Republicans are supportive. Similarly, links to interest groups have a partisan coloring with Democrats more closely allied to the PSEA and Republicans to the school boards. Single-interest, categorical groups are not active in Pennsylvania. Legislative leaders exert their influence by virtue of an acknowledged expertise in education. Even more important than the expertise is an ability to "broker," to put together compromises and forge bargains. The attitude of respect for compromise results in an incremental approach to educational policymaking, an approach which values quiescent agreement over new policy initiatives.

California's legislative education leadership is characterized by a very active, state-interventionist style. California is a state that believes in and exercises control; year after year the legislature develops ever more specific programs. Most of the education leaders are located in the Assembly; turnover has decimated Senate leadership. The leaders are strongly linked to the State Department of Education, whose superintendent is a formidable policymaker. Also, the California scene is impacted by a large number of interest groups. The importance of lobbies probably reflects the historical weakness of parties in the state. The large teacher groups and classified state employees are the most powerful lobbies, but there are a profusion of special interest groups. Some are functional, related to categorical programs, and others are geographic. These groups can have substantial impact on individual issues. An

example is the bilingual education controversy which is described in some detail in Chapter 3. Despite the lack of money and staff, the bilingual groups have managed to thwart efforts to repeal California's present program in that area.

The Florida legislature also takes a leadership role in educational policy, but in contrast to other states, legislators exert considerable influence without benefit of a formal leadership position. For example, one education leader, who served in both the House and Senate, never held a top position because his party was always in the minority. But he was the minority expert on education matters and proved to be very effective. Constituency interests, such as a university in the district, seem to be somewhat more important as a motivation for legislator interest in education in Florida than in the other states. But Florida education leaders are also perceived to be experts, because of their substantial legislative tenure and interest in the field. Many past Florida legislative education leaders who have left the legislature have maintained their involvement in education. Florida legislators are linked strongly to groups outside the state as well as to the State Department of Education and the interests. The leaders exert their influence through their expertise and through an ability to master the legislative process. Such political skills as a good sense of timing, an ability to read the audience, and a persuasive speaking style are important qualities of leaders in Florida.

Wisconsin education policymaking reflects the new prominence of the individual legislator in that state. Party caucuses and majority leadership have lost their previously dominant role. The most important actors in education are members of the two education discussion groups of the Joint Finance Committee. In part, this is because the state's budget document involves many decisions about substantive issues. The Finance Committee thus initiates new programs and amends old ones, as well as appropriates dollars. Wisconsin legislators are attracted to education by a variety of factors, among which are the electoral activities of the Wisconsin Education Association and the presence of university units in legislative districts. Relationships between legislators and the Department of Public Instruction are tinged by an anti bureaucratic bias; and the same attitude, although more muted, applies to the administration of the university system. The Wisconsin style of education decision making is to avoid conflicts; this is done by avoiding divisive issues, and sometimes deferring action until the interests reach their own compromise.

Utah legislative education leaders are a small group of men on the standing education committees and on the Executive Committe of the Joint Appropriations Committee. They attain leadership by dint of hard work, interpersonal skills, and long tenure. There is an important division in Utah between

legislators who care about elementary and secondary education and those who care about higher education. They are linked to different groups outside the legislature and even have different orientations toward the legislative role. The legislature is much more assertive in higher education, imposing more controls and exerting more influence. Utah legislative leaders use their expertise to accomplish their goals; many see themselves as "teachers" with respect to the rest of the legislature, in that their role on behalf of legislation is primarily to present information and to convince by dint of knowledge. The admiration for expertise works to diminish conflict over education within the legislature.

Those who are education leaders in the New Hampshire legislature are persons in formal positions of leadership. The size of the legislature is an important factor, because in a 400-member House only committee or party leaders have any visibility. However, even in the 24-member Senate, leaders hold formal positions. Leaders all have some background in education—as school board members, if not as educators. Their background means that they maintain their interest throughout their legislative careers, and there is considerable continuity of leadership. Education committee members might leave education, but only to serve on an appropriations committee. There is some sub-specialization within education and there is a real effort to further that development through the use of subcommittees within the education committees. Links to the State Department of Education and to interests are particularly useful for information purposes, but the most important links seem to be with locals. The fact that there are so many legislators means that each community has a number of representatives who are petitioned with regularity. The respect for local opinion also reflects a strong belief in local control, in education and other policy areas.

The Findings: Across the States

These different approaches to educational decision making—the varying emphasis on the importance of expertise or on relations with the state department—are what stand out when the studies in this volume are reviewed. There are, however, a few important trends which cross states. These trends also emerged in the State Legislative Education Leadership study's national mail and telephone questionnaire data and are explored at length in the companion volume, *Legislative Education Leadership in the States*. While the national data revealed these findings, the state studies portray them in high-relief, furnishing examples and details which the surveys could not provide.

One important trend is the growing significance of money committees in education. The national survey showed that many of the legislators named as education leaders serve as chairman of appropriations, finance, or ways

and means committees.[5] Leaders who serve on both appropriations and education are often considered the most powerful members in education. In every state reported on here the appropriations committees are growing in influence.

In Pennsylvania appropriations is judged to be "the most important single committee within either chamber." It is seen as a gatekeeper, a committee which bottles up legislation for substantive as well as fiscal reasons, working in consort with leadership and the governor to shape legislative programs. The Utah Joint Appropriations Committee is also a gatekeeper, but a unique one. Every member of the legislature serves on it and on one of its subcommittees. The Executive Committee of Joint Appropriations exerts enormous power; that is where all the demands converge and the decisions about relative funding of services are made. The Wisconsin Joint Finance Committee is probably the epitome of the powerful money committee. It attracts the most capable and diligent legislators. As has been noted, the budget is a very inclusive document which incorporates substantive decisions. The committee also sees all bills with any fiscal implications. California resembles Wisconsin in the sense that non-fiscal decisions often find their way into the budget. Much of postsecondary education policy is made in this fashion. Even in Florida, where the most recent major legislation came out of the substantive education committee, and in New Hampshire, where very little state money is distributed to locals, the money committees are growing in importance.

Whether as an issue of adequacy in a time of fiscal restraint or as an issue of equity related to local disparities of wealth, finance is just so important that it can easily overwhelm other education matters.

Another significant development highlighted in the state studies is the growing importance of staff to legislative decision making in education. Staff who responded to the mail survey felt they had considerable impact.[6] In the states discussed in this book, the staff influence is increasing, and in some it has markedly changed the way the legislature operates.

An example of staff influence is Wisconsin. The legislature has a Legislative Council for committee staffing, a Fiscal Bureau to analyze expenditures, a Legislative Audit Bureau to conduct fiscal and programmatic audits, a caucus staff for the leadership, and a fund for individual staff assistance for all senators and some assemblymen. The growth of staff has meant the professionalization of the legislature; individuals now have more resources at their disposal and rely less on centralized decision makers such as party leaders. The excellent Fiscal Bureau staff enhances the power of the Joint Fiscal Committee whose importance was just noted.

The California legislature's aggressive policymaking stance probably reflects the research and program development capabilities in its staff. The

Utah legislature's staff is of a far different magnitude than California's. Though it is nowhere near as large or as extensive, it has still reached a point where legislators are beginning to worry about being overly reliant on staff.

Staffers can play interesting roles which go beyond research, bill drafting, or fiscal analysis. In Pennsylvania the staff is organized on a partisan basis but serves as a bridge between the parties and chambers. Staffers share information, plan joint strategy and generally cooperate, forging links that legislators may be unable to make. Similarly, the legislative staff and State Department of Education personnel continue to do business, despite partisan differences which inhibit legislators from free communication. Providing linkage is one of staff's critical responsibilities in Florida. A committee staffer is expected to make sure all interested parties have input on legislation in the early stages. In New Hampshire the staff also often serves as the tie with national and regional organizations such as the Education Commission of the States. New Hampshire contrasts with the other states; it has very little staff, with one committee staffer in the house serving six committees. The absence of assistance means that legislators become leaders by working very hard, by doing their own homework. They also rely heavily on the State Department of Education and on interest groups for information, more so than in the five other states.

Of all the cross-state currents revealed by this study, the most crucial concerns an impending generational change in legislative education leadership. In *Legislative Education Leadership in the States*, we discuss at length the finding that the present crop of legislative education leaders has had long tenure and is relatively old.[7] When these leaders leave, a new group will be emerging. The studies in this volume give us some clues about what the new leaders will look like.

First, there is the case of the California Senate, a lesson in the declining attractiveness of education as a policy field. In the Senate, there is absence of educational leadership. Most of those who were leaders decided to retire or not run. One important leader was defeated in 1980. Other legislators have not taken their place because education is no longer seen as a politically beneficial area in which to serve. The general public is critical and opposed to more spending.

The same deterrents to involvement in education are seen in Pennsylvania where new legislators do not seem to be interested in education. It is no longer "sexy" like the policy domain of the environment. But the problem is not just that education is losing its holding power; some newer members of the legislature do not want to be committed to any one policy field. They are retreating from specialization—moving from issue to issue—causing staff to wonder if they, staff, will be the only respository of expertise.

In some senses, Wisconsin presents a picture of the future of legislative education leadership. The new, relatively young Wisconsin legislature does not invest much effort on subject-matter specialization. Education leaders do not spend a great deal of time on education; and the institutional memory on policy issue does, in fact, reside with the staff. Decision making is seen to be episodic rather than continuous; topics are pursued for a while, and then dropped.

It may be, as we speculate in the companion volume, that the only legislators attracted to education in the future will be those with particularistic interests, such as professional educators. In states like Florida, where a major turnover in educational leadership is in progress, we will soon find out what the new generation holds in store.

The Patterns

Beyond information about how education leadership operates and beyond insights into trends which cross states, the six cases in this book provide fascinating pictures of different patterns of state politics. These themes are so distinctive that they surfaced very early. The different patterns of policymaking provide intriguing settings for the studies, and we recommend reading the cases with a special eye for context and flavor.

Ellis Katz describes the Pennsylvania legislature as a home for professional politicians. Partisanship is so strong that it determines the organization of staff and colors relationships with the State Department of Education. Committee chairman cannot compete with party leaders in the power granted by position. In Pennsylvania, just as a professional politician is a respected occupation, a professional lobbyist is considered a legitimate participant in policy decisions. The writer summarizes educational policymaking in the legislature as a "screening process" whereby legislators broker and package demands of the interests and screen out extraneous demands from "non-professionals," which often include constituents. The penchant for compromise, as he puts it, enables the legislature to bridge the deep partisan, geographic, and ideological cleavages which could paralyze it were they to come into play on every issue. It also results in incremental policymaking which may or may not suffice in the more contentious, less favorable climate surrounding education in the 1980s.

If "partisanship" is a one-word description of legislative policymaking in Pennsylvania, the counterpart for California is "fragmentation." As Michael Kirst pictures it, the Assembly and Senate of the California Legislature are characterized by very different climates and even different substantive orientations in education. Up until the 1980 elections there were several strong

education leaders in the Assembly. Whereas the Assembly legislative education leadership has thrived, the Senate's leadership is waning as old leaders leave the legislature and new ones fail to appear. The strong speaker's office is a centralizing force in the Assembly, but there is no counterpart to give the Senate a focal point. The Senate seems to favor general aid in education, whereas the Assembly is oriented toward categoricals such as bilingual education. These divisions between the houses are difficult to bridge. Party certainly cannot do it, since it is a weak force in the state. Most of the staff, too, is organized by chamber. The legislative establishment is so large that it is also hard for personal relationships to develop across chambers. The fragmentation has not greatly hindered productivity, however. As noted, California's legislature is prolific in education, substantially adding each year to an education code which is already the longest in the nation.

Florida's educational establishment is called an "Interlocking Directorate" by Augustus Turnbull. As one important legislative leader remarked, "the legislature *is* the establishment." The Governor was formerly a legislative education leader as was the Commissioner of Education. The latter's assistant is a former House education staffer. These relationships place the legislature in a uniquely effective position, although it does not prevail on every issue. (The Governor recently vetoed a major higher education reorganization bill.) Turnbull suggests that, as in other states, education in Florida's legislature is losing its holding power; still, new Florida legislators have positive role models for the choice of education as a policy area. The most powerful and respected legislators have made their names in education, and upon leaving the legislature they found new positions of prominence.

In Wisconsin an orientation toward governmental reform has had important impacts on legislative policymaking in education as in other fields. Richard Lehne indicates that reform has meant a weakening of centralized decision-making mechanisms such as the party caucuses and leadership. Open-meeting laws have reduced the power of these institutions tremendously, while the elevation of the legislator's job to virtual full-time status and the growth in staff resources have enhanced the role of the individual legislator. The newly professionalized job of legislator is attracting ambitious, young people with enough free time to campaign extensively on the local level. Legislators elected in this fashion are not beholden to party leadership. The growth of staff has made each legislator feel more competent and also weakened reliance on the Department of Public Instruction for information.

A very interesting force in Utah legislative politics is the Mormon Church. Most members of the legislature are Mormons; the education leaders have also held leadership positions in the Church. The Church exerts its authority indirectly since legislators are adherents of church positions and naturally

take stances which are in concert with Mormon ideals. In fact, as Roald Campbell points out, the Church has taken a public position on only a few legislative questions, and most legislators did not need that instruction; they would have voted the Church's beliefs without its formal pronouncement. The common Church membership makes the Utah legislature much more homogeneous than most and leads to a very consensual approach to decision making on education.

Finally, New Hampshire legislative education politics are characterized by the strong tradition of localism which translates into a minimal state role in most policy areas. New Hampshire legislators who are education leaders have well-known "pro" or "con" education stands relating to state funding of elementary and secondary education. At the moment New Hampshire is last in state contribution to elementary and secondary finance. Some legislators want to change that; the majority do not. But they all believe strongly in local control, and even those who envision a larger state role think that unless the legislature funds a program it should not mandate local participation. Because of the localism, the legislature turns out few initiatives in education. The State Department of Education resorts to mandating through regulation, realizing the legislature's opposition to mandates without funding. Since the major question of the state role is often avoided or suppressed, much of the education legislation coming through the General Court is of the housekeeping variety and is settled fairly consensually.

At the beginning of this chapter we indicated that the legislative role in education was growing, to a point of preeminence in many states. It should now be apparent that in several of the states under study here, it may have reached its zenith. In Florida the legislature has been the training ground for all important education policymakers in the state. The California legislature has overcome its fragmented style to become "the big school board." The reformed Wisconsin legislature is moving toward a much more active role, exerting influence over areas such as the university system where it tread very carefully in the past. In Pennsylvania the reactive stance of the legislature may change as the current generation of leaders departs. The Utah legislature is increasing its assertiveness, particularly in higher education. In New Hampshire, if innovation comes it is likely to come from the legislature, not from the state education agency which is hampered by a very decentralized method of operation.

The studies to follow, along with *Legislative Education Leadership in the States*, should begin to fill in the gaps in our knowledge about the activity of state legislatures in education. With the growth in their role, information about which individuals in the legislature make education policy, how they

go about it, and what factors influence their behavior becomes ever more important.

Chapter One NOTES

1. Alan Rosenthal and Susan Fuhrman, *Legislative Education Leadership in the States* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Educational Leadership, 1981) pp. 2–3.
2. Alan Rosenthal, *Legislative Life* (New York: Harper and Row, 1981 forthcoming), pp. 206–207.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 39.
4. Alan Rosenthal and Susan Fuhrman, *Legislative Education Leadership in the States* p. 5.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 16–21.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 85.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 36, 37; pp. 101–107.

Chapter 2 Pennsylvania

Ellis Katz

In terms of its politics, Pennsylvania is a traditional state. It is characterized by strong partisanship, well-developed interest groups, and legislators sensitive to the needs and demands of their constituents. With few exceptions, the state's political leaders tend to be professional politicians who interact with professionalized interest group spokesmen to formulate policy on an incremental basis. Reapportionment and political reform have weakened party organization in recent years, but compared with other states, Pennsylvania is still a strong party state.

The strength of party affects policymaking for education just as it affects all policy areas. In education the legislature tends to be reactive, responding to demands from the State Department of Education, the governor, organized interest groups, and local constituencies. Most education issues that come before the legislature are treated as finance issues and most policy decisions are filled with "hold-harmless" considerations, so that no organized interest or constituency loses too much all at once. Legislative decision making is characterized by bargaining, compromise, and log-rolling rather than by ideological appeals, good government crusades, or a legislative desire to exercise greater control over the educational system.

The General Assembly of Pennsylvania has a 203-member House and a 50-member Senate. Even when one party has been in control of both houses, its majority has usually been narrow. In the absence of rigid party discipline, the party in power has always had to accommodate the minority, either by working with the minority leadership or by dealing with selected individual members of the minority.

Both the Senate and the House share the same political traditions of partisanship, professionalism and bargaining; yet there are important differences

between the two chambers. House members are elected for two-year terms from small, and often homogeneous constituencies. Senators, on the other hand, are elected for four years, and it is not uncommon for a senatorial district to include one or two third-class cities, suburbs and rural areas. This difference in constituencies has important consequences for educational policies. For example, when a senator's district includes urban, suburban and rural school districts, he may well be cross-pressured when it comes to voting on a revision of the school subsidy formula. On the other hand, there are House districts in which a state college campus is an important political force, and the representative may play the role of advocate of a particular higher education interest.

The tradition of partisanship extends to staffing patterns in the legislature. State senators, *qua* senators, have only clerical and district staff, but as committee chairmen, or as minority chairmen of committees, they control committee staffing. Such staff in the Senate not only serve the needs of the committee, but often do a senator's constituency and political work as well. In the House, Democratic and Republican Staff are separately constituted and organized. Democratic staff work directly for the committees. The House Republican staff, however, is centrally organized, with individual staff being assigned to committees by the leadership.

Another factor which strongly influences Pennsylvania's legislative education politics is a deep seated urban-rural division. In fact, within the education committees themselves, deliberation is said to be reasonably bipartisan; Republicans and Democrats work closely together. The rural-big city split is often more salient. Sometimes issues get defined simply as Philadelphia versus the rest of the state.

Currently, Philadelphia elects 9 senators and 34 representatives, 18 percent of the membership of the Senate and almost 17 percent of the House. Because of its numerical importance, especially within the Democratic party, Philadelphia legislators often occupy important positions within the legislature, most notably the chairmanships of the Senate and House appropriations committees. Furthermore, when combined with the Pittsburgh delegation, which is also predominantly Democratic, the urban legislators represent the most important single bloc within the legislature. However, the recent weakening of the Philadelphia Democratic organization, coupled with the indictment and imprisonment of several of Philadelphia's most important legislators, have lessened the influence of the city considerably.

A final, important element in the legislative education policymaking scene is the interest group configuration. The Pennsylvania State Education Association (PSEA) is clearly the most powerful single interest group in education. It represents mostly suburban and rural teachers while the Pennsylvania Federation of Teachers (PFT) is the bargaining agent in Philadelphia, Pittsburgh,

and many of the larger cities. The school boards are organized into the Pennsylvania School Boards Association (PSBA), an important group especially among the Republicans. School administrators, organized into the Pennsylvania Association of School Administrators (PASA), are not perceived as politically active, except on issues that touch directly upon their employment.

More specialized interest groups, such as the Pennsylvania Association of Retarded Citizens (PARC), are not known for their effective lobbying. However, many legislators recognize their ability to win major victories through litigation. Both Philadelphia and Pittsburgh have their own school lobbyists and they exercise influence on the urban legislators.

The dominant higher education voice in Harrisburg is the Pennsylvania Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU). However, the various components of higher education have their own organizations, the larger colleges and universities hire legislative lobbyists, and the presidents of most of the state colleges are politically active in the legislature. In fact, in operation the higher education system is more like a non-system. Policy is made on the local campuses—the state university (Penn State), the three state-related universities (Lincoln, Pittsburgh and Temple), the fourteen state colleges, and the fourteen community colleges—rather than in the legislature or in the office of the Commissioner for Higher Education.

While Pennsylvania exhibits a strong respect for local control in education, almost in spite of itself the state is being forced into a greater role in public education. The forces that are at work in many states—property tax overburden, declining enrollments, and fiscal restraint—operate also in Pennsylvania. The challenge for Pennsylvania is whether the traditional politics of party, constituency, and group can resolve the educational issues of the 1980s as they emerge in the state arena.

The Structure of Education Leadership

Leadership within the Pennsylvania legislature is, at the same time, both everywhere and nowhere. It is everywhere in the sense that one can find well-developed leadership structures—majority and minority elected party leadership, party caucuses, policy committes, committee chairmen, and informal influence networks. But, at the same time, leadership is nowhere because none of these leadership structures can bend the legislature to its will.

Leadership in the area of education is a function of interest, style, and position. According to informants, legislative interest in education is not high. Relatively few individual legislators were identified as having a continuing and sustained interest in educational issues. All of those who were

identified as legislative education leaders in this study also held a position—as a party leader or committee chairman—which gave them a podium from which to exert their influence. They were about evenly divided between the House and Senate and between the Democratic and Republican parties.

Party leadership is very important in Pennsylvania. The presiding officers and majority and minority leaders of each chamber are the most influential members of the legislature. This leadership controls committee assignments, assigns office space, controls patronage, and can perform a host of other services important to individual legislators. In addition, the leadership of the governor's party carries his program to the legislature and often serves as a link between individual legislators and the powerful executive branch. Leadership is also said to dominate the party caucuses, although the power of those bodies in terms of their ability to discipline voting has severely diminished.

Committee chairmen are chosen by a leadership-dominated committee on committees. Seniority is an important factor, although certainly not the only one. Usually, committee chairmen continue to hold their positions from one legislative session to the next so long as their party remains in power, so long as they want their position, and so long as they are able to gain reelection to the legislature.

Each committee has both a majority and a minority chairman, reflecting the basic partisan structure of the Pennsylvania legislature, and each has both a majority and minority staff. Individual committee assignments are made by the party leadership. While a committee chairman might express a desire to have a particular legislator on his committee (or more likely to keep an individual legislator off), the final word rests with the leadership. For example, a few years ago, the House leadership was able to force a legislator onto the education committee despite the strong opposition of the chairman.

The chairmanship of a committee provides an opportunity for leadership within the legislature, but certainly does not guarantee power. The power of a committee chairman is more likely to be a function of his individual skills, his interest in the policy area, his legislative style, his ability to get along with the leadership, his policy area expertise, and his ability to bargain successfully. But in no case can the power of a committee chairman approach that of the elected party leadership.

Special attention must be given to the appropriations committee, clearly the most important single committee within either chamber. According to the formal legislative rules, the role of the appropriations committee is to supply a "fiscal note" to proposed legislation, informing the membership of the likely cost of the proposal. But according to several legislators, the appropriations committee acts like a "super committee," bottling up legislative

proposals for both substantive and fiscal reasons. Furthermore, the committee appears to work closely with the leadership and the governor in refusing to report out legislation.

Although the leadership and the appropriations committee can block education legislation, the responsibility for initiating education legislation—for setting the education agenda for the legislature—rests with the education committees. Power within the committes is, by and large, in the hands of the chairman to exercise or dole out. In the Senate, the current education chairman has occupied that position since her election to the Senate over ten years ago. In the House, where the Republicans just recently gained control, the style of the chairman has been to leave substantial discretion to the chairmen of the two subcommittees on basic and higher education. The minority (Democratic) chairman of the committee has been a member or chairman of the House Education Committee for over twenty years.

While the structure of the two committees follows the partisan tradition, partisanship actually plays little role in their behavior. There has been substantial continuity in the memberships of both the Senate and House education committees and both sides of the aisle have learned to work with each other, leaving the most divisive aspects of partisanship aside.

This is not to suggest that relationships on the committees are always harmonious; both committees have strong urban-rural and ideological divisions. In addition, not all members of the committees share the same overall interest in education. For example, one committee member is from a district which contains a major branch of the state university. While generally conservative on most issues, he is reported to be a "big spender" when it comes to the interests of his constituency. Other members of the committees represent constituencies with large Catholic populations and are advocates of aid to nonpublic schools.

Individual legislators, or blocs of legislators, can also exert influence on particular education matters, quite apart from the education committees. For example, during the recent recodification of the school code, the House approved several amendments offered from the floor despite the fact that they had been rejected by the House Education Committee. Also, because of the closeness of the party division (in the 1979-80 House, the margin was two—102 Republicans to 100 Democrats), legislative majorities are by no means guaranteed to the party in power. Thus, the leadership must constantly struggle to prevent even small defections from the faithful and seek to convert the most wavering from the opposition. As a result, the leadership has sometimes been forced to make large concessions to individual legislators in order to gain their vote to ensure the passage of important legislation.

In the Senate, both the majority and minority chairmen control staffing

budgets. In both cases, staff time is divided between committee work and other work for their respective chairman. Although the vast majority of staff time appears to be spent on education matters, one Senate staffer indicated that the division of responsibilities depends a great deal on the individual Senate employer:

> The functions that staff provide for senators varies. . . . I do a lot of speech writing and that sort of stuff as well as a lot of committee work. There are other people who have their staff do solely constituent work, almost to the neglect of committee work.

Staffing the House Education Committee is somewhat more complicated. The staff is headed by an executive director, hired nine years ago when the Democrats controlled the House. Despite the recent change in party control, he continues in his position and, in many ways, is an "education leader" in his own right. The Democrats, now in the minority, control two additional staff positions. The Republican staff is part of a central pool assigned to the education committee. Currently, two staff members are assigned to the House Education Committee, one who specializes in basic education and one in higher education, which reflects the subcommittee structure. However, like the committee membership itself, despite its partisan structure, the staff has avoided the most divisive aspects of party. Members share information, plan joint strategy, and generally cooperate with each other. It is also important to note that both Republican and Democratic legislators on the committee feel free to go to the staff executive director for information and advice.

Finally, whatever the Senate-House or Republican-Democratic differences might be, all legislators admit being heavily dependent upon their staffs. One House member put it quite candidly:

> There is no way I can be an expert on everything and still chase down people's unemployment insurance claims. So I've got to rely on them to be knowledgeable and expert and to advise me. . . .

The structure of education leadership in Pennsylvania reflects the general structure of legislative policymaking in many senses. The structure of the committees and the staffing pattern is intensely partisan and the power of the committees is severely constrained by the party leadership and by the critical position of the appropriations committee. However, unlike most other policy areas, in education legislators and staffers are able to mute the partisan structural divisions. Other cleavages based on constituency, geography or ideology are often more salient within the education committees.

The Composition of Education Leadership

Education leaders in the Pennsylvania legislature are characterized by long service in the legislature and backgrounds which predispose them to an interest in education as a policy area.

Overall, education leaders average over 10 years of service in their respective chambers. Legislators in general have much shorter tenure. Most of the leaders entered the legislature during a time of educational growth and, consequently, established their reputations as proponents of more state funding, supporters of innovative programs, and advocates for the cause of education generally.

A surprising number of the leaders came directly from education to the legislature. Over half of them were public school teachers and have been involved in educational policymaking since their first terms in the legislature. None of them represents a purely urban constituency. Rather, their districts can best be characterized as suburban, which is not surprising since education tends to be a salient issue in suburban areas.

The leaders' desire to specialize in education as a policy area seems to flow from several factors, relating to ideology, background, and constituency. One legislator, for example, moved to her current district with two young children. Unhappy with the existing school system, she was urged by the League of Women Voters to run for the local school board, but chose instead to run for the state legislature. Elected to the House on her first attempt, she became chairman of the education committee two years later and, when she moved to the Senate, immediately became chairman of the education committee there. Her legislative interest in education stemmed from her particular policy persuasion, her belief in the need for legislatively initiated change.

Other leaders came to the legislature with education backgrounds. One had been a public school teacher for [illegible] a member of the school board of a neighboring township before running for the House. A third leader was a faculty member and dean of women at a state college and another had been past president of the Pennsylvania State Education Association.

A different pattern is exhibited by leaders who were originally attracted to education because of constituency interests. One representative named as a leader had no special background in education, but was originally elected to the House from an urban-suburban district in which school enrollments were growing rapidly. One of his goals was an increase in state funding for education.

While initial attraction to education is a result of a variety of factors, there are clear political benefits for continued involvement. The most obvious advantage is the potential for PSEA support for reelection or for election to

higher office. One senator put it quite candidly, stating that PSEA has "grass roots organization and money." Others pointed to the fact that "teachers are becoming more politically active," and that through service on the education committee "you can build up those political chits that are so important for reelection."

No respondent mentioned any other education group that is expected to be especially helpful at election time. However, many mentioned other benefits from serving on the education committee, beyond the possibility of PSEA support. One respondent referred to the size of the education budget, "anytime you allocate $1.6 billion then you're in a position to gain some benefit from it."

Another respondent stressed that involvement in education provides a lot of exposure and visibility:

> I know that there are a lot of people interested. The whole state provides education, and there are colleges across the state and there are alumni. There are parents organizations and public schools. [All of these] provide you with a lot of opportunities for speaking, a lot of time for talking with people. This political gain is not just in terms of the money and support that you can get from the teachers and those in the actual community. There are a lot of opportunities to be out in public and there's political gain from that.

However, leaders also feel that the very magnitude of the education budget is also somewhat of a liability. One representative commented that service on the education committee had "the least political benefit," because "the biggest controversial item in every local community is the education dollar" and "you get accused of raising their taxes" or of "being tied in with PSEA." Similarly, one senator commented that "they see their local taxes rise and they blame me."

There is very little specialization within education in Pennsylvania. Members of the education committees tend to assume general responsibility for all of education, and perhaps exhibit special interest only when their constituency is directly affected. The one exception to this "no specialization" norm is the division of the House Education Committee into subcommittees on basic and higher education. The chairmen of these two subcommittees are legislative specialists in their respective policy areas. However, this theme should not be carried too far. While the members of the House Education Committee are assigned to one of the two subcommittees, all committee members are full voting members of both subcommittees. Indeed, the chairmen of the subcommittees are hard pressed to identify the official memberships of their respective subcommittees.

Current leaders do not see new education leaders arising in their respective

chambers. On the one hand, several of the current ones are about to leave the legislature. For example, in 1980 one senator ran for the United States Congress and another for statewide office, and a third is considering retirement. On the other hand, younger legislators are less likely to specialize in education. Education is not considered as "sexy" as it used to be.

Many legislators lack the traditional faith in education, and while they seem to recognize the need for "more state dollars," the state role is conceptualized as one of relieving the local tax burden rather than of promoting educational growth. One legislator commented that:

> The younger members coming in are much more independent, less willing to toe a party line, much more conservative in terms of spending money, and coming from a generation that's somewhat jaded about education.

As education is losing its holding power, other issues are seen as "hot" topics:

> I think that there's less interest in education as new issues arise—the environment, the economy, etc.—and as the public changes its interest, we have developed "one issue publics." Now, people are elected either on abortion or anti-abortion. . . .

Even more ominous are intimations that the problem extends beyond the attractiveness of education as a field to the changing nature of legislators themselves. The newer crop of legislators in Pennsylvania is characterized by some observers as peripatetic—devoid of commitment to any particular interest. "They go from one issue to another depending on shifts in public mood rather than becoming subject matter specialists." One legislator described his younger colleague as epitomizing this trend:

> _____ just jumps on everything. He must read newspapers from all over the state and see what any editor or group is advocating and all of a sudden he has a bill in for it. . . . I don't think he knows his right hand from his left hand about anything.

If this trend continues, worried a staffer, "we will end up with a situation where the people with the most seniority and comprehensive grasp of an issue are going to be the staff members."

Linkages in Education Policymaking

Pennsylvania legislative education leaders interact with many individuals and groups at the state and local levels. Their ties to out-of-state organizations are more restricted.

Legislative interaction with the State Department of Education appears to be colored by the partisanship that affects so much of Pennsylvania policy-making. For example, one Democratic legislator complained about the Republican administration:

> They don't seem to recognize that there is a legislature and want to do things unilaterally. There seems to be more partisanship from the front office.

Another Democrat feels that the department restricts the access of Democratic legislators. It forces them to deal with one or two offices rather than welcoming contact with all departmental divisions. On the other hand, a Republican legislator remarked, "The relationship with the department is excellent . . . just what it should be." This respondent said that his relations with the Secretary of Education were cordial and open. "I like to be in on some of the plans he has for the department and I'd extend him the same courtesy," is the way he put it.

Clearly, the State Department of Education is identified as part of the administration. This contrasts to many other states where the department is a non-partisan, stable presence, and opinions about it are not colored by the legislative-gubernatorial party split.

A Democrat indicated that the department's responsiveness depends on the political winds:

> I used to be able to call the department and say, "I need a printout on such-and-such. Can I have it?" No problem. They've still got good people over there. But now I'm not so sure. Formerly, I could, say, solicit positions on pieces of legislation. After I got the department's position, I would solicit the working papers that circulated within the department. . . . I wanted to know what the guys in the bureaus were saying. Now, I can't get them.

Other legislators feel that relationships with the department are not so much a function of partisanship, but merely a reflection of the traditional separation of powers. One recalled remarking to a high department official after a hot difference of opinion:

> Of course, we're at each other on this; that's why God created the Constitution. There's a built-in tension that's designed to be there. We fuss together because we're "supposed" to, because the structures are built that way.

Whatever the causes of the relationship, interactions between legislators and the State Department of Education are characterized by both cooperation and conflict. Legislators speak of sitting down with the secretary and planning

strategies, but they balk at any departmental infringement on their prerogatives. For example, legislators do not clear their agenda with the secretary:

> I would never go over and say to [the secretary] that I'm going to introduce a bill. I would never ask his permission to run something in the committee.

And even the legislator who characterized relationships with the department as "excellent," noted that it would be inappropriate to ask the department's "permission" to do something. The respondent commented:

> I would discuss it with the department and if the department was going to oppose it, I'd say, "well that's just fine." . . . It wouldn't deter me.

The diverse interpretations of legislative linkages with the State Department of Education can, perhaps, be explained by recent executive developments. Prior to the 1970s, the state's affairs in education were conducted by a very decentralized State Department of Public Instruction with close ties to the education community and to individual legislators. But a 1970 constitutional amendment created the State Department of Education, headed by a cabinet-level Secretary of Education.

The first secretary was a close associate of the Chairman of the Senate Education Committee and the two worked very closely together. The present secretary, however, serves a Republican governor and has made attempts to centralize the department and to integrate education into the executive branch. Consequently, it is likely that legislative-state department relations are in a state of transition that will probably continue to be characterized by some conflict.

Finally, although legislator-department linkages change and depend strongly on political factors, relations between the staffs seem to continue pretty much as always. Staff perceptions of the department's cordiality depend to an extent on the feelings of their legislative employers, but staffers have made their own contacts within the department and maintain their working relationships despite shifts in power and persuasion.

The Democratic suspicion of the current State Department of Education has influenced the interaction of legislators and staff with interest groups. Some Democrats have begun to turn to interest groups—especially the PSEA—for information that they may have normally requested and received from the department.

In Pennsylvania, as in many states, the advent of collective bargaining has split the old state education coalition. While the Pennsylvania State Education Association that emerged from this split is clearly committed to collective

bargaining and to the economic well-being of its members, it retains something of its claim to being the principal spokesman for education on the state level. Part of this continuing role is due to the recalcitrance of the Pennsylvania School Boards Association. According to one Republican legislator, PSBA is very uncompromisingly conservative and out of touch with its own membership. Furthermore, according to one Democratic respondent, Democratic members are unlikely to have close relations with PSBA, because the association's assumption "is that certain people, particularly Democrats, are in PSEA's captivity and they can't deal with you." What emerges, in a very rough sense, is a Republican-oriented school boards association linked to the more conservative Republican legislators and a state teachers association, while relatively bipartisan, more closely linked to Democratic members of the education committees.

But PSEA's central role is based on more than its loose alliance with the Democrats. The teachers group also is respected for superior expertise in educational matters. For example, one Republican legislator commented that:

> PSEA is very helpful, they're on top of things. When we changed the school subsidy formula, they were the leaders. I mean, they had mathematicians and statisticians in our meeting with calculators and they were blowing the department right off the map.

And in describing the PSEA role in education policymaking one Democratic legislator said:

> On an issue like subsidy, I would talk to PSEA, talk to AFT, talk to the department, talk to Philadelphia certainly; there's a whole range of people I'd talk to. But I would turn to PSEA more in a sense because PSEA has a sophisticated computer system—They're reliable and fast.

While acknowledging the special status of PSEA, leaders recognize the need to involve a multitude of interest groups in all phases of legislative policymaking. One respondent, commenting on the recent House revision of the school code, pointed out that it is important to involve and maintain on your side all the relevant parties. According to him:

> It just affects too many interests and too many people and too many livelihoods. There's no way we can do it without just moving it forward inch-by-inch and having everybody there as you go along.

As important as the PSEA is, he continued:

> In terms of trying to get together the coalition that would operate in respect

> to the subsidy bill, you can't talk to those [PSEA] folks alone. They're a piece of the package, an important piece, but a piece.

The practice of interest group involvement in the legislative process is ingrained deeply in the Pennsylvania tradition. In part it results from a sense of professionals interacting with each other. One senior legislative staffer said that relations developed from working together over an extended period of time, and for long and strenuous hours.

But even more importantly, the legislature, according to most respondents, is "a reactive body," formulating policy to deal with specific situations that are brought before it by the affected interests. One observer captured this orientation when he described the legislature's attitude towards the education community as, "Tell us what you want and let's see if we can accommodate you."

This applies to the few organized groups that are active in the state arena. For example, school administrators, because they are not politically active, rarely interact with legislators. As one leader said, ". . . the only superintendents I have to deal with on a regular basis are Philadelphia, then Pittsburgh."

Similarly, higher education is active in Pennsylvania politics only through the Pennsylvania Association of Colleges and Universities. The crucial role of PACU was attested to by a leader who commented that, although he sometimes dealt with the college presidents, "on a day-to-day doing-business basis, I rely on _____ of PACU for the backing and forwarding on particular issues." Another legislator commented along the same lines: "Generally, with the exception of those schools that actually receive direct institutional support from the state, their interests are expressed by PACU."

Finally, it is interesting that Pennsylvania does not exhibit the nation-wide propensity toward the proliferation of special interest groups. Pennsylvania education politics are limited to the participation of the traditional groups—the state education association, the school boards, the largest urban district, and the teachers unions. In higher education, while there is some interaction with individual colleges (especially with those legislators whose districts contain the colleges), most business is conducted with the statewide association of colleges. No leaders mentioned any non-education groups—such as the League of Women Voters or the Chamber of Commerce—as being active in the development of education policy.

It is not surprising that Pennsylvania legislators tend to be advocates of their constituency interests. Nor is it surprising that Pennsylvania legislators keep in close contact with their constituents, maintaining district offices and speaking to local groups whenever possible. Legislative education leaders are

no exception. In fact, when legislators discuss the special interests of their colleagues, they often refer to constituency as the root of these particular concerns. They are described in the following terms:

> _____ tends to get interested in parochial school aid: _____ speaks for the state colleges; and you know how _____ is going to go on labor-management issues. But that's a function of their constituencies. . . .

> _____ has some interest in special education issues and seems to be bringing a number of bills in . . . but that's because there's a strong interest in his district about it.

> There's one senator in particular who's interested in higher education, but that's because his district contains two state colleges.

Many of the groups which press their claims as constituents are not active lobbyists in education policy on the state level. Groups such as the local chambers of commerce, parochial schools, and parents (especially those of special education students) are included in this category. Interestingly, no respondent mentioned school administrators or school board members as being politically active on the local level; and one House member commented that "to hear from a principal or superintendent is almost unheard of." At the same time, the presidents of the state colleges appear to maintain close contact with their legislative representatives. In fact, there are several legislators who are, or who have been, on the faculties of state colleges or on their boards of trustees.

A final set of linkages are with groups outside the state. Pennsylvania legislators and legislative staff tend to see their problems as unique. Consequently, with few exceptions, the state's education leaders are not closely linked to their colleagues in other states through such organizations as the Education Commission of the States (ECS), the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), or the Institute for Educational Leadership (IEL). One respondent characterized the legislature as having:

> . . . a real tendency to be parochial. I think that perhaps in education, we extend ourselves a bit further than most people do but, by and large, there seems to be a tendency to go to the major lobbying groups and to the department to get information.

Currently, four of the legislature's education leaders are ECS Commissioners. Generally, they have high praise for the work of the organization. For example, a Democratic senator commented that ECS has real clout in Congress and has good data. And a Republican House member observed:

"We've been using ECS a good deal and we have no fear about getting on the phone and talking to their legal department." However, Pennsylvania's involvement with ECS is relatively recent. One respondent recalled that when he was first appointed an ECS Commissioner, he knew nothing about the organization. In fact he and another commissioner did not know of their appointment for the first two years of its duration. Most recently, a decision was made to include education committee staffers in ECS meetings. Whether or not this will substantially affect Pennsylvania's parochialism remains to be seen.

No other national organization was perceived by leaders to be especially helpful in education affairs. In fact, in commenting on other organizations, one respondent observed, "they're nice to go to occasionally, but they're not significant in anything we deal with day-to-day." Thus, neither legislators nor staff appear to be very closely linked to national organizations; instead, legislators and staff continue to rely on the State Department of Education and the major interest groups for information.

Styles of Leadership in Education Policymaking

The image of Pennsylvania educational politics that emerges thus far is one of partisanship and constituency-based conflict, tempered by a continuity of leadership and a tradition of cooperation that mitigate the most divisive aspects of the system. It is appropriate now to begin to explore the process of legislative leadership in education as it operates in this atmosphere. In other words, how do leaders lead?

As might be predicted, the most dominant characteristic of Pennsylvania's education leaders is their ability to successfully broker the party and constituency differences that exist in the legislature. As one respondent put it:

> If you're not willing to broker, then you're going to be unsuccessful. Brokering is at the heart of Pennsylvania politics. Especially with the partisan division, you have to come to compromises.

Almost all the identified education leaders are acknowledged experts at forging bargains and compromises. Many of these agreements get worked out in informal networks of legislators which have a variety of bases.

There are networks of those who room together, dinner networks, commuting networks and drinking networks as well as ties based on joint committee service or office proximity. For example, the Senate Education Chairman served in the House first. She made many contacts and friends there and still draws on them. Two pairs of education leaders are from adjacent districts and have worked effectively on local matters over the years.

Another channel through which brokering takes place is the executive director of the House Education Committee, who links Republicans and Democrats. Although he is a Democrat, Republican members of the committee and Republican staffers evidently feel free to "do business" with him. Similarly, a senior Democratic representative and past chairman of the House Education Committee serves as a link between Republicans and Democrats because of his long tenure and involvement in education affairs.

The ante for being able to broker, for playing the political game, appears to be some claim of expertise. All of the eight legislators identified as education leaders have some claim to expertise in education because of long tenure or backgrounds in education. This is not to suggest that the education leaders are in fact experts. As one staffer put it:

> I think the expert's function is pretty much on the staff level. . . . There are not many legislators who are going to go to American Education Finance Association meetings; there aren't many who are going to read the professional journals; there just aren't enough hours in the day for that sort of thing.

Even the legislators themselves acknowledge they are merely perceived as having expertise. For example, one House member said, "I think I would be looked upon by my colleagues as having expertise . . . grass roots experience." Or, as one legislator put it in describing one of his colleagues, "_____ has developed a reputation for being at least somewhat of an expert." Real or not, this perceived expertise is important. According to one House member:

> If _____ gets up and says something on an education bill, people will vote with him. And if _____ gets up and speaks on an education bill, people will listen.

One legislator recognized the potential authority of this perceived expertise and used it to his advantage in committee and subcommittee meetings. He recalled: "One of the things I'll say is this is the way it works; or, damn it, you haven't been in the classroom."

While skill at forging bargains and the aura of substance are the prime ingredients of successful operation, legislators sometimes feel the need to invoke broader support in behalf of some policies. At times it is important, and more so for some legislators than others, to "play to a certain constituency," to take policy positions in behalf of certain sectors. This advocacy works best when it is the legislator's own constituency on whose behalf an appeal is launched. As one legislator commented:

> I don't forget the kind of people I'm representing. The kind of people who

> are really paying the bills, the kind of people who are working class, who understand the work ethic, who work hard most of their lives and are now finding it very difficult to make ends meet.

While it is accepted to be a spokesman for one's constituency, it is not expedient to be perceived as an advocate for organized interests. One senator said she was "for PSEA" only as long as they were "right on the issues." Another legislator said that being "for education" does not mean always supporting PSEA.

Despite the partisanship of the Pennsylvania legislature and the salience of other cleavages in state politics, education issues arouse little controversy in the legislature. They float rather smoothly through, because the general political leadership of the state has little interest in education except as it impacts on fiscal considerations. Education issues are compromised out between the professional interests who press claims on the legislature and the education committees which screen these external demands.

The role of professional interest groups in the forging of education policy is exemplified in two issues currently before the legislature: the attempt to recodify the school code and the proposal to create a statewide governing board for the fourteen state colleges. Recodification makes the law more intelligible to school solicitors. But to the extent that it involves decisions about what to mandate explicitly and what to leave out, it is an important issue for lobbyists. Much of the compromising takes place outside of the legislature. And on the bill to create a statewide board for the state colleges:

> The legislature, in general, couldn't care less. If the education community comes in and says, "We think we could function more efficiently," or "We would function in a way that would make our teaching better," or "make our research capacity better" . . . and "here's what we would like you to do," the legislature, in general, will say, "Fine, tell us what you want and let's see if we can accommodate you."

The rather subdued give-and-take between the interests and the education committees is interrupted only by pressures from "the folks back home," which are often viewed as disruptive forces. In a sense the legislature is an appeals board; locals who are not satisfied with district-level solutions press their claims on the legislature. As one respondent said:

> We have so many people involved throughout the state. . . . That's where the action is and that's where the ordinary legislator gets his feedback from—from teachers and parents. Teachers have a problem with the labor laws, or kids aren't getting bused that should be bused. And all of these problems in local districts find themselves in bills heading toward the [legislature].

In other words, when someone fails to get what he wants in his school district, he goes to the legislature for action.

To a great extent, the role of the legislature is to differentiate between the demands of the professional interests and the demands generated out of constituency politics. The education committee handles this task with as little disruption as possible, hoping to block at the pass any extraneous or extreme initiatives. Very controversial legislation is avoided or killed in committee, unless it's something the education interests feel strongly about. Usually the education committee functions to screen out the constituency demands which do not mesh with the position of the professional interests and to quietly broker the group demands into a politically feasible solution.

One respondent described this screening function quite candidly:

> We [the education committee] try not to make our guys vote on prayer bills or on bills requiring the teaching of the evils of communism. But, God forbid, you should get somebody in charge who decided that you ought to vote regularly on these weighty matters.

Another respondent described how the education committee screened out competency testing: "The legislature, from time to time, has adopted amendments on the floor of the House, but we beat them back this time because of the legal questions raised in Florida . . . so we beat them back and scared the members away."

The Pennsylvania legislature's approach to educational policy stresses compromise, bargaining, and brokering. It reflects the traditional Pennsylvania politics of local interests and professionalized interest groups. The penchant for compromise is the legislature's solution to the deep partisan, geographical and ideological cleavages which could paralyze the legislature were they allowed to surface on every issue.

The Impact of Legislative Education Leadership

The Pennsylvania legislature's role in education is essentially incremental. As one respondent commented: ". . . legislative policymaking, insofar as it exists at all, is a matter of accretion . . . over a long period of time."

The incremental approach relates to the brokering, compromising style of the legislature. Its role is a reactive one. The legislative education task is to work out the demands of various interests, not to make radical changes on its own initiative. The reactive posture permits the legislature to keep potential conflicts quiescent and enables it to function, albeit slowly. If the legislature did conceive of itself as innovative or entrepreneurial, the schisms in Pennsylvania's political make-up might erupt and prevent any action.

While the legislature's generally reactive orientation and the dual functions of appeals boards and screening process seem to apply equally to both basic and higher education, there are important differences in terms of how the legislature relates to each. One respondent suggested that the legislature's "narrow and restricted" role in higher education served important purposes:

> We don't go into much detail in higher education because we feel that there should not be that much control from the legislature. Many people, I think, are conscious of academic freedom and do not want to be accused of interfering with that on the postsecondary level.

In any case, the constitutional mandate for higher education is vaguer than that for elementary and secondary schools. For whatever reasons, the legislature's role in higher education has been essentially limited to fiscal matters. In the words of one respondent, "the role of the legislature traditionally has been to turn the crank and let the machine run by itself."

It remains to be seen whether this laissez-faire attitude toward higher education will continue. The legislature's role in higher education is likely to increase because of the coming fiscal crunch. Caught between declining enrollments and rising costs, the universities and colleges will seek more state assistance. Many legislators feel that the state has not yet adequately addressed the governance and financing of higher education.

While the future role of the legislature in higher education might be problematic, the consensus among the respondents is that its role in basic education is expanding. This increasing role in education may simply be a part of generally growing state activism. More people are pressing their claims at the state level these days. As a result, according to one legislator "by acceeding to new pressures, we are imposing new programs and new obligations on the department and on the local school districts."

Increased legislative involvement may reflect the legislature's frustration with a rapidly growing educational bureaucracy. The legislature may be trying to "catch up with the executive branch . . . capture back some of the power." As a legislator observed:

> The legislature is very willing to stick it to the department. Even _____'s attempt to get rid of the State Board of Education was a shot at the department. A misplaced one, I think, but it was one. Increasingly, we're seeing a demand by the legislature for control over regulations.

Indeed, there are current attempts in the legislature to guarantee greater legislative control over regulations issued by executive agencies. While not aimed specifically at education, if enacted the proposal would give the legislature a veto over the department's proposed regulations. But at least one

education leader was not sanguine about this apppoach. He observed:

> It's easy for us to say we want to review the regulations, but nobody has the time to do it. One guy, _____, is great in this area. He will go charging off and take twenty-three of the twenty-four hours necessary to do that, but he'll be the only one.

According to one legislator, there is danger in this revitalized legislative interest in education. He expressed fear that the legislature would depart from its traditional screening function and enact legislation that the legislature is really not very serious about, but yet create new obligations on the State Department and the local districts. He expressed the opinion that:

> We'll accede to the demands of the pressure groups, put it in and make the symbolic gesture. But there's confusion about what should be symbolic and what should be real. It's different if we require the department to implement a program in patriotism or if we require them to implement a program for the gifted.

Traditionally, the education committee has been able to screen out what it viewed as extraneous demands. With increased pressure on the legislature, coupled with the legislature's perception that the education bureaucracy has gotten out of hand, it is not clear that it will be able to continue to differentiate between the real and the symbolic.

Pennsylvania politics is the politics of the party, interest and constituency. With regard to education, the party leadership appears not very interested in education—except as it might impact upon taxation and government spending—and has left substantive issues to the education committees of the Senate and the House. This committee leadership has worked closely with the highly organized educational interests of the state to formulate policy on an incremental basis, tempered always by the need to satisfy diverse constituency interests. In this context, the role of the legislature's educational leadership has been to react to initiatives from the interest groups and attempt to accommodate them by successfully brokering them through the complex legislative process.

But the changed environment poses additional challenges to the education leadership. Constituencies throughout the state make new demands, as they are affected by inflation, increased taxation, and the spiraling cost of education without noticeably improved educational performance. Their representatives, often new to the legislative process and without the discipline of party, become spokesmen for their constituencies and make more and more demands upon the legislature.

The questions are whether the screening and brokering approach to educational politics will continue to operate in the 1980s and whether such a system will be functional for the society as it attempts to grapple with the educational issues that will arise during the next decade. Although they cannot be addressed here, these questions are worthy of the attention of the political and educational leadership in Pennsylvania.

Chapter 3 California

Michael Kirst

The California legislature has developed as probably the strongest in the nation. It is self-sufficient and independent of executive branch domination. It is well paid and well staffed to the extent that it need not rely on lobbyists or the State Department of Education for research, information, and analysis.

In a 1971 study by the Citizen's Conference on State Legislatures, California's legislature was ranked first in the nation on an overall measure of effectiveness. One of the reasons is the excellent staffing situation. In addition to committee staffs, individual legislators have their own assistants. In California even a freshman assemblyman has office space and professional and clerical assistance comparable to minority leaders in some states. The California legislature is uniquely served by the Legislative Analyst's Office, first established approximately 30 years ago. It functions as an independent research and analytical agency for all legislative proposals that involve the expenditure of monies. There is also a Legislative Auditor General with an evaluation role similar to that of the U.S. General Accounting Office.

California legislators tend to think of themselves as policymakers first and party members second. Since candidates could crossfile until the late 1950s, a number of legislators still serving today at one point sought election as both Democrats and Republicans. Some of them did, in fact, reach the legislature after winning both party primaries. In addition, the lack of party machines at county and municipal levels has contributed to the electorate's relatively low level of awareness or concern for strict party lines. This is not to say that party politics are unimportant. With the abolition of crossfiling, and with the emergence of strong leadership from the speaker of the Assembly who has the authority to appoint committee members, partisan thinking in the legislature has been on the increase. However, the tradition of ticket-splitting

voters and bipartisan legislative issues still exists. Even major issues—like how to finance schools after Proposition 13 limited local tax revenues—are not decided on a straight party-line vote. In a sense, influencing legislative decisions becomes a more difficult process, since capturing the party caucus may or may not produce the desired votes on the floor.

The office of speaker of Assembly is the Legislature's most powerful position with its strength rooted in three interwoven powers:[1]

- Appointment of all members of all committees as well as chairmen. By appointing committees and deciding which bills go to which committees, the speaker can assure the passage, defeat, or amendment of almost any measure.
- Control of flow of legislation through scheduling or burying a bill.
- Ability to raise hundreds of thousands of dollars for campaign funds that are donated to allies. These funds have made a major difference in the campaigns of many legislators.

The speaker sets the philosophy and fiscal limits that orient education policy. He imposes party unity in a state that lacks the electoral tradition of strong parties. The reputation of the strong speaker goes back to 1963 when Jesse Unruh earned his "Big Daddy" label for an overnight lockup of the Assembly when it refused to support a budget he wanted passed.

Speaker Leo McCarthy, who served from 1975 through the 1980 session, is described as a "master of persuasion" rather than a boss. He presided over a Democratic party which had a comfortable majority, but not the two-thirds margin needed for budget approval. McCarthy dismissed the view of an all-powerful speaker as outdated and unrealistic. One of his top aides emphasized that his style of leadership meant "spending hours in discussions with experts in the various fields of law." It did not, according to him, "rely on the whip."

However successful his persuasive skills, at times McCarthy had to resort to the inherent power of his position. For example, when the Assembly Education Committee recently killed a major school bailout bill on McCarthy's instructions, no Democrats voted for it. There is a story that one freshman Democrat was in tears; she had promised constituents that she would support the bill but was ordered not to by the Speaker. The Senate Republican leader said:

> A number of legislators were told that if they didn't vote with the Speaker on a particular piece of legislation there would be no financial support from the Speaker for them at the next election. Or they might lose a choice committee assignment or maybe their office might be moved to the seventh floor of the Capitol.

There are only six floors in the Capitol.

However, the speaker's power is definitely on the wane. In the winter of 1980, there was a revolt by a large block of Democratic assemblymen who wanted to oust McCarthy. Many personal and political motives account for the rebellion, led by Majority Leader Howard Berman, which severely weakened the speaker's authority. In 1981 there will be a new speaker, Willie Brown, who was elected with Republican assistance and despite the majority of Democrats who opposed him.

Viewed in a broader context, the speakership appears to be falling victim to the rapidly changing political attitudes of the public, which are transforming institutions at all levels of government. The most obvious is the kind of sentiment which gave rise to the taxpayer's revolt. A weakened speakership has implications for education policy. In the past, special interest lobbyists have dominated when the speaker was unable to enforce discipline. Since the speakership is only 15 years old, "not rooted in history," as one legislator expressed it, the decline of the "imperial speakership" should not be viewed with surprise.

The GOP side of the aisle is also in transition. No sooner did the 16 new conservatives elected in the wake of Proposition 13 take their seats than they ousted the minority leader. It is assumed that the militant Republican group wants more confrontation with the Democratic leadership. One former GOP legislator said with respect to the new conservatives:

> The so-called children of 13 owe their allegiance to being children of 13 first, not to the Minority Leader. She has to fit, in some measure, their idea of what carrying out the mandate of 13 is. If she doesn't, they could turn on her.

In California the legislature is just one of several powerful actors in education policy. There is an elected state superintendent with a visible and potent statewide political base. The State Board of Education has significant formal powers. California ranks high in the formal powers of the governor who has a line item appropriations veto and extensive appointment authority.

Staff resources available to all these government institutions are impressive. The State Department of Education (SDE) has over 2,500 employees, including a sophisticated planning and evaluation staff. Governor Brown uses his State Board of Education appointees as education advisors. His national ambitions and frustration with the lack of leverage points in elementary and secondary education have diverted his attention from the field. Indeed, the Governor has usually chosen to react to education proposals made by the legislature or chief state school officer rather than initiate his own. AB 65, the 1977 school finance bill, was a notable exception.

Sacramento also houses a highly developed interest group structure, with

full-time executive secretaries in offices similar to their Washington, D.C. counterparts. The California interest group structure varies by level of education. At the postsecondary level, the central university administration is dominant, with a striking absence of special-purpose or teacher organizations. The student lobby is small, but surprisingly effective. The number of interest groups in elementary and secondary education is huge, with some Sacramento-based lobbies aimed at increasing general aid and some oriented toward categorical programs. The staff resources of these lobbies are growing. They produce sophisticated policy analysis on educational issues. The California Teachers Association (CTA), which is affiliated with the National Education Association, is the third largest interest group contributor to legislative races. Other groups with a major goal of increased general support to school systems include the Association of California School Administrators (ACSA), the California School Boards Association (CSBA), and the California Federation of Teachers (CFT). These groups have found sympathetic ears in the Senate. There are also a number of groups organized around individual categorical aid programs such as bilingual and disadvantaged education. These lobbies have more influence in the Assembly. The usual outcome is more money for both general and categorical aid, with no clear priorities emerging from the legislature.

In large measure, the various lobbyists representing interest groups (and it may be appropriate to include the SDE here) still tend to rely on the "soft-sell." They see their major role as providing information. They concentrate on four committees: Education and Finance in the Senate; and Education and Ways and Means in the Assembly. These are the committees that pass or kill much of the legislation of interest to the education community. There is no evidence that other committees—the Senate Rules Committee, for example—influence the flow of bills, nor has the appointment of select committees garnered much attention from educational interest group lobbyists.

The legislature takes a very active role in education policy. About 1,000 education bills are introduced yearly. Most of the 200 or so that pass add to an elementary and secondary education code that is already the nation's longest. The legislature's orientation features the need for state intervention to improve the alleged shortcomings of local education officials. California is a high state-control state; each year legislated programs and regulations become more specific. In elementary and secondary education the legislature examines any idea that circulates in the national market place and often mandates it. An indication of the legislature's growing role was its movement in 1980 to reappropriate some federal education funds, thereby enlarging its influence over the State Department of Education and the State Board of Education.

The legislature's activity in postsecondary education depends on the level of the institution. The University of California has constitutional autonomy clauses which protect it from specific regulation. The California State University Colleges have fared less well in the independence area, but legislative control is primarily through the appropriations route. The community colleges, however, are regulated at a rate and depth that is closer to elementary and secondary, but with substantially more deference for local campus prerogatives.

The Structure and Composition of Legislative Education Leadership

The most salient feature of the structure of legislative educational policymaking in California is the striking difference between the two chambers. Education leadership has been thriving in the Assembly, while in the Senate there is an absence of leadership in the field.

The Assembly benefits from the centralization brought by the speaker's office. It provides a focal point which the Senate does not have. In addition, in the Assembly there are several experienced senior education leaders (one of whom was defeated in the 1980 elections) who have a number of potential years of service. By contrast, the Senate has lost most of its senior education leaders. Two retired, and one senior senator was elevated to chair the finance committee (and he was subsequently defeated in 1980), leaving no experienced Democrat to chair education. The chairman who was appointed had little of a record in education. He focused on oversight and criticism of administration by the SDE, but did not establish himself as a substantive leader.

The Senate's difficulty has been in attracting new members to the field of education. Some attribute this to the lack of political benefit in education these days. The public is not as favorable as it once was. According to one legislator:

> Twenty or thirty years ago the general public was pro-education and felt that education was a wise investment of funds. But in the last five or seven years, because of declining test scores and inner city school problems, people no longer think education is a good buy.

Educational issues are more problematic now.

In the 1960s and early 1970s the legislature was in the business of adding new programs like vocational education or driver training, but the current fiscal situation requires restraint. The tasks now are less politically popular. They include finding funds to replace local contributions, which were severely limited by Proposition 13, and redistributing money from one district

to another.

The post-Proposition 13 fiscal situation is so desperate that the legislator's main worry is protecting his constituency's interests. The focus on securing funds for one's own constituents has contributed to the prominence of the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) as a lobbying group and to the development of a rural caucus in the legislature. One legislator indicated that the letters he gets from local school districts are "filled with anxiety and fear of bankruptcy." Another said:

> I think that the districts in California in the last five years have had so much trauma that their main communication with the legislature is, "Help us, we're drowning from all these categorical requirements with no funds, Prop 13, from collective bargaining . . . help us."

Another reason for education's loss of drawing power in the Senate may be a lack of campaign "juice" and contributions by educators, in comparison with other groups. Even though the teachers organizations are active in electoral politics, one legislator indicated that they cannot match the influence of other groups:

> I would say that education is different than other program areas—insurance or water—where you have monied interests who have a lot of financial stakes and are more aggressive in lobbying and providing campaign contributions. Campaign contributions in education appear to have a marginal impact, because most of the people who are education leaders have an educational philosophy that they are very true to.

Given the trends in Senate education leadership, the balance of power in education policy has shifted to the Assembly. This is in part because a key Senate staffer became chancellor of the community college system, leaving the Assembly school finance staffers in a relatively stronger position.[2] Moreover, Assembly legislators have depth and breadth in education. The Assembly Education Committee Chairman has been in the legislature for 18 years and is an expert on school finance and facilities. The Assembly Ways and Means Chairman is a 13-year veteran whose prime interest is education; he dominates higher education areas. The Chairman of the Education Reform Subcommittee is a former teacher. A number of freshmen in both parties are educators or former school board members. As a staffer expressed it:

> What you have now in the Assembly is a core of people who are quite competent, quite committed, and knowledgeable. . . . There doesn't seem to be a lot of dropping off of interest in the Assembly.

The interest by five-year veteran and freshman legislators is noteworthy,

given the difficulty in recruiting new leaders in the Senate and in other states. Many Assembly legislative leaders were either teachers, administrators, or school board members before they ran for the legislature. Some have a strong ideological commitment to education as well as a background in it. They see a potential for impact. A staffer describes her chairman's commitment in this manner:

> His view is that education is a way for people to grow, as a way to break out of socioeconomic constraints, as a way for people to have some sense of themselves. And K–12 is manipulable, much more so than the university.

In addition, some assemblymen see education as a stepping stone. One or two may run for state superintendent if the incumbent retires.

Linkages in Education Policymaking

California legislators are closely linked to state agencies and lobbies. There is a unique relationship between the legislature and the State Department of Education, primarily because of the man who heads it.

The State Department of Education is under the leadership of its constitutionally elected and thus independent superintendent, Wilson Riles, who was overwhelmingly returned to office in the November, 1978 elections. It is difficult to find political actors in the capital who can separate the department from the man; he is highly respected as a leading spokesman for public education in the field, in Sacramento, and in Washington, D.C. He is also considered a potent and astute politician. His opposition to a policy proposal effectively dooms it and, though he does not always win what he wants, he can almost single-handedly protect programs that are on everyone else's "hit list."

Traditionally, the SDE was a sleepy bureaucracy that rarely bothered anyone, but under Riles it has been turned into a force to be reckoned with. In the past the agency for the most part busied itself with required state paperwork sent up from districts, while routinely handing out money due them. But now the department monitors schools throughout the state and decides in some cases whether districts get money, depending on how well they run programs. As a result, a spokesman for the CTA said:

> The department has gone from a graveyard for old superintendents, a warehouse to collect statistics and send out notices, to a major determinant of educational policymaking. What has happened, particularly in the hands of an aggressive administrator [like Riles], is the department has become a significant power to deal with.

Another lobbyist commented that SDE's "empire is absolute." It is the

largest bureaucracy in the state with over 800 professionals, many of whom are seasoned and effective campaigners in Sacramento political warfare. The SDE's hand is strengthened immeasurably by its command of technical fiscal data on the schools; its staff in this area is highly respected. Adding to its overall effectiveness is the mutually supportive relationship Riles has developed with the State Board of Education. The State Board is not in itself deemed to be very influential, but in previous administrations antagonism between it and the SDE had weakened education's clout in the legislature.

The SDE does not like to lose and its bruising style has made enemies. For example, some legislators who have opposed the department accuse it of stirring up constituency opposition during reelection. One critical staffer asserted that the SDE is sometimes viewed as "having an axe to grind," interested in its own programs rather than general education. The Department of Education is also criticized for poor administration and has suffered through some difficult managerial oversight hearings. But despite much legislative criticism of its operations, the SDE's record with the legislature in terms of legislative output is quite impressive. The department's legislative image is frequently one of advocacy rather than expertise, but this seems to be the fate of strong leadership.

There are substantial differences between higher and elementary and secondary education in terms of legislative ties. The University of California has fewer lobbies on its behalf, but a high success rate in achieving legislative goals. Part of the university's favored position reflects legislative respect for the constitutional protection of university autonomy. The Regents are also influential and prestigious, especially in comparison to the State Board of Education. Numerous alumni serving in the legislature help the university cause. Even a fiscal conservative will bend if he is "true blue" for U.C.

The university's greatest strength is its ability to present a united front to the legislature. The nine U.C. campuses do have a similar mission but there is also a conscious effort to speak as one to legislators. A former U.C. lobbyist characterized this strategy as "keeping the lid on." As one lobbyist indicated, "There are incredible sanctions against university folks who air the family laundry in public."

The fact that there are very few higher education lobby groups furthers the appearance of unity. Not many views which differ from the central system are heard. While the elementary and secondary education area is fragmented among 1,040 local education agencies with numerous categorical lobbies, higher education spokesmen include only the Regents, central administrations, some local campus groups, the professors, and a student lobby. The American Federation of Teachers (AFT) controls most community colleges, but unions at other levels are weak.

The university is further insulated from legislative influence because there are few education leaders interested in postsecondary education. Both the Senate and Assembly defer on many issues to the Chairman of the Assembly Ways and Means Committee, who has pushed for minority access and more attention to university teaching as opposed to research. He uses non-statutory language that accompanies the budget to infringe somewhat on university autonomy. Indeed, the authorizing subcommittee on postsecondary was abolished when he moved up to chair appropriations.

A major issue is the extent of the university's autonomy under the state constitution. Article IX, Section 9 states:

> The university shall be entirely independent of all political or sectarian influence and kept free therefrom in the appointment of its Regents and in the administration of its affairs.

It also grants the Regents full powers of organization and government. This means, according to the university, that the legislature cannot place detailed restrictions on how the Regents spend their money. But the Chairman of the Assembly Ways and Means Committee argues that the legislature has "the constitutional right to ask questions and to condition any grant of money."

Among the most heated issues that he has pursued are:

- Student fee increases—the Chairman thinks fees are too high.
- Emphasis on undergraduate teaching and tenure—the Chairman wants more emphasis on teaching.
- Farmworkers displaced by agricultural mechanization—the Chairman wants the "social impact of research" to be a factor in funding decisions.

According to the Chairman, our society wants an excellent university that provides the best in education and research, but that has not lost touch with real people and the real world. The legislature, he claims, has the responsibility for making sure that "the money taxpayers have authorized us to appropriate is going for the taxpayers' purposes, not just for some private ego trips of academics or intellectuals or an institution in an ivory tower."

From the university point of view, the Board of Regents—not the legislature—speaks for the public interest; that is why the governor and other state elected officials serve on the board. University executives feel it is improper for a small group of legislators to sit as a court of appeals and hand down decisions in the form of budgetary control language.

Legislator links to both the State Department of Education and the university system are strongly impacted by lobby groups. California has a rich history of interest group dominance going back to the railroad oligarchy of

the late 19th century.[3] The state was, until quite recently, fodder for political scientists, such as Harmon Zeigler and Hendrik Van Dalen, who contended that a weak party system paved the way for pressure group dominance.[4] It was not until the Political Reform Act of 1974 that effective curbs on the excessive influence of special interest monies were finally established in California. Even so, Vic Pollard of the *California Journal* reported that lobbying expenses were up 25 percent in 1977–78. Expenditures for entertainment (very often of the $24.99 lunch variety—a penny less than the total at which reporting is required) increased 500 percent, and campaign contributions rose even more steeply.

The California Teachers Association, controlled by an oligarchy of school superintendents, dominated all the education interest groups through the forties and fifties.[5] By settling disputes internally and presenting the government with their demands weighted with consensus, the organization determined state educational policy with little interference. It enhanced its predominance by controlling the selection of the state superintendent, usually an ex-local superintendent himself.

By the sixties a shift had taken place.[6] The professionalization of the reapportioned legislature and the emergence of partisan politics coincide with the fragmentation of the powerful monolith that dominated state educational policy. The coalition was not able to adjust to new conditions, including increasingly partisan legislative voting patterns, centralization of legislative decision making, and the wholesale Democratic takeover in 1958. The interest groups could no longer contain their differences. Separately, they began to take their cases to the most sympathetic legislators. The unitary voice of professional education became a babble of competing tongues laden with self-interest. The administrators were exiled from the CTA which girded for battle with the rival CFT; and they eventually formed the ACSA, aligning themselves with school boards. Labor-management strife increased greatly. Special functional groups born of federal categorical aid initiatives and special geographically-focused groups pleaded their unique needs.

In fragmentation, the separate groups gained strength. Perhaps only the superintendents, whose oligarchical power was shattered, lost in the transformation. The 1960s were a period of rapid educational growth; there were sufficient resources for all the groups to enjoy some measure of success. It was a case of the "triumph of many fragmented interests," to paraphrase Zeigler and Van Dalen. The newly active functionally- and geographically-oriented interests were able to flourish by concentrating on their narrow needs and mobilizing their smaller constituencies, while the older broad-based associations slowly attempted to adjust to the new politics. The ACSA, CSBA, and the PTA are still hamstrung by their more democratic organizational

structures and professional educator bias. The employee unions have succeeded in making the necessary internal transformations.

Signs of decline and other threats to public education began to appear in the early 1970s. In the competition for scarcer resources, several groups began to emerge as predominant forces in state educational politics; notably the teachers unions and the big school districts, especially the Los Angeles United School District (LAUSD). Other interests had to rely more and more on friends in the legislature, such as the Black Caucus, and on SDE protection.

The special focus functional groups in California are as multitudinous, fragmented, and transitory as the categorical programs that inspire their formation. It is exceedingly difficult to get a good sense of what groups exist for how long, with what constituency, and with what sort of political activity, representation, and effectiveness. Given the degree of consensus among interviewees that the categorical interests in general had the most to lose in the post-Proposition 13 policy process, it is somewhat surprising that no one in Sacramento seems to have any listing of the groups, even within their special arenas. There simply is no coordination between them, or any visible effort even within SDE to consolidate their potential influence.

The only broad-based groups with any power are those with large memberships and the capacity to raise campaign funds, the teachers—nearly 200,000 altogether—and the classified employees. Statewide associations of public sector managers and/or trustees have comparatively small memberships. They are unable to raise campaign funds or even to contribute through participation in testimonial dinners because they cannot use public funds for such avowedly political purposes. Management associations such as ACSA and CSBA have recourse only to the status of their members. The school board and community college trustees have somewhat of an advantage in that they, like the legislators, are locally elected officials, which gives them common ground for communication. In fact, several legislators are ex-trustees, having started their elective careers in that capacity.

However, both K–12 and community college manager and trustee associations are weakened by the limited involvement of eligible officials from the large districts, with the biggest legislative delegations. These single-focus, geographically based interests have found that it is to their advantage to go it alone. Even many smaller district superintendents and board presidents tend to rely on their own independent contacts and strength rather than on their statewide associations. But it is the defection of the powerful large districts, such as Los Angeles, the Los Angeles County Office, the Los Angeles Community College District, and others from San Diego, Long Beach, San Francisco and Oakland, which really hurts. To make matters

worse, the five above-mentioned school districts formed their own organization, the Big 5, several years ago. It has become the Big 8 with the addition of San Jose, Fresno, and Sacramento unified school districts.

An important linkage between legislators and groups is through the provision of information. Despite the extensive staffing in the legislature, there are lobbies whose expertise is respected and sought. The school finance policy technical expertise at CTA's disposal is deemed to be very high, and its campaign clout guarantees it the ear of members. LAUSD employs a woman who is acknowledged by most observers to be among the very brightest and best technicians in the state school finance policy arena. One Department of Finance expert stated flatly that "LAUSD has more technical capacity than the rest of the state combined."

An interesting recent phenomenon is the formation of a collective of 41 organizations—educator groups, good government groups, and geographically based groups. It is known as the "Tuesday Night Group" because it began to meet on Tuesday nights during school finance reform debates. It rarely attempts to arrive at a uniform position because of its varied constituencies, but it serves as a useful vehicle for the exchange of political information and a strong voice on behalf of general aid to education. It also has great political strength, because of the combined influence of its members, and provides a vehicle by which the groups can muster winning coalitions of legislators.

Styles of Leadership in Education Policymaking

The California legislative style is very conflictual. The main arena of conflict is general versus categorical aid, and the Senate and Assembly contest each other regularly on this issue. One observer described it in terms of a ritual dance:

> The Senate would formulate a general aid bill spread among all LEAs. It would come to the Assembly and they would always hook on categoricals for the disadvantaged, school site improvement, and special education. The resolution was more for everybody—general plus categorical.

The bitterest battle in recent years has focused on one particular categorical program, bilingual education.

During a period of restricted budgets and widespread skepticism toward the public schools, the Bilingual-Bicultural Education Act of 1976 has been threatened with repeal in the California legislature several times. The controversy may well continue, given the growth of Hispanic pupils from 11 percent of total enrollment in 1970 to 24 percent in 1980.

There are a variety of different perspectives on the bilingual education controversy to be found in the legislature. One group supports appropriate English programs for students in English only, even if the Spanish language proficiency which they do have is lost completely in the process. Another perspective to be found in Sacramento is sympathetic to the problems of school district administrators in implementing the regulations for a bilingual education program. It seems to make more sense, from this perspective, to simply eliminate those requirements, if a district is having difficulty recruiting a bilingual teacher or finding a way to juggle the budget to meet the instructional needs of bilingual students. Many legislators feel that there is justification for cutting bilingual programs since this is an English-speaking country.

Some legislators see bilingual education programs as "extra" programs for students, not as a "basic skills" program for students of limited English proficiency. Especially since the passage of Proposition 13, the legislature has been exploring additional ways to cut the state educational budget, and bilingual education programs may be one way.

On the opposite side is the belief that bilingual education is "affirmative ethnicity," to use a term coined by the *Washington Post* reporter Noel Epstein, because it allows the use of the students' primary language in instruction and also allows instruction in the cultural heritage of these students.

The legislative leaders identified in this project have a significant part to play in this issue and, to a large extent, the long-term outcome will depend on their actions. The sponsor of the present bilingual education law in California is an advocate and representative of bilingual education adherents. He is a former teacher but has not been involved in a leadership role in other areas of education. The Chairman of the Chicano Legislative Caucus has joined to assist in the passage of bilingual education. He has clearly articulated the need for bilingual/bicultural teachers before both houses of the legislature and has voiced loud opposition to changes in the current state requirements.

The Chairman of the Assembly Education Reform Subcommittee, defeated in the 1980 elections, was a noted opponent of the current program. He sponsored legislation to repeal it. The great compromiser on this issue has been the Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, also defeated in 1980. With those leaders gone, it is difficult to predict the course of future developments, but it is certain that interest groups will continue to take strong positions on the issue.

Large educational organizations such as the California Association for Bilingual Education (CABE) and the Association of Mexican American Educators, Inc. (AMAE) have joined with other groups such as the L.A. County

Bilingual Directors Association and the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF) to make a concerted effort to preserve the integrity of bilingual education in California. Through regular meetings, supporting the Chicano Legislative Caucus, talking with individual legislators about the bilingual program, and testifying on various bills, the California Bilingual Community Coalition has been able to educate the legislature as well as thwart efforts of the opposition to repeal the current law.

The group has now been called the "bilingual industry," even though this all-volunteer force lacks the financial capital of any other lobbying group found in the Capitol. As a matter of fact, it is interesting to note that almost all of the coalition members are women, most of them Chicanas. The coalition has been able to secure a broad base of support from administrators, bilingual teachers, community people, academicians, and other professionals.

The coalition operates independently of any legislator, but works more closely with those who are supportive of its goals. The legislative Chicano Caucus is stronger after having survived a period of internal strife, and the Bilingual Community Coalition also continues to build in strength and experience. Its greatest challenge now is to preserve the integrity of the current Bilingual-Bicultural Education Act.

A major exception to the conflictual style of legislative leadership was seen in the adjustment to the politics of austerity after Proposition 13. The passage of Prop 13 in June 1978 cut in half the local property tax support for education. The legislature had two major decisions: (1) whether to replace the local money; and (2) if so, which of the 6,000 units of local government should receive more or less from a state "bail out."

The Governor was expected to submit a concrete plan for implementing Prop 13, but he proposed no specifics. Brown's role was limited to accepting or rejecting the legislature's proposed cuts. He waited and reacted, which appeared to legislators as an adroit way to stay above the tough and unpopular decisions. This led to even more resentment against Brown by Republicans and Democrats alike.

The legislature had three weeks to fashion a plan. More than a month before Prop 13 passed, the Chairman of Senate Finance had accepted its inevitability and asked his staff to develop a plan for distributing the state surplus to local units of government. Overnight the state K–12 education share went from 44 percent to 78 percent. But the legislature decided the surplus was not enough, so it would have to trim the budgets of state agencies to provide more local bail-out aid. Consequently, the budget committees were called into action to determine "how much could you rob Peter [the state agencies] before he was in worse shape than Paul [local government]."

Many legislators had post-Prop 13 "hit lists" of favorite state budget cuts.

In education there was considerable newspaper speculation about Superintendent Riles' favorite program—School Improvement—that provides resources for school site councils. But the attack never came. Budgets were cut about 10 percent across the board.

Legislators were probably reluctant to rock the boat, to do anything that wasn't proportional. The educators left the cuts up to the Assembly Ways and Means Education Subcommittee. The subcommittee recommended (and the legislature approved) cutting adult education (except literacy training) and summer school. These were peripheral programs whose demise did not affect the basic enterprise. In higher education there was no large program like summer school that was an easy target. The cuts were more surgical and precise—out of state travel, equipment, new scholarly journals, alumni activities, library acquisitions and so on. Higher education was happy with the subcommittee's work, given the circumstances. Wholesale assaults from the right were avoided. Legislators who recurrently rode herd on the university, but were basically supportive of its mission, closed ranks to protect it from "undiscriminating fiscal cleavers wielded by unthinking Proposition 13 zealots."

The Impact of Legislative Education Leadership

The legislature is increasingly seen as the "Big School Board." It controls all of K–12 spending, and state centralization continues to increase. The legislature is also taking a more intensive look at postsecondary education. But there are too many actors to say the legislature is always preeminent, and as fiscal concerns become more pressing, programs are less interesting to legislative leaders. California will continue to experiment with new ideas, but not at such a high cost as in the past. The spending effort for education during 1970–80 has dropped dramatically at the same time that the state assumed 80 percent of school funding.

The past two years have been notable for a significant increase in legislative oversight of administration. A sunset provision (applicable solely to K–12 education) was implemented in 1980. Eight categorical programs are slated for termination or renewal in 1981–82. Even more legislative staff has been hired for this new task. The California legislature has contracted with major evaluation firms, including the Rand Corporation and the Stanford Research Institute, to conduct multimillion dollar program evaluations of the largest categories. Legislative staff are directed by statute to sign off before the SDE can finalize the evaluation contracts. The detailed evaluation design is included in the statute.

The legislative impact pervades all elements of California education policy. But the legislature's relative influence in a system with multiple important

institutions and actors depends on the commitment and sophistication of key members. The high turnover in the state legislature recently has weakened educational leadership. Twenty-three new members were elected in November 1978 as the "Post-Proposition 13 babies"—dubbed by journalists as the "Bad News Bears." These newcomers tended to be more aggressive and refused to follow their party leaders. In 1980, their number increased slightly. Twenty assemblymen retired in 1980. The reasons for so many retiring are summarized by the *California Journal*[8]

> The growing distrust of politicians and the stresses of public life have taken their toll and reduced the psychic rewards of the job. Internal party strife and bitter leadership struggles further exacerbated negative feelings among members in both parties.
>
> A sense of malaise was particularly noticeable among retiring Democrats. Instead of dealing with new programs of ideas, Democrats face retrenchment in the new tax-cutting atmosphere of Sacramento. Buffeted by single-issue groups, threatened by swarms of new initiatives, and confronted by resurgent business political action committees, some Democrats decided they would rather quit than fight.

Also, two key education leaders were defeated in 1980, and other powerful figures may lose authority when the new speaker organizes the Assembly.

Educational leadership will also be influenced by the nature of California politics in the 1980s. The election process will probably be dominated by money and media, with charismatic personalities and buzz words necessary to get the electorate's attention. Parties will continue to be very weak; in fact, voter loyalty to party may almost disappear.[9] Business and labor lobbies will be crucial money suppliers. Certain groups, such as women and conservatives, will continue their ascent in political power. On the other hand, Chicanos will grow in numbers but not as political office holders. Finally, government funds will grow tighter than ever, leading to an even greater clamor over the budget. And public employees, particularly teachers, will become more frustrated and militant.

Observers of the California educational scene have cause to wonder whether California can maintain its innovative stance through changing conditions. It has been noted that there is a lack of education leadership in the Senate, and the Assembly could be similarly affected in the future. Certainly, the legislature will continue its control over education, since more centralized governance has been an established result of the growing centralization of funding. An important question, however, is whether the legislators exerting the control will care as much about education as their predecessors did. Legislative education leadership is in transition in California; the commitment

to progressive educational policy may be lost as the present generation of leaders departs.

Chapter Three NOTES

1. The material in this section is derived from several stories in the *California Journal*. These articles were prepared by Robert P. Studer, "McCarthy as Speaker" (November 1979), pp. 382–383; Vic Pollard, "Will the Imperial Speakership Survive the Assault on Government," (May 1980), pp. 197–199; and Ed Salzman, "The Bitter Berman-McCarthy Struggle" (February 1980), pp. 48–50.
2. In late 1980, some experienced Assembly staff left or indicated that they planned to leave their posts. Therefore, the Assembly seems to be losing its staff advantage over the Senate.
3. Material on interest groups is excerpted from a recently completed report for the National Institute of Education by Michael Kirst and Stephen Somers, *Collective Action among California Education Interest Groups: A Logical Response to Proposition 13*. This research was funded by the Institute for Finance and Governance at Stanford University.
4. Harmon Zeigler and Hendrick Van Dalen, "Interest Groups in the States" in Herbert Jacob and Kenneth Vines, *Politics in the American States* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), pp. 122–160.
5. See Lawrence Iannaccone, *Politics in Education* (New York: Center for Applied Research in Education, 1967) for his construct of interest group structure. He cites studies of California interest group history by Deane Wiley, B. Dean Bowles and Lawrence Fahey.
6. Dean Bowles, "The Power Structure in State Education Politics," *Phi Delta Kappan* (February 1968), pp. 337–340.
7. Some of the analysis is derived from Don F. Speich and Stephen S. Weiner, *In the Eye of the Storm* (Washington: Institute for Educational Leadership, May 1980).
8. Charles M. Price and Charles G. Bell, "Leaving the Legislature," *California Journal* (September 1980), p. 366.
9. Ed Salzman, "California Politics in the 1980s," *California Journal* (January 1980), p. 4–6.

Chapter 4 Florida

Augustus Turnbull

In Florida the legislature has traditionally taken a leadership role in establishing policy. The governor, state agencies, and even the various interest groups have been of less importance than the members of the House and Senate in education policy matters. This leadership position for the legislature came about during the decade on the 1970s following reapportionment, the drafting and passage of a new state constitution, and the reorganization of the executive branch of Florida state government.[1]

Not content with just reforming others, the legislature proceeded to implement most of the standard reforms of the legislative modernization literature—adding professional staff, constructing modern buildings with offices for each legislator as well as for the leadership and support personnel, increasing legislative time by providing for regular meetings of the standing committees around the year (in addition to the 60-day regular session), and developing extensive computer support.

Such changes led the Citizens Conference on State Legislatures in 1971 to rank the Florida legislature fourth in the nation in overall professionalism and first in independence. In developing such a reputation, the Florida legislature has also developed some persistent behavioral patterns which are important in understanding the Florida legislative process. Some of the most important are the following:

• Control of the legislature is in the hands of the speaker of the House and the president of the Senate, who are selected by the majority party and elected for one two-year term by the members of their chamber. Once in office, the presiding officer dominates the process through the appointment of all committees and committee chairmen, including the chairmen of the rules committees who effectively control the flow of legislation.

• The majority party (the Democratic party) in Florida is definitely in charge, but for the most part the minority party works in harmony with the majority, and exceptional Republicans may even develop leadership roles in committee or on the floor.[2]

• All standing committees are staffed by non-partisan professionals, most of whom survive the biennial turnover in legislative leadership either by remaining in the same post or by transferring to another within the legislature.

• Leadership rotates every biennium. The speaker and president are permitted by custom to serve only one term. Most chairmen rotate also; they are leaders in the faction which is successful in electing the presiding officer. But the Democratic caucus chooses a "speaker designate" and "speaker pro tem designate," so future leaders are known in advance. Thus, the discontinuity caused by turnover is tempered by a long lead time.

Having established itself as the primary determinant of state policy generally, the Florida legislature has not shied away from playing a key role in establishing and frequently revising educational policy. Most observers consider it the preeminent actor in the field. The legislature's primary rival in educational policy leadership has been a series of committees and commissions—some named by the governor and others by the legislature itself. These commissions—for example, the Governor's Citizens Commission on Education, 1971–1973—have suggested needed improvements in the Florida system of education. In many cases the legislature has chosen to follow the suggestions, but in others it has ignored them in favor of its own solutions or the status quo.

During the decade of the 1970s, the period examined by this particular study, Florida has had three governors. Claude R. Kirk, Jr., 1967–1971, the one and only Republican governor of the century, was flamboyant in a flamboyant time. He served in the closing years of the turbulent 1960s and involved himself personally in th 1968 strike of Florida school teachers and in scenes of unrest on Florida college campuses.

Kirk's successor, Reubin O'D. Askew, 1971–1979, dominated the decade but had surprisingly little interest in education matters, especially in his second term in office. He appointed the citizens committee cited above, which was chaired by outgoing Speaker of the House Frederick H. Schultz of Jacksonville. Although this commission is credited with a major impact on educational policy in Florida by establishing principles still supported by the legislature, the Governor was not very involved. By the 1975 session the staff director of the House Education Committee could comment that he had not seen the education advisor to the Governor during the whole session.

Governor D. Robert Graham, who began his four-year term in 1979, by contrast has built much of his public reputation as a supporter and reformer

in education. For most of the decade under study, he was in educational leadership positions in the Florida House and Senate and authored some of the more notable educational legislation during that period. In his first two years as governor, his interest in education continued as has the tradition of legislative leadership. This dual effort at leadership in the educational policy arena has led to confrontation between the Governor and the legislature over educational policy. There are more bills passed despite gubernatorial opposition, more vetoes, and more appeals to the courts. It is too early to judge how the balance of influence will be readjusted, but it is clear that some adjustment is, in fact, taking place.

The Department of Education has been a survivor, but not an initiator of policy in the state. The 1960s ended with a radical transformation of the educational environemnt. What had been termed the educational monolith—teachers, principals, superintendents and their respective associations speaking to the legislature through the voice of the State Department of Education (DOE)—was shattered by the teachers' strike of 1968. Any remaining solidarity was eliminated when the teachers were successful, along with other public employees, in securing the right to bargain collectively by an act of the legislature in 1974. The legislature acted only after the Supreme Court announced it would implement a constitutional provision requiring collective bargaining if the legislature failed to act.

The Department of Education is administered by the elected Commissioner of Education who is a member of the cabinet and serves as Secretary of the State Board of Education. In 1974, after the incumbent commissioner resigned under fire, Governor Askew appointed to the post a former speaker and dean of the House (with 24 years of legislative service), Ralph D. Turlington.

Turlington was subsequently elected to the post in his own right and continues to hold the position. He has long been a spokesman for education—and especially for the University of Florida which was located in his legislative district. Turlington appointed as his deputy commissioner Dr. Roger Nichols, a former university professor who had served as staff director of the House Education Committee and later as the chief assistant to Speaker Terrell Sessums. While Turlington and Nichols have not been interested in a frontal challenge of the legislature they have not been reluctant to influence the process in more subtle ways.

In addition to the posts already mentioned, five former legislative staff directors are officials of the Department of Education. Two current members of the Board of Regents are former legislators and another resigned recently. Other staff move back and forth frequently among executive and legislative offices. These examples suggest the nature of the "Interlocking Directorate"

that governs education in Florida. The legislature has been the source of all the current executive branch educational leadership.

A number of lobby groups are active in Florida education politics. After the 1968 strike, the various teacher groups tried to establish their new roles as representatives of teachers in the collective bargaining process. In so doing, there was considerable conflict among rival organizations in Florida and their national affiliates. In the early part of the 1970s these rivalries hampered their effectiveness in the legislative process, but by the end of the decade conditions had stabilized and teacher union representatives had begun to show real effectiveness in influencing legislation.[3]

The two main teacher groups are the Florida Teaching Profession (FTP) and the Florida Education Association/United (FEA/United). Observers suggest that for most of the decade, the FEA-United group was the more effective since it had several large grass roots organizations in major counties of Florida. More recently, the FTP has improved its position. Some would say it has even pulled ahead as a result of two developments. First, the FEA-United supported a losing candidate for governor and the winning candidate, Graham, has not forgotten who his educational friends are and are not. Second, in the 1980 session a compromise had been hammered out on a major piece of legislation, the Educational Practices Act, but the FEA-United reserved the right to seek changes in one clause. Subsequently, it failed to persuade the legislature to ignore the consensus position, and the failure further dented FEA-United's reputation for effectiveness.

A college professors union, the United Faculty of Florida (UFF), is a newcomer to legislative lobbying. There is some evidence that it is growing in effectiveness as its leadership learns how to work with the legislative leadership. The Florida School Boards Association is considered one of the more effective lobbyists for the administrative viewpoint in education. Its long-time executive director is especially successful in one-on-one discussions with legislators.

The Association of Florida School Superintendents is a more low-key organization, but it has considerable effectiveness in dealing with technical changes in the school law. Its current executive director and lobbyist is the immediate past director of the division of public schools of the Department of Education and a former county school superintendent himself.

In the last five years the school financial officers of the larger school districts have become a respected, albeit informal, lobbying group. Leading members of the group spend much of the session in Tallahassee and are called upon for technical assistance. They have become highly influential in this key area of educational policy.

At least one other group deserves attention. Students in the state university

system (representing nine universities) have became organized as the Florida Student Association (FSA). On a number of specific issues during the past five years, the FSA has demonstrated its capacity to overcome the opposition of the Board of Regents in winning approval by the legislature of specific items of legislation of interest to students. Community college students are not so organized and consequently have less visible sway in the legislature.

The Structure of Education Leadership

Florida legislators who are considered education leaders[4] are more likely to be senators than representatives (several served in both the House and the Senate), and more likely to be Democrats than Republicans.

All but one of the leaders have been committee or major subcommittee chairmen or held other leadership posts, although these posts may not have had any formal relationship to education. Several of the key education leaders have held the chairmanship of both the substantive education committee and of the appropriations subcommittee dealing with education finance. Others have held one or the other chairmanship, and still others have influenced educational policy from party leadership posts. A long-term former staffer in the Senate observes that Florida's legislative structure vests all power in the presiding officer, and in turn, in his appointees as committee chairmen and floor leaders. However, no consistent pattern has emerged relating position to effectiveness in establishing educational policy. Obviously, it does not hurt to hold a key chairmanship or other leadership post; on the other hand several of the leaders have been effective in pushing major educational legislation at a time when they were not in a chairmanship and indeed were considered to be in a faction opposed to the leadership.

One leader, for example, was involved in education throughout the entire period under study. He was noted as important to the development of major education legislation in each of the years being examined, but it was not until the 1979–80 biennium that he had a formal leadership post as Chairman of the Senate Education Committee.

Another leader shifted his attention from human services issues (he had been chairman of that committee for several years) to education only when he became education committee chairman. He retained the interest during a biennium in which he was without a leadership post and renewed his effectiveness in the last two years as speaker pro tem and chair of the appropriations subcommittee dealing with education. Over the years he has become recognized as one of the intellectual leaders of the House.

Finally, one leader who never held a visible position made a great impact on education. Before becoming a legislator, he served for a number of years on a local school board and became a leader of the Florida School Boards

Association. This experience quickly made him a spokesman for the School Boards Association even as a freshman, minority member of the House. His leadership opportunities continued when he moved to the Senate. As the member of the minority party considered most expert in education matters, he has been an almost automatic appointment to conference committees dealing with educational legislation. Therefore, he is effective, even though his party status has kept him from formal leadership positions.

Rather than position, the key to education leadership appears to be the amount of interest and concern possessed by the legislator. All of the members identified as leaders have demonstrated a continuing interest in one or more education topics. They have done their homework with interest groups and agency personnel and, of course, have become effective general legislators as well.

Although the total number of educational leaders is small—less than 20 of the several hundred possible legislators over the decade—it has not been a closed shop. Those legislators willing to become effective through study of the issues have been accepted and put into leadership positions. The biennial cycle of leadership change in the Florida legislature keeps open the opportunities, and most presiding officers have been careful to name chairmen from among those both knowledgeable and interested in the subject.

Since money controls most policies, the appropriations committees have had major influence over educational policy; but it would be inaccurate to characterize their role as one of dominance. Major legislation, such as the Educational Accountability Act of 1976 and the University System Reorganization Act of 1979, were products of substantive committees.

The tension among the various levels of education is continuous, even though all are represented by the same Department of Education. On the legislative side, the House has alternated between a unified committee over all of education and separate committees for K–12 and for higher education. Vocational education and community colleges, the other major components of the education community, have either been included in the overall committee or have been carried along with the public schools and the universities into the separate committees.

As noted previously, the Florida legislature is well staffed. Each House member has an aide or a secretary and each senator [illegible] both. Each of the 23 House committees and 14 Senate committees has a staff director, one or more legislative analysts, and clerical assistants. In addition, each chamber has a bill drafting unit and a clerk or secretary's office which keep up with the legislative paperwork. A joint legislative management committee provides a comprehensive information service, a computer support division, a legislative library, and personnel and accounting support.

Staff support in education is located in the education committees of the two chambers (two committees in the House) and the education subcommittees of the two appropriations/ways and means committees. These subcommittees are anonymously termed subcommittee "B" in the Senate and subcommittee "III" in the House. The substantive committees have normally operated with three to five professional staff members and two or three clerical positions. The House Appropriations Committee has usually assigned at least two professional staffers to educational finance, supplemented by the additional partial attention of a capital outlay specialist. The Senate Ways and Means Committee has varied its practice, but throughout most of the decade has had at least one of the senior budget analysts assigned full time to education.

Determining staff involvement in educational policymaking is considerably harder than identifying the legislator's involvement. Most staff, especially those who remain with the legislature for a long period of time, are expert at remaining behind the scenes. There is a fair amount of turnover, and some staffers may work on only a few bills intensively before departing, while others provide a limited, summary analysis on dozens or even hundreds of different bills without making a significant impact on any. Nevertheless, respondents did identify some staff members who had significant impact on major legislation over the decade.

A third of those cited were staff directors of education committees; two were budget analysts for education; and two others had the role of representing the presiding officer of their chamber on education-related matters. Such staffers have a substantial role in monitoring the progress of key legislation and assisting in the complex negotiations among members of the two chambers, the agencies, and the various interest groups. The other staffers named served primarily as analysts for substantive education committees. In general the professional staff provide analyses of issues and of legislation drafted by others. Upon request of the committee chair or other members, they may draft the more complex legislation related to their committee's jurisdiction or develop amendments to bills assigned to their committee for review.[5]

The Composition of Legislative Education Leadership

What brings a legislator to an abiding interest in education legislation? Some members, like former school board members and a principal, come to the legislature with prior educational experience and carry that into the legislative arena. Another member came into the legislature with a strong interest in vocational education, which expanded into other parts of education as his tenure continued. Two prominent representatives had become convinced of

the need to improve higher education after businessmen in Florida and elsewhere told them that a major impediment to industrial development was the low quality of the university system.

One staffer observed:

> I have come to believe that legislators get involved in education for the same reasons as professional educators, not because of the glamor but rather in the recognition that the problems are almost universally worth solving. I would further guess that for the best legislators it must be quite frustrating to cast a vote on 60 to 70 percent of the state budget without understanding the issues and the complexity of the educational system.

Another staffer suggests that many of the leaders have a general feeling that public education in recent years has not been as productive as when they were in school and that public disenchantment with the quality of education leads the members to seek corrective steps.

A former staff member suggests that the smaller districts have provided more leaders than the larger and that the University of Florida has always had a champion in the House or Senate. The larger counties might be expected to be powerful because of the size of their delegations, but they have been less influential than some of the smaller counties which produce a key leader. Internal disagreements, including partisan fights, tend to split the larger delegations and make them less effective than sheer numbers would suggest.

What makes certain members leaders? One observer suggests that a universal characteristic possessed by these members is the respect of their colleagues for their knowledge and understanding of the issues and their sincerity:

> Unlike some of the demagoguery on busing during the 1960s, legislators genuinely look at problems seeking solutions. Especially in the early 1970s, where the interplay of property taxes and school finance and subsequently the FEFP (Florida Education Finance Program) weights were developed through formulae. Some members stood far above other members who had not the time, energy, effort, desire, or perhaps intellectual capability to keep on top of all the issues and data.

Expertise grows with exposure. An initial problem in the school finance reform of the early 1970s was that very few people understood the existing formula, The Minimum Foundation Program (MFP). One legislator suggests there were only two people who understood the program, and they were not allowed to fly on the same plane because if it crashed, no one would know how to fund the schools. The legislator notes that he and certain colleagues were successful in making the process explicable, "There were 30 members who had at least partial working knowledge when we got through."

One result of this growing expertise was that the legislature "took the initiative from the State Department of Education," whereas previously the legislature had just reacted. Eventually even the commissioners of education volunteered staff assistance to the legislature. This led to the legislators demanding more information and becoming more sophisticated. Their data demands grew beyond what the State Department of Education was interested in producing.

Not every legislator who is active in education becomes a leader. Florida has not lacked educational demagogues and proposals for punitive legislation. The period of student unrest and concern over the drug culture sparked a number of restrictive bills and curricular suggestions that were not warmly received by the educational establishment. Other bills setting forth minimum classroom contact hours for community college and university faculty were also unpopular on campuses around the state. Nevertheless, the proposers of such legislation, while perhaps individually powerful in the legislature, never became part of the leadership in the committee structure that governs educational legislation. As one observer noted, "The punitive, inflexible type never made it into the educational leadership; the power of the educational constituency and their fellow members never let them into key positions."

In Florida, as elsewhere, leading legislators become specialists in the sense that they focus their attention in a limited number of areas and they earn the respect of their colleagues. The other members get in the habit of "watching their button," that is to say following their lead in voting on issues in their area of expertise. All of the education leaders would be likely to have their buttons watched. This is not to say that they all limit themselves exclusively to education, but for most of these leaders it is their major focus.

Within education there are topics of more interest to one member than another, but the broad jurisdiction of the committee structure works against intensive specialization for those members serving extended periods of time. It is more important for leaders to develop a comprehensive understanding of the subject area than to become known for competence in any one subarea. A long-range systems perspective is a major component of educational leadership. It often takes at least three years to pass a good bill. The first year is spent in developing the concept, the second in polishing it and gathering support which becomes strong enough to pass it in the third year. To succeed in such an environment, one must have a long-range perspective.

Since the presiding officers change every two years and have the option of changing committee chairmen and the membership of the committees, continuity of leadership is something of a question mark in Florida. In the decade under examination, one can find very little continuity of leadership

in formal positions. However, members in the leadership category have typically had some close connection with education and positions of relative significance throughout the period. They have been in the legislature for years and kept their interest in education legislation throughout their time there.

Interest in education continues after leaving the legislature. Several legislative leaders were appointed to the Board of Regents. The outgoing Senate President in 1980 has been named to the Post-Secondary Education Commission by the Governor. A respected minority leader went on to serve as a member of the Commission on the Future of Florida's Public Universities.

Education holds the interest of legislators because, as one of the major programs of state government, it is very visible. However, the costs of involvement in education are perhaps greater than the benefits. Due to the complexity of the subject and the variety and number of interest groups and bureaucracies involved, concentration on major education legislation leaves little time for other policy matters. The complexity of education issues is magnified by the fact that all the varying viewpoints—constituency interests and group interests—have their spokespeople in the legislature. This point was made well by one leader in the closing debate on the Higher Education Reorganization Bill of 1980. He told the House that taking on the educational establishment is to take on the legislature itself, as well as all of the outside interests. The only task more difficult is reapportionment.

Furthermore, many of the issues do not have much political sex appeal and the most significant issues require several years to take effect, thus diluting the pride of authorship and the political benefits. The trend in Florida toward formula funding of programs has minimized (although not removed) the opportunities to provide programs for one's home district.

One senior House staff member suggests that the costs or benefits of involvement depends on the legislator's district. Being an education leader helps if one is from Tallahassee or Gainesville (seats of the three oldest universities in the state)—in fact one has to be seen as an education leader from those districts whether interested or not! Usually, if one is from the urban areas it does not hurt, but some rural districts can object to a legislator who becomes too active in education matters.

In the area of education, Florida is perhaps in the first years of a major change in personnel. Four outstanding leaders have left the legislature. Another might well step down after his forthcoming term is completed in 1983. Of the seventeen members on the decade-long leadership list, only eight are still in the legislature. Observers expect a focus on consolidation rather than innovation in educational policy in the near future. There will always be

some legislative "tinkering" with the system and there is some major unfinished business in higher education, but in the next few years the opportunity for significant innovation is likely to be slight.

Linkages in Education Policymaking

Linkages with the major educational agencies and interest groups are direct and most often initiated by the designated lobbyists or other officials of the agency or interest group. The Department of Education has a number of officials quite familiar with the legislative process. In addition to Commissioner Turlington and the several former legislative staff members now employed by the department, a number of other key personnel in DOE served as staff to the legislature in the 1960s when it lacked staff of its own. These individuals were borrowed during the session to write and analyze legislation for the members and have continued that activity on behalf of the DOE and its several divisions.

The department is expected to provide accurate enrollment, financial, and capital outlay needs data; but the legislature over the years has been vocal in its dissatisfaction with the quality of the data presented. For most of the decade the legislature has pushed the department toward an aggressive role as the overseer of local educational programs and the initiator of reforms. Almost as persistently, the department has resisted while arguing that real decision-making power is and should remain in the hands of local school boards.

In the middle of the decade under review, one legislative leader pushed hard to convert the department into an "educational auditor," modeled after the role of the legislative auditor. In this proposed model, the DOE would investigate the performance of local school systems and suggest improvements. The DOE could see little political support in such a "bad guy" role and successfully fought the proposal; what it had to accept instead was the Educational Accountability Act of 1976, which consolidated and strengthened a number of efforts since the 1973 report of the governor's commission to push school-based management and to require regular reports of student accomplishments. The 1976 bill provided for statewide assessment testing, student progression standards, and the withholding of graduation diplomas from students failing to pass a functional literacy test. After it became clear that this approach had strong popular support, Commissioner Turlington and the department became its champions and since have defended the legislation against a series of court challenges.

A senior legislative staffer suggests that in the last five to six years the commissioner and his immediate staff have had less and less influence. The department's organization has hindered its impact. It is comprised of at least

four fiefs—public schools, vocational education, community colleges and universities—which rarely agree among themselves. Even within divisions there may be conflict. Furthermore, the fragmentation of the teacher groups and the lack of unity in the education profession's point of view—with principals, school boards, and teachers acting independently—has limited the influence of the department.

The organized education interests are regarded as important, although biased, sources of data and opinion. A house budget analyst specializing in education points out that the education leaders in the legislature do not have to seek out the groups because each group has a legislative program and is aggressive in pushing it. The lobbyists are always around so the leader can ask their viewpoint in a casual setting. In putting together the 1973 education finance reforms, there were several joint meetings of House and Senate leaders to which lobbyists of the school districts and education associations were invited. The legislators explained what they were doing and got feedback from the educators.

One problem groups have in working with the Florida legislature is the speed with which issues crystallize after perhaps a long period of gestation. This was particularly true in the context of the many changes made by the newly reapportioned legislature. Annual sessions and the demands for information as well as legislative ideas for change came too fast for groups to react. "There were dramatic shifts in short periods of time from where we were to where we would be. Groups such as the tax assessors and parents could not keep up." One result of this fast pace is the expansion of the lobbying core in Tallahassee. Almost any organized group which wants to be effective in dealing with legislation has full-time lobbyists in Tallahassee during the session and many people there all year around.

Local school districts are relatively uninvolved, with the exception of a few larger districts such as Dade (Miami), Palm Beach, and Pinellas (St. Petersburg). Dade County has been cited as being especially effective. It comes to Tallahassee with a specific legislative program and understands how to utilize its large legislative delegation. There is almost always a major Dade County legislator on the education committee or education subcommittee of appropriations. One former budget analyst tells of the year that Dade County school board representatives met with the speaker to insist that they needed "X" millions of dollars to fund salary commitments. He agreed to see they got the money, and in return the school board agreed to support whatever other school legislation the leadership wanted to pass.

Legislators themselves are in touch with local educators. The importance of representing constituency interests is exemplified by one whose feats on behalf of the University of Florida are legendary. He had an uncanny ability

to know exactly when something of importance to the university was coming up. One staffer recalls a particular meeting of the education appropriations subcommittee. After a Friday meeting, the staff member was told to develop some numbers over the weekend and the subcommittee would meet on the floor Monday to consider them. (This was prior to the legislature's adoption of strict meeting notice requirements.) The Chairman had a speech cancelled and returned early to Tallahassee to find the staff member just finishing the work early Sunday afternoon. He decided to call a subcommittee meeting then and was able to round up enough members for a quorum. Starting about 2:30 p.m., they worked through the budgets for public schools, the State Department of Education, the junior colleges, the education and general budget of the universities; and by 5:15 p.m. they had gotten to the budget of the Institute of Food and Agriculture Sciences (IFAS) at the University of Florida. The chairman had instructed the staff to prepare major cuts in the IFAS budget. But just as the subject was introduced, a shadow passed over the glass door of the hearing room in the deserted building. The door opened and the champion of the university walked in: "What's next on the agenda?" he asked. The IFAS budget was not cut.

Any discussion of linkage is incomplete without some discussion of the legislative staff role, since providing linkage is one of staff's critical responsibilities. A committee staff member is expected to make sure that all interested parties have an opportunity to provide input on legislation at the earliest possible stage of development. Members much prefer to know the position of all interested parties—whether or not they intend to revise the legislation. The motto "No Surprises" is dear to the heart of most long-term legislative staff.

Given the fact that 400–500 bills relate to education in any given session, the limited staff must rely upon the DOE, local education agencies, and the various interest groups to supplement any other sources of information. As in other areas of legislation, there is the assumption that interested parties will call any problems they have to the attention of the legislature. Exposure to a wide variety of viewpoints is expected to uncover any problems with the legislation. Said a staffer, "The cardinal rule which I observed was that there should be no surprises for the committee by having lobbyists or interest groups presenting more current or extensive data."

Legislative education leaders are also tied to out-of-state actors. Florida legislators are active in multi-state and national organizations such as the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), the Southern Regional Education Board (SREB), the Council of State Governments (CSG) and the Education Commission of the States (ECS). There is no consensus, however, on how much, if any, these external organizations contribute to educational

policy initiatives. One staffer spoke to a common paradox, "If a person testifying before a committee begins by saying that states A, B, and C do this in this way, the committee will respond by saying, 'Well, we have to be cognizant of the fact that Florida is different.' On the other hand, if the testimony does not reference practice in other states, one of the first questions will be, 'How do other states handle this?' " The same person said his committee made considerable use of the American Association of University Professors, the Southern Regional Education Board, and the Education Commission of the States as information clearinghouses.

Some observers believe that many reform ideas which Florida considers come from national organizations such as ECS or NCSL. "They are brought back by legislators or a staffer. The 1973 Commission on Education got much of its information from national groups like that."

Styles of Leadership in Education Policymaking

Some Florida legislative education leaders clearly exert their influence through their specialized knowledge in the field of education. There are also some leaders who primarily represent a constituency, either a geographic or interest-based one. For example, two prominent leaders can usually be considered to support the views of school administrators. Still another group has definite ideological orientations. One legislator could be counted on to support activist programs to improve society through better education. At the other end of the continuum is a legislator who prides himself on a no-nonsense, conservative back-to-basics approach to education which clearly influences his orientation toward education policy.

All leaders though, no matter what their expertise or philosophy, exhibit some degree of ability to use the legislative process effectively in building a consensus for their positions. A leader must have a comprehensive knowledge of the legislative process with particular attention to details of procedure and an understanding of how to persuade one's colleagues. A sure sense of timing is an important ingredient of this talent. An excellent illustration is a leader who at the beginning of the seventies was completing a legislative career which spanned more than two decades. His legend remains. As one staffer comments:

> Representative A is a very, very competent politician. He was by far the most effective legislator I have ever seen. He had a shelf of props—newspaper clippings and other things—he could pull out to dramatize a point. He was one of the few legislators to realize that you cannot win all the time, so he set up things to lose on, so that people would not notice that he was winning 100 percent on the things he really wanted.

The staffer went on to describe a scene where the Senate President came over to a House committee to explain a bill that he wanted badly. He was a very effective speaker and had the committee in the palm of his hand until Representative A took over the questioning and began to back the President into a corner. The President slowly began to realize the bill could be killed. The committee proceeded to make a series of amendments that drastically revised the intent of the bill. Representative A then proposed a far-reaching amendment that would have completely gutted the bill. The President was able to defeat him on that and went back to the Senate happy with what he could salvage and pleased with his "victory" over Representative A's amendment. Representative A, however, went away having secured his objectives through less far-reaching changes—and without the stigma of embarrassing the Senate President.

This leader had a superb sense of timing and an ability to read the mood of his committee and the audience. He was known to keep a bill on an agenda all session until the moment when the committee, the reporters, and the audience were in the right balance to bring about his objectives.

Technical skill, or perhaps just a knowledge of what one can get away with, is illustrated by another incident. As a very complex bill of over a hundred pages developed through the amendatory process in the closing hours of the session, it was causing the technical staff frantic hours as they tried to put it into correct legislative format. The House and Senate had been waiting for some time to get the final version on the Senate floor for passage. Pages from the bill's many sections were still lying in small piles scattered around the Senate secretary's office, when one senator said they had to pass the bill then. Another said they didn't have it ready and they couldn't pass blank pages. The first just grabbed a stack of paper, put it in a bill folder, and said, "I'll show you." Minutes later the Senate and then the House passed overwhelmingly a hundred sheets of blank paper.

It should be noted that such practices are not common. In fact, a postscript to the story is that the House clerk arrived just before midnight in the office where the staff was still laboring to put together the bill passed some time before. "If you don't have that bill in my hands by midnight," he declared, "I will refuse to certify it." The bill in final form consisted of what the staff members were able to get together by midnight.

In part due to his detailed knowledge of the legislative process, a member occasionally will become the "answer man" for an entire chamber, the person to whom everyone turns when something has to be done. A senator (who later became the state's lieutenant governor and then U.S. Deputy Secretary of Agriculture) had this role. In the early 1970s when the legislature was considering complex problems of taxes and school finance, the senator solved

everything that came up.

Persuasiveness in committee or floor debate is an essential element in a member's developing the reputation of being a master in the legislative process. One of the classic stories of persuasive skill is a two-stage debate between Representative B and the Republican leader in the House. The party leader proposed an amendment to a tax bill that would have provided exemption to the sales tax. Representative B objected and told how he had recently been back to his little home town to see his "old daddy, the town blacksmith." Blacksmiths were having hard times (this was in the 1960s) and Representative B "couldn't see the sense to exempt a lot of wealthy folks from the sales tax, when the little people would still have to pay." A substitute amendment killing the exemptions passed overwhelmingly. Sometime later the Republican leader tried again, this time carefully including blacksmiths in the list of exemptions. Once more Representative B took the floor to describe a trip home to talk to his aged father. "I've talked to my daddy about this and he's upset. He doesn't want an exemption because he has been a hard worker all his life and he wants to pull his fair share." He then passed another substitute amendment killing the party leader's amendment once more.

Another legislative education leader redoubtable in floor debate was once engaged in a lengthy discussion with the minority caucus chairman, who was dubious about the changes in school funding procedures. At the conclusion of a long discourse on the formula, the dollars involved, and the policy implications, the leader said to the caucus chairman, "If you could vote for this, I will be glad to come to your district and help you get reelected based on all you have done to help education in your area." The chairman responded that the price was too high to pay for reelection. The representative then brought down the house by saying, "If that is all that you have gotten from the last hour, then even if I came down to help you, you couldn't get reelected."

Another aspect of the ability to use the legislative process is effective use of one's position. A few exceptional individuals manage to become leaders or to retain a leadership role without a position. But having a role as chairman or membership on the key committees such as appropriations and rules helps enormously. The independence of chairmen varies from time to time. Some presiding officers keep closer control over the flow of legislation than others, and there are periods when the process is more or less open to rank and file input. In Florida a definite trend has been toward more concern about democratic procedures such as open meetings with preannounced agendas, but the power of a chairman or the speaker or president continues to be great.

A staffer describes working with a particular Senate Ways and Means

Education subcommittee chairman. He and the chairman would work up the recommendations and then call in the committee and tell them what they'd done. It was not unusual just to go into the chairman's office and "settle the thing."

In considering the power of position, one must never overlook the pervading influence of the presiding officers in the Florida legislature. The Senate president and House speaker, as noted above, appoint all committees and committee chairmen. They refer all bills to committee. And through the appropriations committees, to which all bills having a financial impact are referred, and the rules committee, which schedules floor debate, they can dominate the timing of consideration of legislation. As presiding officers, they determine who is recognized to speak and settle points of order (the House speaker has never been reversed on a point of order by the membership). Nevertheless, the style of leaders varies considerably; some have their own programs and some leave substantive leadership to the committee chairmen and others. In the early years of the period under review, speakers had definite education programs. Later, one speaker told his first education chairman to "do something to help children learn to read and write," but left the implementation of the instruction up to his education chairman. The result was the Basic Skills Act of 1975 and the Accountability Act of 1976.

A recent speaker returned to the model of central leadership. He had definite plans for educational changes at both the public school and higher education levels. To facilitate consideration of these proposals, he even divided the education committee into separate K–12 and higher education committees. His aim was to push higher education reform, and a separate committee would be able to concentrate on just that agenda. The Speaker's staff kept close tabs on the progress and content of education legislation, and the minority leader spearheaded the legislative push. Senate presidents have been considerably less visible than speakers in pushing educational reform, although one president representing Tallahassee with its two universities, did appoint a special assistant to coordinate education policymaking during his term in office.

Almost by definition, one cannot be a leader without followers. In the Florida legislative environment, with its rapid turnover of formal leadership and the relative insignificance of party, considerable stress is placed on building coalitions on major continuing issues and consensus on specific issues. Education policy illustrates these two approaches.

Coalition-building often involves regional politics. Delegations from a given area are organized to support the interests of that area. In the less populous northern part of the state, delegations may represent more than one county and are generally cohesive. In many of the urban centers, especially

where party politics is a factor, cohesion is less easy to obtain. Dade County's very large delegation, for example, can rarely agree on a consensus position.

One exception is funding for schools. The "urban coalition" has been a consistent voice for more school funding in general. On a few occasions it has challenged the leadership of both chambers—notably by threatening to reject the leadership position on school appropriations. On one occasion a legislator lost his education committee chairmanship by going along with the position of more funds for education rather than with the position adopted by the speaker and the appropriations chairman. In 1977 another deadlock was broken only when the leadership promised to find $26 million in money for compensatory education funds the following year.

Consistent urban-rural clevage has been visible in the sparring over the "cost of living factor" and the "sparsity factor" in the funding formula. Cost-of-living-factor proponents from the urban districts argue that expenses for education are higher in the urban areas and should be recognized in the formula. Rural sparsity-factor advocates note that administrative and other costs are much higher when the schools are spread out over a large geographic area and that these costs should also be recognized.

An aspect of consensus politics on a specific issue is illustrated by the experience with the Education Practices Act of 1980. Efforts to reform the process by which teachers are disciplined were stalled for years in the conflict between administrative and union viewpoints. Finally, two factors broke the logjam. The legislature had sunsetted the existing commission, thus forcing some change, and newly elected Governor Graham wanted to get the cabinet out of its statutory role as the final arbiter of a misbehaving teacher's fate. The education dean of the University of Florida called all parties together—DOE, both unions, school boards, and superintendents' associations—and in a series of meetings they hammered out a consensus position which was accepted without change by the legislature.

In considering the legislature as a whole, one is struck by the continuity of intense involvement in educational policy setting despite the wide differences in individual styles and the fair amount of change in actors over the decade. Florida legislators are self-confident about their responsibility for leadership in educational policy setting. While they value consensus, there is no hesitation to challenge colleagues or the educational establishment in seeking to reform education in the state; there has been a consistent conviction that improvement is possible and that it is the legislature's role to push the educational community into accepting these improvements.

The Impact of Legislative Education Leadership

The overall impact of legislative education leadership in Florida has been

positive, although not without its traumatic effects on agency personnel and educators at the local and institutional levels. Florida is generally regarded as being at the cutting edge of educational reform.

The public schools operate within a comprehensive educational accountability process based on a heavily state-funded-and-equalized financial formula. Essential responsibilities for curriculum and financial management rest with the school principal. But student assessment reports provide for public scrutiny and oversight while students, in order to receive a high school diploma, must become at least "functionally literate" as measured by a state-mandated test. Substantial additional funds have been put into the schools, with particular attention to the primary grades, in order to promote successful basic skills education as a foundation for further development.

Higher education in the past 15 years has seen the development of 28 community colleges and the expansion of a university system from three schools to nine. The number of students enrolled in higher education has climbed by several hundred percent. As the 1980s begin, the legislature is shifting its attention from access to quality. Funding formulae are being revised from enrollment-driven factors to program factors, with an explicit mandate to develop program-quality measures. The higher education governance structure is under debate; and all parties concerned, including the legislature, are under strong public pressure to prevent political interference in education, while insisting that authority and responsibility be put into the hands of officials who can bring about quality. The education community, of course, has been heavily involved in all of these developments as have been several governors and citizens commissions. Nevertheless, the driving, continuing force behind the policies has been the sustained interest and concern of education leaders in the Florida legislature.

Chapter Four NOTES

1. This study spans the decade of the 1970s. While some of the other studies provide historical perspective, they are not explicitly designed to focus beyond the 1979–80 session.
2. During the period Republican Claude Kirk was in the governor's chair, party conflict in the legislature grew to new heights marked by the creation of minority and majority leadership posts. Such rancor has subsided, some suggest proportionately with the shrinkage in numbers of Republicans because it takes at least one-third of the membership of a chamber to have leverage even on votes requiring a two-thirds majority. In the 1973–74 period, when the Republicans did have more than the one-third required in the House, partisan tension was higher and resulted in the Democratic

speaker reducing the size of the Republican staff.

3. Much of the information in this section is based on "State Policymaking for the Public Schools of Florida," by Frank P. DePalma, mimeo, prepared for the Educational Governance Project, Ohio State University, January, 1974.
4. In addition to the reputational survey performed for the larger study of which this analysis is a part, the author, former staff director of the House Education Committee, and his assistant, also a former legislative staffer, performed their own analysis for the *entire decade of the seventies*. For this period the author identified approximately 150 specific legislative issues, 40 members of the legislature and 30 legislative staff members associated with educational policy. Each person interviewed was asked to select a limited number of issues for a given year or biennium and then to indicate the legislators and staff most important to the resolution of the issues; respondents were free to add names and issues and did so to a limited extent. Of the 40 members of the legislature initially identified (and some 20 others added by the respondents) seventeen can be categorized as consistent leaders in educational policy matters over the decade. A smaller group of "consensus" leaders was developed by asking the respondents to name the five most influential legislators over the decade. Of these five, all those who were in the legislature in 1979 were named as leaders in the larger study. The larger study also identified others on the list of seventeen, all those who were current. This chapter will refer to the entire group of seventeen, adding a historical dimension to the study of legislative education leadership in Florida.
5. The chambers' bill drafting services draft bills for individual members and committee staff typically draft bills for the committee and committee leadership, which bill drafting then double checks for technical accuracy.

Chapter 5 Wisconsin

Richard Lehne

In Wisconsin, one author writes, "the movement towards political and governmental reform . . . and the growth of the state's public university . . . symbolize that which is unique and distinctive. . . ."[1] The centrality of these two factors in the state's public life is aptly captured by the location of the state capitol building and the historic campus of the University of Wisconsin within sight of each other in Madison. These two elements have combined in Wisconsin to create a tradition of government which presumes that solutions to public problems should rest on informed, non-partisan analyses of the substance of issues. The heritage of the "Wisconsin Idea" of applying university expertise to state problems still pervades governmental decision making in the state and contributes to the climate of reform.

The citizens of Wisconsin do not simply support governmental reforms; they embrace them. The structure of state government itself is a product of numerous national reform movements which have occurred over many decades. The state's only constitution was ratified in 1848. It requires the popular election of six state constitutional officers—the governor, the lieutenant governor, the secretary of state, the state treasurer, the attorney general, and the superintendent of public instruction—as well as the election of the judges of the state Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. All constitutional officers are elected for four-year terms. The state enacted the first civil service system in the country in the nineteenth century; it strengthened the governor in the decades after World War II by allowing an unlimited number of terms, by reorganizing the executive branch and by expanding the governor's budgetary role; and it has recently streamlined its judicial structure. Wisconsin provides public funds for political campaigns, limits the size of individual contributions, and requires the disclosure of expenditures.

The Wisconsin legislature has shared in this reform tradition. The state established the first Legislative Reference Bureau in the country in 1901. In more recent years it has established a Legislative Council to staff the committee system, a Fiscal Bureau to analyze expenditures, the Legislative Audit Bureau to conduct fiscal and programmatic audits, a caucus staff for constituency-oriented tasks, and additional aides to provide individual staff assistance for all senators and most members of the Assembly. The Wisconsin legislature is generally considered a well-informed and independent body in a state with a strong executive.[3]

The State of Wisconsin has begun to make elective office a full-time profession. A decade ago, one study of the Wisconsin legislature noted, "Candidates (are) . . . expected to 'prove themselves' through successful ventures in private life" before standing for the legislature.[3] Legislative service was normally a second career taken up after becoming established in a private position or retiring from that position. Today many run for the legislature as part of a first career. The annual salary of legislators now exceeds $20,000 per year and additional allowances and per diems are provided. Many people become candidates for the legislature after ending or even during their college years or after they have served as congressional or legislative staff aides. The result has been a legislature which is younger, better educated, more analytic, and less experienced. Relatively few members have been elected to local government office, once a prime stepping stone to a legislative candidacy. Fewer are lawyers, only 22 of 132 members, and more are unmarried, 38 today compared to only 7 a decade ago. In the last legislative session, for the first time in Wisconsin history, a majority of the members of the Senate and Assembly listed their occupations as full-time legislator.

The educational system which these legislators help direct has a distinguished heritage and extensive operations. The University of Wisconsin is the fourth largest system of higher education in the country, now serving 146,000 students.[4] The University of Wisconsin System was created in 1971 as a result of the merger of the University of Wisconsin with campuses at Madison, Milwaukee, Green Bay and Parkside (Racine-Kenosha) and the Wisconsin State Universities System which had evolved from an earlier system of state teachers colleges. The merged system is now composed of 13 universities, 14 two-year centers and a statewide extension service. It is governed by a 16-member Board of Regents which appoints the president of the system as well as the chancellors of the individual campus units. Wisconsin is a state where economic growth and per capita personal income have lagged behind the national average but where public sector expenditures are

above the national norm.[5] This unusual commitment to support public services has made possible the great growth of the university system. In the past decade the University of Wisconsin has conferred more doctoral degrees than any other institution in the country, but to do this it has become the employer of approximately half of all state government employees.[6] Wisconsin ranks third in the nation in governmental support for higher education as a percent of personal income, behind only special situations which occur in Alaska and Utah.[7] The "Wisconsin Idea" of applying university expertise to the needs of the state has led specific constituencies to support the system, and it has contributed to the still apparent tradition of pride in the University.

Public per pupil expenditures for elementary and secondary education in the state are slightly above the national average despite Wisconsin's below average personal income. The state relies heavily on local property taxes to support education with 59 percent of school revenues coming from local sources, 36 percent from the state and 5 percent from the federal government.[8] Wisconsin, like most states in the north central region of the country, has been hard hit by declining enrollments. Peak enrollment in the public elementary and secondary system occurred in 1971–72, and the state has lost more than 100,000 students in the years since. The full impact of these trends has not yet been felt by the elementary and secondary system, and it is yet to reach the collegiate level. Befitting the Progressive tradition, the Department of Public Instruction is headed by a popularly elected superintendent, chosen for a four-year term on a nonpartisan ballot in the spring after a presidential election. Wisconsin has no state board of education, which some argue helps maintain the discretion of local school officials in educational decision making.[9]

Elementary and secondary education in Wisconsin was dominated until about the mid-1960s by a coalition of the established educational associations and the Superintendent of Public Instruction.[10] Candidates for superintendent were then required by law to hold a state certificate allowing them to be a local superintendent, and many local superintendents were also members of the Wisconsin Education Association (WEA). The Wisconsin Association of School Boards (WASB) worked closely with the legislature, expressed the views of its locally influential members, and defended the traditions of localism in educational decision making. As in many other places, the state-level coalition in Wisconsin divided in the late 1960s, over labor management issues and questions of state mandates. The requirement that the State Superintendent of Public Instruction hold the highest administrative state certificate was repealed. The WEA devoted more of its efforts to teacher welfare issues and became active in electoral politics. Many observers today describe it as the most influential political force in the state. Despite its lack of direct

participation in the electoral arena, the WASB still plays a prominent role in legislative policymaking. The Wisconsin Association of School District Administrators can effectively represent the views of superintendents on occasion while the other teachers and administrator groups are less visible. There is no statewide parents group with wide political influence, although the PTA may be reestablishing a presence. Relations among the education associations, and particularly between the WEA and the WASB, have improved in recent years as the K-12 system has had to cope with declining enrollments and relatively constant resources, and the groups are now again able to join together in a United Action Council to defend or enhance educational funding.

Students of state legislative leadership in education find Wisconsin a place where both public education and governmental reform have been uniquely prominent. This prominence makes possible a relatively unobstructed view of current relationships between the legislature and public education, and it provides some indication of how such relationships might evolve in other states in the years ahead.

The Structure of Education Leadership

Two decades ago, relations between the Wisconsin legislature and both the state's higher education system and its elementary and secondary structure were sparse and relatively uncluttered. Most governmental activities of the University of Wisconsin were with the governor and the executive branch rather than the legislature, and most elementary and secondary policies were dominated by a state level education coalition whose decisions were usually accepted by the legislature.[11]

Many of the trends which have affected education throughout the country in the last two decades have appeared in Wisconsin as well. Education in the state now faces more vigorous competition for public funds than it did in the past, as one longtime participant in Wisconsin education politics recalls:

> When I started, the elderly and the environment were not issues; highways had a separate fund; no one thought about waste disposal. Education was a very attractive issue with little competition. No one in the legislature would have gone home, it would have been political suicide to go home, without doing something to improve school aids.

The large share of the state budget appropriated to support the University System and to provide funds for elementary and secondary schools must now be defended at a time when enrollments have declined and public confidence has diminished. In addition, harmony within the education community itself has been strained in recent decades by labor-management strife and basic

transformations in university institutions and procedures. The legislature has responded to these educational developments by devoting greater attention to education issues and by playing an expanded role in the formulation of education policy. For all these reasons, the traditional structures of legislative decision making for education have been supplanted in recent years by a structure which better accommodates educational change and legislative innovation.

Legislative decision making in Wisconsin in the first part of the 1960s was a centralized affair, and the major legislative reform of the late 1960s and early 1970s, increased staffing, reinforced this pattern.[12] The growth in staff at that time in Wisconsin accrued primarily to the party leadership, party caucuses, and to the Joint Finance Committee, all mechanisms of centralized decision making.[13] An education committee chairman from this period notes that it would have been unthinkable for the education committee to defeat or delay a bill sought by party leaders and the caucus.

The Joint Finance Committee in Wisconsin is an even more crucial locus of legislative decision making than analogous committees in other states because the state's biennial budget act encompasses far more than just appropriations. Particularly under Governor Patrick Lucey, the budget act has grown to be a sweeping document which initiates new programs and amends old ones as well as performing the normal appropriations tasks traditionally associated with finance committees.[14] A decade ago, the Joint Finance Committee held executive sessions on the budget, and individual members of the committee were designated to hear privately recommendations from committee chairs or others on specific programmatic areas. The Joint Finance Committee then reported a budget bill which would be passed essentially without amendment.

Legislative reforms in Wisconsin in the last ten years have enhanced the role of the individual legislator and weakened institutions of leadership. The job of a senator or representative has now approached full-time status, and significant new staff resources have been provided to many legislators to assist them in their activities. In addition, open-meeting laws have been passed which apply to legislative committee meetings and party caucuses. Hardest hit by these changes have been the party caucuses and the majority leadership. One association official reflected this decline of the party and caucus by saying:

> They hardly call a caucus anymore because people won't attend. They walk the halls and tell the party to go to hell. The name of the game in the Assembly now is to get 50 votes, not to get the majority party. I really care less about the party leaders than about the chairmen of the Joint Finance Committee.

A similar view was expressed by someone concerned about higher education:

> Once the political question about higher education policy was whether the Republican party or the Democratic party was more supportive of the University. Now you ask whether individual legislators find it in their interests to back or to criticize the system.

The party caucus remains more important in the Senate than in the Assembly, and it still retains a role in the budget process, but there is no doubt that its significance has been reduced dramatically.

Part of this legislative fragmentation is a result of new patterns of electoral politics in local constituencies. Wisconsin's Assembly districts are relatively small, with a population of approximately 45,000 each, and party organizations in most areas remain undeveloped. With the post of a legislator moving toward full-time status, ambitious young people with few obligations or other persons with jobs that provide much free time can devote months to knocking on practically every door in a legislative district. Intensive local campaigning was not known in much of Wisconsin, and it has upset traditional voting patterns. Legislators elected in this way often feel little obligation to the party leadership in the legislature, and this in turn has made the party leadership hesitant to take forceful positions on many issues. The majority party has difficulty holding together its members.

The Joint Finance Committee remains today the keystone of legislative decision making in Wisconsin. It attracts many of the most capable and diligent legislators from both chambers. It dominates the appropriations process. "When it comes to the budget," one finance expert commented, "there is no higher authority than the Joint Finance Chairmen." Joint Finance is staffed by the Legislative Fiscal Bureau which is a very well regarded nonpartisan agency with thirty-three employees. Critical statements from the Fiscal Bureau cause concern among program advocates and agency officials. Furthermore, the Joint Finance Committee guides many non-finance decisions in Wisconsin because of the inclusiveness of the state's budget document and because legislative procedures require that all bills with fiscal implications be sent to it as well as to the standing committees. One education committee chairman commented that if he had his legislative career to do over he would have sought a seat on the Joint Finance Committee because he is concerned about education, and the Joint Finance Committee is the most effective place to shape education policy.

Even the Joint Finance Committee, however, has been affected by recent changes in legislative operations. It too must accommodate the preferences of full-time legislators who are less subject to party direction, and it too must

abide by the open-meeting regulations which require public posting of committee sessions. In part to avoid some of these regulations, the Joint Finance Committee has established five discussion groups to help it analyze the budget, including one on elementary and secondary education and another on higher education.[15] The meetings of the discussion groups, which have four to six members each, are not closed, but they are not well publicized either. In the half decade since their creation, the discussion groups have become a key stage in the budget review process of the Joint Finance Committee.

The two education discussion groups have somewhat distinct identities. Attendance at meetings of the Higher Education Discussion Group is smaller, and the discussion is more free-flowing. Sometimes, there will be no one at a group session other than the members, staff people from the executive Department of Administration (DOA) and the Fiscal Bureau, and representatives of the agency being considered. In contrast, Elementary and Secondary Education Discussion Group sessions often attract legislators who are not committee members, a dozen or more legislative aides, representatives of the associations, as well as DOA and Fiscal Bureau staff. Representatives of the Department of Public Instruction attend some sessions. Issue papers prepared by the Fiscal Bureau establish major items on the discussion group agenda, but sometimes legislators develop their own issues or raise questions in response to constituency requests.

The rule that the full Joint Finance Committee accepts the decisions of the discussion groups is followed most consistently in the higher education area. While the caucus may make a few minor changes in the higher education budget, it too basically accepts what is presented. One participant notes, "The Joint Finance Committee's decisions on the university system are almost never a matter of contention, but elementary and secondary aids are frequently a problem." More legislators are concerned about funds distributed through the school aid formulas, and they express their concerns at each step in the process. Elementary and secondary finance issues will be fought out in the discussion group, the Joint Finance Committee, and the caucuses.

Standing committees in legislatures tend to attract members who support the programs of their committees. This is true of the Senate and Assembly education committees in Wisconsin. The Wisconsin Senate has fewer committees than the Assembly, and one Senate committee is responsible for both education and revenue. The Assembly committee's jurisdiction is restricted to education. In recent years, the Assembly Education Committee has been more active in the education area than is its Senate counterpart.

Standing committees relate to the discussion groups of the Joint Finance Committee in diverse ways. Some ignore the appropriations issues that come

before Joint Finance and direct their attention to other topics. Other committees become advocates for their program areas before Joint Finance by urging the expansion of funds and the restoration of cuts, and still others attempt to rearrange budgetary priorities within their jurisdictions, recommending some increases and some reductions. The Assembly Education Committee began holding hearings on the education budget six years ago. The Assembly Education Committee's budget hearings have informed education committee members about the content of the education budget, and they have given education interests an additional opportunity to plead their case before the press. While the university system in particular has tried to enhance the role of the standing committees, the impact of the activities of Assembly education on the judgment of the Joint Financial Committee has not been resounding. Some say that the education committees are defenders of the educational establishment whose effects on Joint Finance are minimal, while others suggest that Joint Finance weighs seriously the views of the education committee on the non-finance issues in the budget.

Discussion groups of Joint Finance probably have more influence on education policy than do the education committees, but standing committees in Wisconsin appear to have grown in stature in the last six years or so. The advent of full-time legislators has increased the activity of many committees and enhanced the probability that they will be diligent in examining questions in their domains. Some standing committees now serve as gatekeepers in the Wisconsin legislative process. While rules permit committees to report bills with a negative recommendation, the education committees now release only those measures which are supported by a majority of committee members. Bills sought by the leadership have been held in committee because of the lack of support by a committee majority.

A function recently acquired by the standing committees is the review of administrative rules. All committees receive copies of proposed rules, and some, such as the Assembly Education Committee, frequently hold hearings on the drafts. While an umbrella Joint Committee for Review of Administrative Rules usually objects only on narrow legal grounds, a standing committee may express opposition to proposed rules for simple policy reasons. The leverage in writing administrative rules under this process has shifted, some believe, from the executive departments to the legislature. The university system is now exempted from submitting its rules for clearance, but one official of an association active in the elementary and secondary area reports, "We regard the administrative rules review process to be of equal importance with the statutory process. It gives us a second kick at the cat."

Recent legislative reforms in Wisconsin have interacted with developments

in education to weaken the structure of centralized legislative decision making. While the Joint Finance Committee remains the major arena for decisions, its discussion groups have emerged as critical institutions. The head of the Higher Education Discussion Group can be the most influential legislative voice in a policy area where there is little non-budget legislation. In the elementary and secondary area, the discussion group considers issues which affect many members intimately, and it works more closely with the Joint Finance Committee and others in the legislature. Opinions of members in the caucuses must be considered, and active standing committees are now visible. There is little reason to doubt that the trend of the diffusion of authority throughout the legislative structure will continue in the years ahead.

The Composition of Education Leadership

The seven key education leaders identified for this study are a rather homogeneous lot. They are all between thirty-three and forty-nine years of age, and they were first elected to the legislature between 1970 and 1976. All seven have held formal positions in the current session which involve them in education issues, and they typically represent smaller cities or suburban areas. A group of six subsidiary education leaders displays more diverse characteristics. They entered the legislature between 1953 and 1970, and they are between thirty-seven and sixty-six years of age. Some represent the state's largest cities while others come from districts which are primarily rural. These thirteen legislators possess special characteristics which make them leaders whose judgment others accept, but they also share some of the same qualities which encourage the average legislator to devote time to education policy.

Traditionally, education was an attractive issue area in Wisconsin for representatives and senators who wanted to affect statewide policies while still participating in issues which were prominent in their own communities. Their involvement was often an extension of pre-legislative activities as school board members, parent organization leaders or teachers, and identification with education enhanced their stature in their constituency. In addition, property tax rates in individual communities are affected by the amount of state aid which is provided to help operate the local schools, and tax burdens are always of interest to legislators.

Today, the attractiveness of elementary and secondary education to legislators has diminished in Wisconsin as it has across the nation. "Once it was an asset to be involved in education," a long-time legislator noted, "but now it has become a liability." Fiscal constraints require difficult choices when schools are losing students, and in Wisconsin these unpleasant decisions have

been accompanied by the enactment of new state mandates which diminish the autonomy of local school districts and antagonize influential constituents. The types of decisions which state legislators must make have also changed profoundly in the past decade. The emergence of collective bargaining has given almost every state education issue a labor-management dimension which requires legislators to choose between one group of constituents and another. The visibility of teacher organizations in some constitutencies has also made schools the targets of anti-tax groups and thus created enemies for legislators who attempt to defend education. This divisiveness has led one leader in education decision making to plan to reduce his level of involvement in the years ahead.

The quality of school performance appears to be subjected to less criticism in Wisconsin than it is in many other states. This lower level of criticism may be the result of better schooling in the state or of the educational traditions of the state's citizens, but some argue as well that legislative criticisms of school performance have been muffled by the political strength of the Wisconsin Education Association Council. The overwhelming political fact of elementary-secondary policy in the legislature, many assert, is the electoral assistance which teachers provide legislative candidates. Some legislators are said to owe their elections to WEA assistance and are properly beholde The Council publishes legislative voting records of incumbents, and it favc incumbents in its endorsement process. Legislators who receive a rating of 70 percent or better on the list of weighted rollcalls selected by the WEA automatically receive the teachers' endorsement. One legislator noted that two hundred volunteers in his last campaign were members of school teacher families, and the desire to win this assistance is why some representatives and senators seek to participate in K-12 issues.

The motivations for participation and judgment in higher education issues are based on different factors. In general, legislators see few political consequences for participating in higher education issues, either positive or negative. Neither students nor faculty groups are effectively organized to participate in electoral campaigns, and the university administration can not take an active political role. One advocate of a more aggressive political strategy by higher education interests laments:

> Opposition to the university does not come home to a legislator. One colleague has been consistently critical of university budgets and management, and he has advocated substantial increases in graduate tuition, but he will receive more electoral support from his unit of the university than I will get from mine.

One education leader finds this absence of pressure constructive. "The average legislator is pushed around a good deal in the elementary and secondary

area," he noted, "but in higher education people can vote for what they think is good policy."

The one exception to the general lack of political stakes for participation in higher education issues occurs for legislators who have large university units in their districts. Some political mileage can be achieved in a constituency by senators and representatives who become champions of the local campus. Some local chancellors will indicate which legislators have been helpful, and some individual faculty members and students do become active in campaigns. In economically depressed areas, vigorous support for the university can be represented to business groups as an effective way to boost the local economy.[16] While certain legislators are frequently described as advocates for particular campuses, this role appears to be obligatory only for legislators who represent the Madison area. The large concentration of faculty and students in this area all but compels local legislators to be automatic defenders of Madison campus welfare.

These general considerations motivate individual legislators to participate in the conduct of education policy, but they do not help us distinguish education leaders from rank and file legislators. Certain characteristics which are important in other states do not appear in Wisconsin. Lengthy service is not a prerequisite for education leadership in the state. In contrast to the decades of service often possessed by education leaders in other states, none of the seven key leaders has served as long as ten years in Madison, and only one of the six subsidiary leaders has extended tenure.

Detailed command of the substance of a policy area also fails to command a following. Contrary to the expectations created by the image of a well-staffed, full-time, resourceful legislature, the degree of specialization and expertise possessed by Wisconsin legislators in the educational policy area is rather low. In the past there were legislators to whom everyone would turn when retirement programs, for example, were being considered. Today such legislators have passed from the scene. In fact, none of the seven education leaders who returned a survey for this project indicated that he or she spent as much as one-third of his or her time on education issues. The institutional memory of the Wisconsin legislature on policy issues is no longer composed of individual senators and representatives who acquired expertise over many legislative sessions. Today, the memory of the institution rests within the staff structure and particularly in the Fiscal Bureau. Decision making in the system is often described as episodic rather than continuous. A topic will be taken up, dealt with, and then set aside for a number of years.

This does not mean that legislators do not become very knowledgeable about the proposals which concern them. As in many states, individual representatives and senators will work on a particular bill to alter state regulation

of Indian education or truancy, for example, because of constituency pressures or individual interests. The knowledge acquired to secure enactment of a single bill, however, seldom accumulates in Wisconsin to become continuing expertise in a policy area. In most states, the enactment of a program must be followed in subsequent years by additional legislation to amend, refine, and improve the workings of the original design. In Wisconsin such tinkering with a program is usually done through the budget bill in a quasi-administrative way rather than through new legislation introduced by the original sponsor and handled by the standing committees. Individual legislators are rarely involved in the details of a program over a number of sessions. Since the Joint Finance Committee is generally the arena for the amendment of ongoing programs, subject-matter experts seldom appear in Wisconsin, and even if individuals develop the requisite expertise about a program, legislative procedures usually deny them an expert reputation even among those who are active in the policy area. In addition, there is substantial movement from committee to committee in Wisconsin, and long term involvement in any policy area is unusual.

Probably the single most important factor which does contribute to education leadership in Wisconsin is position. All of the seven major education leaders have held posts in the current session which involve them in education decision making, and four of the six subsidiary leaders hold now or have held in the past positions which help guide the general business of the legislature. Two of the subsidiary leaders appear to have reached their position through many terms of service on relevant committees. Eleven of the thirteen leaders are Democrats, and only two are Republicans, reflecting the presence of Democratic majorities in both chambers. A second factor which characterizes the seven key leaders is a reputation for being intelligent, capable, or hardworking. These seven education leaders are all regarded, at least by some standard, as good legislators. A final characteristic which enhances a legislator's stature is the image of being somewhat detached from organized interests. Uncritical followers of certain organized interests are disparaged as "water carriers" for those groups, and their judgments are discounted accordingly. While such a reputation does not exclude a person from leadership, it diminishes the legislator's prospects and effectiveness.

Linkages in Education Policymaking

The structure of a legislature constitutes a framework within which individual senators and representatives attempt to fulfill their public roles and realize their personal ambitions. Most legislators seek to improve the content of public policy and to ensure their own reelection prospects. Neither of these

objectives can be achieved alone, however. They can be secured only in concert with others in the policymaking system or in the legislator's local constituency. The linkages between legislators and others help shape the policies that are enacted and help identify the legislator who will be reelected.

Relationships between the legislature and state education agencies have not been cordial in recent years. In fact, an antibureaucratic theme has developed among education leaders in the Wisconsin legislature. Part of this results from the national trends in the 1970s. While the heritage of the New Deal depicted government agencies as instruments for the solution of social problems, the past decade has viewed public agencies as problems in their own right. They have been accused of being more concerned with their own well-being than with the achievement of the public purposes they were established to attain, charged with being too rigid to coordinate activities within their own structures, and indicted for substituting their own preferences for those of the elected officials whose policies they are supposedly administering. Less deservedly, they are also criticized for not clarifying the programmatic ambiguities left unresolved by policymakers, and they are used as scapegoats by articulate officials and staffs for any dissatisfaction with program operations, whatever the source. Regardless of fairness, an anti-bureaucratic tone is clearly heard in the legislature's messages about the elementary-secondary structure and higher education system in Wisconsin.

One study from 1972 described the role of the Department of Public Instruction in the following terms:

> Our data suggest that the Department of Public Instruction did not play a significant role in policymaking. Traditionally, state departments of education have been seen as responding to rather than exercising leadership, and the DPI in Wisconsin is no exception.[17]

This reactive role which the Department was described as playing in the early 1970s is thought by most observers to have dwindled even further during the balance of the decade. The top leadership of the Department is accused of failing to provide educational, administrative, or policy direction for the conduct of public instruction in Wisconsin, and the consequence is thought to be drift and needless controversy. Champions of the department argue that supervising an educational program in a time of declining enrollments, diminishing resources, and falling public confidence is a task which poses great challenge to any group of administrators. Whatever the reasons, few disagree with the comment of one well-placed legislative source who noted, "I have not been to a meeting in five years when someone stopped and said, 'I wonder what the DPI thinks.' " "The only reason people consult the DPI

now," one association official remarked, "is not for their educational judgment but because of their data system."

The depth of the criticism of the administration of the University of Wisconsin system is certainly not as profound as that directed toward the DPI, but the anti-bureaucratic theme is unmistakable there as well. Some legislators say that the university's legislative relations are ill-managed, that its personnel policies are chaotic, and that the administration is not willing to face the unpleasant decisions which are necessary for the university to flourish in the future period of declining enrollments. One long-time participant in education policymaking stated, "I have never seen a legislature which is as skeptical of university management policy, as questioning of university statements, and as disdainful of university procedures as the current body." The growing doubts about the competence of university management has not yet led to as detailed an involvement by the legislature in university affairs as is seen in the operations of the K-12 system in the state, but an informed dissatisfaction has materialized which was not evident a dozen years ago.

Two areas which illustrate the importance of legislative policy links to the state education agencies are the provision of information and the mobilization of the statewide educational coalitions. In past years, when elementary and secondary education policy was still dominated by the coalition of statewide education groups, the Superintendent of Public Instruction usually mobilized the coalition in response to a generally recognized opportunity or difficulty. The mobilized coalition would then work through interim committees, the governor or the DPI to advance its objectives. Without organization by the State Superintendent, the various elements of the state education policy system are seen today to be operating in greater isolation from each other than in the past. To fill this organizing void, association officials are not discussing new efforts to encourage the DPI to mobilize educational groups as it did in the past. Instead, current suggestions envision the associations themselves establishing study groups on education topics with members drawn from the associations, the Department of Administration, the Legislative Fiscal Bureau and perhaps from the department. The presumption is that if the members of these association-sponsored study groups can agree on a needed policy initiative, the balance of the state education policy system will accept the proposal.

The diminished role of state education agencies is also evident in the change in the sources of information legislators use to reach policy judgments. The study from 1972 reported that eleven of fifteen legislators interviewed indicated that the DPI *almost always* provided information that satisfied their policy needs while the remaining four said that DPI's information *usually* met their needs.[18] The analysis concluded that legislators regarded

the DPI as the most useful source of information about public instruction in the state.[19] In a survey for this study, seven education leaders were asked to specify the sources of education information which they found most useful in reaching policy judgments. None of the seven mentioned the DPI. These legislators responded that the Wisconsin Association of School Boards and the legislative staffs were places that they approach first for information.

The decline in reliance on the Department for information reflects both the anti-bureaucratic tendency now apparent in legislative circles in Wisconsin and also the growth in the importance of staff services available to the legislature. One official in the DPI captured this change in status almost wistfully:

> In the past, when we went to meetings we were the source of expertise about how schools operated. When a question came up, they were dependent on us for the answer. Now you go to a meeting, and everyone has one or two aides. When a question comes up, they turn to their aides. We administer the programs, but the legislative and gubernatorial staffs know as much as we do. You would be surprised how much individual legislators know about specific topics. Today, most of the analytic computer runs we do are for the legislature or the governor, and not for our own purposes.

The days when there were a few wise educators in the DPI to whom legislators would go for information and judgment have passed. Personalities as sources for information about school operations have been replaced by data systems. Legislators now look to their own staffs to marshall and organize data, and the DPI has been relegated to the role of assembling information for others. Legislative staffs still rely on the departmental data system, but they bring analytic training and policy expertise to the examination of that information which individual legislators rarely acquire. Legislative staffs have in effect grown up between legislators and the DPI, and they are able to interpret DPI data and thus enhance the independence of legislative decision making.

The fact that the legislature even wants information about university system operations constitutes a departure from past decades. "In the past," one university official noted, "you would hear from legislators about constituent problems, but now there is a detailed dialogue about managing the system." Some officials complain that the legislature and the governor focus on university management issues rather than questions of policy, and this requires the analysis of operating information. The University of Wisconsin system maintains most of its own records, and many of its definitions and formats are not consistent with those which the Department of Administration uses for the balance of the executive branch. This contributes to ongoing tensions between the two agencies as the university system resists efforts to make it

conform to standard governmental record keeping. The growing volume of data needed to manage campus units from the system's central administrative offices however, provides information which can be analyzed by legislative and executive staffs. Legislators active in the higher education area report that their efforts would be impossible without the talent, continuity, and diligence of the legislative staff. As in the elementary and secondary area, legislators are beginning to demand information needed to review the judgments made by educational administrators rather than simply accepting the judgments made by others.

Most legislators, of course, want to be reelected, and many of their contacts are maintained for simple electoral reasons. Many communications may be occasioned by policy concerns, but they have important and sometimes predominant electoral significance as well. Contacts with the WEA and with individuals and groups from a local constituency often fall into this category. Regardless of the different implications, however, most legislators report that they hear from essentially the same groups in their districts as they do in the capital. School teacher associations, board members, and administrators are in contact with legislators in most districts with greater or lesser frequency.

Within this general framework, the nature of the contacts varies according to the composition of the district, the needs of the individual member, and the legislative position of the member. Legislative districts which are entirely within a single community will usually have an active teachers group, but only a handful of school board members. Legislators who represent a number of smaller communities will sometimes encounter less effective teacher associations but a large and formally organized association of school board members. In larger communities, secondary school principals are often in touch with members while, in districts composed of smaller towns, local superintendents more frequently express their concerns and their objectives directly to individual legislators. Most senators and representatives who are active in the education area, especially those who occupy a formal position of education leadership, report that there are countless local education groups which a willing legislator could address every evening.

Some legislators report that they seek different things from school board members and teachers. The electoral activities of the WEA lead most senators and representatives to want the campaign assistance which the teacher organizations can provide, but, instead, their contacts with school board members are designed to forestall opposition rather than win support. Board members are often influential community figures, and the ambitious or antagonized board member could become a future opponent of the incumbent legislator. Board members are unlikely to provide much assistance to a legislative candidate even if they endorse his or her candidacy, but a board member who

is offended by legislative actions could become a troublesome enemy in the years ahead.

Relations between the university system and the legislature have also become more constituency oriented in the past decade. One university administrator describes this change:

> Once the university went to a few senior senators, usually on the Joint Finance Committee, when it had a problem. These were usually legislators without units of the university in their districts and who frequently had not had the benefit of higher education themselves. Today our best friends are those legislators who are concerned about local campuses.

Another university figure commented that there are few legislators who defend the university as a system any longer.

When the university system was created from the merger in the early 1970s, the expectation was that the system administration would carry the burden of legislative representation and that the campus chancellors would be called upon periodically to support system efforts. Today, university issues are divided between system priorities and campus matters. Issues of enrollments, the general funding formula, and coping with inflation are system priorities, and individual chancellors should not oppose the system administration on them. Individual campus projects and distinct campus programs are matters which chancellors frequently bring to the attention of their local legislators. Legislators report that the volume of contacts from local chancellors has increased significantly since the merger, and these contacts often take the form of appeals from unfavorable decisions made within the university system structure. Apparently the system administration itself occasionally softens the blow of an adverse campus decision by encouraging local chancellors to try to generate support for their programs, projects, or buildings among legislators. Legislators who occupy formal leadership positions in education indicate that they receive appeals from chancellors across the state for campus projects, and most frequently these chancellors came from campuses which are experiencing troubled times. As is typical of large state universities, rural legislators also hear from organized agricultural interests which champion the activities of the university's agricultural extension service.

Styles of Leadership in Education Policymaking

The most frequent style of legislative behavior is to avoid conflicts which can arouse individual and group antagonisms and endanger reelection prospects of incumbent legislators. For the reasons mentioned above, it has become more difficult for education leaders to avoid such conflict in recent

years. The education issues now considered by the Wisconsin legislature usually evoke rather predictable divisions among the senators and representatives. Some issues pit the Milwaukee legislative delegation against legislators from the balance of the state. Other proposals divide legislators into one group which favors a more responsible role for the state government in the conduct of education and another which opposes the growing volume of state mandates and supports the traditions of local discretion and home rule. Collective bargaining legislation has long divided advocates and opponents rather distinctly in the state, and in recent sessions a further division has appeared between labor union supporters and the new liberals. Fiscal conservatives are usually reluctant to endorse enhanced spending programs championed by traditional liberals while state school aid proposals normally lead representatives of well-to-do school districts to oppose the claims of legislators who represent school districts with few local resources. While some of these legislative divisions resemble partisan cleavages, most observers report that education policies do not normally unite one party in opposition to the other. Elementary and secondary education issues and higher education questions are usually considered less partisanly than most other matters that come before the Wisconsin legislature because, as one chairman noted, "We are dealing with kids not parties."

Most legislators try to navigate around the perils of legislative division and conflict. For the average legislator and for certain activities of education leaders this often means sponsoring legislative remedies to narrow problems affecting school operation that have come to the legislator's attention through constituent or interest group concern. As sponsor, the senator or representative usually tries to propose remedies that do not violate the interests of established education groups. While many legislators can be identified as more responsive to some education interests than others, most bills sponsored to respond to specific problems in school operations usually avoid intergroup conflict. Legislative proposals of this sort generally expand the education enterprise or leave the interests of established groups unaffected.

When proposed legislation does generate conflict among organized education constituencies, a frequent legislative preference is to defer action until the dispute can be resolved by the groups themselves. Both legislative and gubernatorial staffs have agreed, for example, that their principals have more to lose than to gain by routinely making judgments about the components of the budgets of individual units of the university system. The legislature's concern as defined by the Joint Finance discussion group is to guarantee that funds are distributed equitably and responsibly among the units and to allow occasionally an extra project for a local campus, but they prefer to have most such matters resolved by the Board of Regents. Education leaders generally

desire to avoid involvement in needless battles.

Sometimes a legislator will try to fashion a compromise in a contentious area by brokering the positions of the various groups, but this can be a risky endeavor. While the aim is to discover a solution which is acceptable to all groups, the danger is that all groups will feel that their interests have been sacrificed in the process. A recent group effort to authorize collective bargaining in higher education prompted some legislators to try to broker the various positions to yield an acceptable compromise. After much effort, legislators finally concluded that it was difficult to work with higher education interests. No bill was passed, and no solution to the problem discovered.

Avoiding a brokerage role among various claims and interests is usually impossible in the appropriations process. The standing education committees are sympathetic to the claims of educators, and many regard them as "defenders of the education establishment." The leaders of the Joint Finance Committee and its discussion groups are cast almost inevitably as defenders of the state treasury as claims for public support always exceed available resources. The leaders of Joint Finance meet weekly with the party leaders during the appropriation season to review major budgetary decisions and consider specific budget directions and needs. Leaders and members on Joint Finance know that the budget they present must respond to the concerns of enough members in the party caucuses to be enacted. Sometimes the discussion groups will anticipate and accommodate popular positions, and on other occasions they will establish a firm position from which they recognize they will be forced to compromise in caucus. While more legislators are interested in elementary and secondary funding than in higher education decisions, the appropriations process is one that demands a brokerage style in collective decision-making institutions.

The individual styles of the legislators who chair committees in the education area appear within the contours of these generalized parameters of legislative behavior. One recent education committee chairman departed from normal traditions and approached committee business on a partisan basis. The chairman's projects were the major items of committee business during the session, and the bills of minority members were not reported even if they had the support of most of the committee. Relationships among members became strained, and little substantive legislation was enacted. Another ambitious education leader was noted for his responsiveness to established education interests. This legislator would sponsor bills for organized groups and introduce resolutions in caucus to restore or enhance funding for projects which had been rejected earlier in the appropriations process. While this legislator did not have an especially favorable reputation among other legislators, his position and his role as a representative of resourceful groups

established his leadership status.

Another chairman in the education area would be described in the terms of the congressional literature as a middleman. There were only infrequent partisan divisions in the committee, and the chairman would assist both Republican and Democratic members move their bills on the floor. His positions reflected the mainstream of committee opinion, and he would persuade others of the validity of his views by force of personality. In contrast, a second chairman who guided the committee nonpartisanly was ideologically out of tune with the majority of the committee members and a majority of the legislature. His leadership rested on a reputation for diligence, and procedural fairness. Information was shared among all members of the committee, hearings were held on bills desired by the minority or the majority, staff assistance was available to all members to amend their bills, technical flaws of proposed bills were resolved in committee rather than on the floor, and no bills, even those sought by the chairman, were released from committee without the support of a majority of the committee. Bills that won the backing of this committee were usually adopted by the full legislature.

The Impact of Education Leadership

This examination of education leadership in the Wisconsin legislature is both fragmentary and time-bound. It focuses on a single element of the education policy system in the state, and it essentially ignores the balance of that system. Scant attention has been given to the role of the governor's office in the conduct of education policy, the effectiveness of education leadership in urban and other local areas and to the internal operations of the Department of Public Instruction. Certainly the quality of leadership in any part of the education policy system affects the character of education leadership in the legislature. The personal judgment and individual capacity of those who occupy critical positions in the university system and the Department of Public Instruction, for example, shape legislative action, and changes in the personnel who guide those institutions will in turn affect patterns of legislative behavior. In addition, this discussion reflects the characteristics of the education policy environment which existed in the late summer and early fall of 1980. These characteristics are subject to change. If education were again to become an expanding policy area in Wisconsin or if the political heritage of governmental reform were supplanted by some other dominant political tradition, legislative leadership in education would also be reshaped.

Despite these limitations, the presentation does permit review of our two central analytic questions: What factors explain most fully why education leadership in the Wisconsin legislature takes the form that it does and what factors account for the degree of impact that this leadership has on the conduct

of education in the state? The foundation of education leadership in the Wisconsin legislature appears to be legislative structure and position. The importance of the Joint Finance Committee in the legislative process and the critical role of formal position appear to be the distinctive features of the Wisconsin scene. A variety of personal legislative styles appear to be acceptable paths to leadership in the state, and specific types of linkage to the policy process do not appear to be obligatory. The impact of legislative action on state financial aid to local districts and on the objectives of the teachers unions affects the extent to which members accept the decisions of education leaders.

Appraisals of the impact of legislative leadership on education policy in Wisconsin rest on generalized impressions rather than on disciplined analyses, but some comments are possible. Legislative leaders in the state probably have their greatest influence on the fiscal aspects of education policy. Much of the initiative for change in the state financial support for education rests in the Joint Finance Committee. Legislative decisions which determine the amount of state support for education and which define standards for distributing that support among local school districts, however, are closely limited by widespread expectations that previous financial commitments will be maintained in the future. Individual education leaders in Wisconsin also affect state policy in specific areas where personal enterprise can avoid conflict with legislatively important education interests. Frequent examples of such actions appear as legislative remedies for narrow problems that arise in school operations, but another example occurs in the efforts of a legislator who chaired a specialized education committee. This chairman concentrated his activity in the higher education field where the political stakes were small and where there were few reasons for other legislators to object to his lead. His intelligence and his activity won the backing or at least the acquiescence of a few other legislators in key positions, and he came to dominate legislative policy in this area. In contrast, Wisconsin legislative education leaders in recent years have not mounted comprehensive reviews of the conduct of elementary and secondary education in the state, and they have not initiated legislation which fundamentally reorients school district behavior. Again, legislative structure appears to be the most important factor in explaining the impact of education leaders on education policy in the state. The level of expertise acquired by education leaders in Wisconsin and legislative relationships with the education bureaucracies also appear to affect the impact of leadership on the content of policy.

Students of relationships between education and state legislatures from the state can see in Wisconsin one view of the future. They find a legislature where traditional education leaders have been replaced by a younger group

which is more skeptical of educational authority.[16] Legislative appraisals of the conduct of higher education have become more constituency oriented, and organized teacher interests have become a dominant standard for evaluating legislative proposals in the elementary and secondary area. These changes have occurred in a legislature which is less centrally directed than it was a decade ago and more responsive to individual member preferences. The task ahead for education interests is to devise imaginative ways to relate to these new legislators in a policy environment which is less supportive of education agencies than was that of the past decades.

Chapter Five NOTES

1. Allen Rosenbaum, "University Reorganization in Wisconsin," in Leonard E. Goodall, editor, *State Politics and Higher Education* (Dearborn: LMC Associates, 1976), p. 301.
2. John Burns, *The Sometime Governments* (New York: Bantam Books, 1971), pp. 52–53.
3. Ronald D. Hedlund and Wilder Crane, *The Job of the Wisconsin Legislator* (Washington: American Political Science Association, 1971), p. 48.
4. *State of Wisconsin Blue Book, 1979–80* (Madison: Legislative Reference Bureau, 1979), p. 541.
5. National Center for Education Statistics, *The Condition of Education: 1980 Edition* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 28.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 125.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 141, 136.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 70, 72.
9. Dudley E. Brown, *State Policy Making for the Public Schools of Wisconsin* (Columbus: Educational Governance Project, Ohio State University, 1974), p. 15.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 61.
11. This paper does not consider Wisconsin's Vocational, Technical and Adult Education system which had a biennial 1977–79 budget of $124 million.
12. Alan Rosenthal, "Professional Staff and Legislative Influence in Wisconsin," in James A. Robinson, editor, *State Legislative Innovation* (New York: Praeger, 1973), pp. 183–224.
13. Hedlund and Crane, *The Job of the Wisconsin Legislator*, pp. 22–23.
14. *Blue Book*, p. 378.
15. *Blue Book*, p. 404.
16. Rosenbaum, "University Reorganization in Wisconsin."

17. Brown, *State Policymaking*, p. 69.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 71.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 65.
20. For early evidence of the emergence of this new breed of education legislator see Richard Lehne, *The Quest for Justice* (New York: Longman, 1979).

Chapter 6 Utah

Roald F. Campbell

Utah is a unique setting for the study of legislative education leadership. An unusual appropriations procedure involving every legislator, the strong influence of the Mormon Church, and separate environments for elementary and secondary and higher education policymaking characterize the context in which the legislative education leaders operate.

In the Utah legislature there are 104 members, 75 in the House of Representatives and 29 in the Senate. Eight of these 104 members, four in each body, have been identified as the principal legislative education leaders, and this study focuses on them.

The Utah legislature meets each year; a general session of 60 days duration is held in odd-numbered years and a budget session of 20 days duration is held in even-numbered years. The Senate has 11 standing committees, two of which have to do with education, one in higher education and the other in public education. The House also has 11 standing committees, two of which deal with education, one for higher education and one for public education. Between sessions there are joint interim committees, which include members from both Senate and House. The 11 interim committees—two in education, one in higher education and one in public education—ordinarily meet one day each month between legislative sessions.

In Utah the Joint Appropriations Committee includes every member of the House and Senate. It is headed by an Executive Committee composed of seven senators and nine representatives. There are nine Joint Appropriations subcommittees of which two are in education. One deals with higher education and is composed of 8 senators and 12 representatives. The other deals with public education and is composed of 6 senators and 12 representatives. Every member of the legislature serves on one of the nine Joint Appropriations subcommittees. All appropriations are finally brought together by the

Executive Committee; and the senator and representative who co-chair that committee are in a position to exercise great influence. Both of them are among the legislative education leaders dealt with here.

The Mormon Church (officially, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints) plays an extremely strong role in the Utah Legislature. Most members of the legislature are Mormons. Not only do they hold membership in the Church, they are frequently active officials such as ward bishops (leaders of a single congregation) or stake presidents (leaders of several congregations). Such positions in the Mormon Church have more than usual significance, since the Church has no paid or professional ministry and relies on lay members for leadership. Frequently, leadership in one or more church positions does much at the local level to identify possible candidates for the legislature and to convince voters that such persons are capable of leadership in other arenas. In any case, Church influence is pervasive in the state and in the legislature. The General Authorities of the Church do not have to indicate what stand legislators should take on moral questions; legislators are already firmly attached to those positions by their upbringing and beliefs.

This being the case, it is little wonder that Church influence is perceived to be indirect rather than direct. Only on a few questions, such as liquor by the drink and ERA, has the Church taken a definite stand. Editorials in the Church newspaper, *The Deseret News*, report those positions. Most legislators do not even need that much instruction on how to vote.

Some Utahans feel that the concomitants of Mormon affiliation are conservative social views. One informant summed up the Church's influence, "The legislature is subservient only to the Church, no one else, you buck the Church and you lose." He gave as examples ERA and the proposal to provide some state supervision of private schools. One respondent noted that there was some rightwing influence on legislators and another suggested that most legislators were rather orthodox Church members; said he, "that is how they get elected." The common Church membership makes the legislature very homogeneous. The tendency is to settle issues by reaching a consensus; there is very little conflict.

In 1979–80, 19 of the 21 members of the Senate were Republicans, as were 51 of the 75 members of the House. Most of the time party membership is a minor consideration, particularly in education. At the same time, "in the crunch," the party caucus position is a deciding factor. The distribution of power between the governor and the legislature is a live issue in the state, and since the current governor is a Democrat and both houses of the legislature have Republican majorities, partisanship may be a complicating factor. A legislative committee has recently given consideration to a plan to reconvene the legislature to reconsider any bills vetoed by the governor after the

legislature adjourns. The governor's strength is his control over the budget, but his power is somewhat diluted by the Board of Examiners (made up of the governor, secretary of state and attorney general) which approves certain appointments and types of expenditures.

Utah has two education agencies at the state level: one for higher education, the Board of Regents; and one for elementary and secondary education (generally referred to as public education), the State Board of Education. The Board of Regents is composed of 16 members, appointed by the governor with the consent of the Senate, and has jurisdiction over nine state universities and colleges. The State Board of Education is composed of 11 members, elected from regions of the state, and has general jurisdiction over the 40 school districts and special schools for the deaf and the blind. The State Board of Education also acts as the State Board for Vocational Education. The executive officer of the Board of Regents is the Commissioner of Higher Education and the executive officer of the State Board of Education is the State Superintendent of Public Instruction.

The public school agency, which includes the State Board of Education and the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, seems to be more independent of the legislature than the Board of Regents and the Commissioner of Higher Education, which constitute the higher education agency. This difference probably stems from two factors. First, there is a long tradition of autonomy accorded public education, particularly as exemplified in both constitutional and statutory provisions protecting public school revenues. Second, the State Board of Education and state superintendent tend to have a recognized constituency in the 40 local boards of education and their superintendents. In higher education, on the other hand, each of the nine institutions has a constituency, not the Regents or the commissioner.

The legislature's power vis-a-vis the agencies seems to be growing. Recently, the legislative interim committee on higher education met with the Board of Regents and insisted that the Regents clarify the status of the Commissioner of Higher Education with respect to the presidents of the institutions, or the legislature would write such clarification into law. The Regents took the directive and moved toward such clarification.

Just as public education and higher education are dealt with in separate legislative committees, the interest group environments for legislators concerned with these two aspects of education are quite distinct. In the public education realm, the Utah Education Association (UEA) is a powerful lobby. But several legislators seem to put more credence in positions taken by the State School Boards Association and the superintendents' organization than the UEA. The Parent Teacher Association is also seen as exercising considerable influence. Some legislators also mentioned the presence of special

interests representing vocational education, the handicapped, and the hispanic population. Overall, it seems that legislators listen to all of the interest groups, but do not see themselves as captive to them.

In higher education no group seems to represent the professors as effectively as the UEA represents the teachers in the public schools. Indeed, the public employees organization of the state, to which many of the classified employees at colleges and universities belong, seems to be more visible than any other interest group in higher education. Also active are a retired professor's group, student body representatives from some of the institutions, and a council of institutional presidents.

As a historical note, in 1969 Zeigler and Baer[2] made a study of lobbying in four state legislatures, one of which was Utah. In that year some 89 percent of the legislators were members of the Mormon faith, and that figure would be about the same today. They found that legislators perceived education to be the strongest lobby in the state, and that is still a common perception. A decade ago Utah was seen as a high lobby state, but lobby influence was thought to be relatively low. Today Utah still seems to be a high lobby state, but perhaps lobby influence is somewhat stronger. Earlier it was concluded that education was a high saliency issue, and that remains the case today. Earlier also the pervasive influence of the Mormon Church was pointed out, that influence is still present, although it is seldom direct on the part of the general Church officials.

The Structure of Legislative Education Leadership

Education leaders in Utah are primarily majority party members in visible positions. Leadership more often resides in the Senate. One representative indicated that in education the Senate "more often calls the shots." In fact, the only leaders who are of the minority party are senators with long tenure.

Actually, there are three centers of legislative education leadership: those interested in public education; those interested in higher education; and the two men who chair the Executive Committee of the Joint Appropriations Committee. The latter serve as gatekeepers on all appropriations, with one of them also serving on the Joint Appropriations subcommittee for public education, and the other on the Joint Appropriations subcommittee for higher education. In short, these two help fashion the education recommendations made to the Executive Committee and they then exercise key roles in passing upon those recommendations.

The small coterie of education leaders dominates, no matter what the particular education issue. However, there is some tendency to turn all issues into money issues which, in combination with the unique membership of the committee, helps to explain the hegemony of appropriations.

Staff is very important to the leadership in education. A major staff member with some assistants serves higher education and a similar arrangement pertains for public education. One respondent noted that there had been a real shift to more staff help over the last ten years. Legislators tended to agree that staff members did good work and that their recommendations were accepted "most of the time." There is almost a love-hate relationship between members and staff. On one hand, there is great need for staff help and appreciation for its quality; on the other hand, there is some resentment at being at all dependent upon such help.

Staff help is of three kinds: the legislative analysts deal mainly with finance; the legislative researchers deal with a variety of education issues; and the legal staff examines the legal implications of proposed legislation. These days so much reliance for information is placed on legislative staff that the importance of the state department and of lobbyists has been reduced.

The Composition of Legislative Education Leadership

The Utah education leaders are primarily natives who reside in urban areas. Most have been owners and managers of small businesses. Furthermore, they are all Mormon and have all held leadership positions in the Church.

These men are primarily attracted to education as a field because education is important as a public issue. Only a few have specific backgrounds in education; most are involved because they are concerned about their children's education and because public education and higher education together represent more than half of the state budget. The education committees and particularly the subcommittees on appropriations are powerful committees.

Some leaders are attracted to education because of strong public confidence and support for it. While the nation's faith in schools and colleges may be diminishing, provision for education remains, in the mind of many Utahans, the most important governmental function performed by the legislature. As one of the senators remarked, "When I first came up here they were going to put me on the welfare, but I found out that was a can of worms and requested education."

There is also some tendency for legislative education leaders to be drawn to the field because of their reformist impulses. Several acknowledged that they wished to effect some improvements in the schools, in the legislative process for education, or in the education agencies. A few legislators who devote themselves to education have been publicly recognized as "Utah educators of the year" by Phi Delta Kappa, the education honor society.

A final reason for involvement concerns regional interests. Some legislators may seek involvement in education to protect or advance the interests of a particular college or university in their region of the state.

Whatever the motives for their initial involvement, legislators who become education leaders "work at it." In short, they give time and energy to the task and they become informed. One legislator expressed it prosaically when he said, "You go to the meetings."

Almost all of the legislators also referred to the need for interpersonal skills in attaining leadership recognition. Again, this was said in different ways. One legislator indicated that he had learned how to deal with people in his business, another remarked that one had to be "aggressive but not abrasive." Other responses included such terms as honest, fair, articulate, and decisive. A few of the legislators noted that their training and professional qualifications had been factors in their recognition as education leaders. For instance, one member said, "I am the only CPA in the House and that fact seemed to bring me to the attention of the leadership when they wanted someone who could work with the budget."

Tenure is very important in developing influence. All of the education leaders have served at least four years, and the average tenure is eleven years. These leaders are also intending to stay in the legislature, and in 1980 almost all of them were running for reelection; one was running for lieutenant governor.

Lengthy tenure permits legislators time to study the issues and become experts in the field. But experts do not focus on education exclusively. Frequently an interest in education is coupled with an interest in taxation or budget. All of the legislators being considered here have membership on the joint subcommittees of appropriations for public education or for higher education and two of them serve as chairmen of the Executive Committee of the Joint Appropriations Committee. These leaders had to become expert in the budget and other financial matters as well as education.

There is some further specialization within education itself. The legislative committee structure divides public education from higher education. The legislative staff follows that same division--public education and higher education. The state agencies for education also conform to that division--the State Board of Education concerned chiefly with public education and the Board of Regents concerned chiefly with higher education. Some legislators not only become specialists in higher education, they become specialists, or perhaps more appropriately advocates, for one institution in their region of the state.

Such specialization may not always be beneficial for the total field of education. One respondent indicated, "We can hardly get the two groups to speak to each other." It should be noted, however, that in the Executive Committee of the Joint Appropriations Committee the two groups converge.

There, the demands for higher education and the demands for public education, as well as the demands of all other state programs, must be weighed, each against the others.

Linkages in Education Policymaking

Legislative education leaders in Utah are linked to individuals outside the legislature by long established patterns. Some legislators are apparently secure in information received from a few friends and trusted advisors. Others feel the need to secure advice from a wider range of people. The latter would go to the legislative analyst for information on finance and the state superintendent on certification. In other words, his contact would vary by the issue. The most notable example of variation according to issues is the existence of an entirely different set of linkages for those legislators involved in public education and those involved in higher education.

In the case of public education, important contacts are with the UEA and its full-time lobbyist and the State Superintendent of Public Instruction. Local superintendents of schools are important to urban and suburban legislators, particularly those from Salt Lake City and its suburbs. PTAs also count. Contacts outside the legislature are most important for information on financing issues, the technicalities of the state aid formula in particular. Information has also been sought on proposed changes in teacher certification requests.

In the case of higher education, linkages are with the Commissioner of Education and institutional presidents and staff members. To these sources legislators turn for information about higher education budget allocations among and within institutions and about proposed student fee schedules. Interestingly, legislators do not establish regular patterns of communication with the Board of Regents. Indeed, one legislator said, "they don't know we exist."

Legislators have also been known to indicate that the Regents do not properly do their job. Relatively minor campus operations can be blown up into important issues. Publication of the student newspaper at the University of Utah became such an issue when some legislators met with the Board of Regents and the President of the University. The President indicated that he had little control over the student paper and its choice of articles. One legislator turned to the President and said, "You mean you have no authority over the operation of the university?" The implication was rather strong that the Regents ought to select presidents who could and would exercise authority.

Legislative education leaders involved in higher education have sets of

contacts with two groups who rarely figure in the discussion of those interested in public education. They are Church officials and the business community. In the case of the Church, specific Church leaders, not the top hierarchy of the Church, were sometimes named. Another linkage, perhaps more subtle, was noted in Church positions held or previously held by some of the legislators. For instance, some are former mission presidents and some are currently in key Church posts, and even more have been, or are still, bishops and stake presidents.

Legislators do have their own internal source of information, the staff. Staff is seen as a particularly important source during the legislative oversight process. There is a new office, the office of the Legislative Auditor General, established by the legislature in 1975 under provision of a constitutional amendment approved by the voters in 1972. The constitutional language reads:

> The Legislature shall appoint a Legislative Auditor General to serve at its pleasure. The Legislative Auditor shall have authority to conduct audits of any funds, functions, and accounts in any branch, department, agency or political subdivision of this state and shall perform such other related duties as may be prescribed by the Legislature. He shall report to and be answerable only to the Legislature.[1]

Statutory provisions give more specific direction to the Legislative Auditor General. He is charged with determining the effectiveness of state programs in accomplishing their intended objectives.

In accordance with the constitutional and statutory provisions, the office of Legislative Auditor General has now been in operation for over five years. Performance audits have been conducted on many areas of state government. Recent audits made in education included a study of normal school scholarships and a study of public school transportation. Legislators see the office of the Auditor General as an important instrument in legislative oversight. The budget for the office of Auditor General in 1981 is $675,000, and 21 professionals are employed by the office.[2]

Among the national organizations legislators turn to are the National Conference of State Legislatures, the Education Commission of the States, the Council of State Governments, and the Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education. A few legislators apparently seek information from several of these sources, a few others said that they skim information from these organizations, and some admitted that they pay little or no attention to such information. Participation in these organizations seems to be limited. Some legislators indicated that they used to participate but did no longer. One reason for restricted participation may be parochialism, a feeling that Utah considers its concerns as relatively isolated, unrelated to others.

Styles of Leadership in Education Policymaking

Utah legislative education leaders tend to see themselves as experts in the field of education. They see their role as one of presenting "the facts" to the rest of the legislature, and securing passage of legislation by force of information.

Many leaders feel they come upon this role as "teacher" naturally. It is a matter of personal preference or disposition. For instance, one said that he was a "student by nature." Another said that "he had a natural curiosity." Still another explained that he "had always sought verification." Finally, another said that "going after the facts was in keeping with his approach to life."

Some legislators also alluded to their training as the basis for their pedagogical style. The lawyer in the group noted that he had been trained to ferret out the facts. Another referred to the fact that he was the only CPA in the House, and he ascribed such training as basic to his style of legislative performance. A third legislator simply referred to his graduation from college as giving him a foundation from which to inquire as to the merits of the case.

The individuals also realize that their personal inclination toward a professional stance is reinforced by the general culture which rewards those who know or are perceived as knowing. These responses are caught up in the following phrases: "Our culture respects authority;" "We reward those who speak with authority;" and "An informed person gets positive reinforcement from his colleagues."

Practice mirrors perception to some extent. That is, leaders who see themselves as experts do conduct themselves in this manner in many ways. For example, they respond to questions in committee and elsewhere, present the school bill on the floor, speak intelligently, use information to defend pet projects, appear before education groups, and support their stands. However, a less talked-about but equally important side of leadership is the ability to effect compromise, to "play the game." One has to be able to bring the minority along, get people together, bring the committee along, hammer out the state budget, and adjudicate the dollars available. One leader felt that as president and manager of a sizable business he has learned "how to compromise" and the skill prepared him well, but generally legislators prefer to talk about their expert role and admit their brokering abilities as kind of a necessary evil.

The agreement on the importance of expertise translates into a relatively consensual approach to educational policymaking. The culture of Utah seems to reward more those who seek consensus than it does those who are abrasive. Beyond respect for the facts is the common church membership that gives

the legislature homogeneity and cohesiveness. One legislator said, "If the Church has a position on an issue, they [the legislators] line up."

The Impact of Legislative Education Leadership

The legislature plays a very important role in Utah education policy. The legislature shapes what is decided in education, and its role has great legitimacy for two reasons. First, education is a high interest area in the state, and those who shape education are seen as performing an essential public service. Second, the state avows an egalitarian view of education. This view leads legislators to support programs designed to equalize opportunities among the 40 school districts. Such a view has also supported the establishment and maintenance of many colleges and universities so that college opportunity might be readily available to prospective college students. To be sure, each of these many institutions also receives strong political support from its regional constituency. Still, egalitarianism lends legitimacy to such political activity.

The primary route for the exertion of legislative influence is the budget. The "power of the purse," expressed through the finance formula, means that the legislature dominates funding arrangements. Other important legislative roles are the establishment of standards regarding items such as class size, and the development of programs for special populations, such as vocational and special education.

Legislative control over higher education is farther reaching than its control over public education. The Board of Regents, a creature of statutory law, has less independent authority than the constitutionally authorized State Board of Education. The legislature has actually limited the number of institutions of higher education in the state and actually approved the level of program that could be offered at each institution. Some institutions offer only two-year programs, some offer four-year programs, and some do graduate programs as well. At the graduate level programs are actually allocated among the institutions by the Board of Regents, but these decisions are subject to legislative scrutiny. The legislature also determines tuition payments at colleges and universities and approves all capital funding arrangements.

In summary, the legislature makes much of the education policy in the state. As elsewhere local control often serves more in the breach than in practice. It is an honored tradition but the legislature is increasingly assertive through the budget process and the establishment of programs. Institutional autonomy, the counterpart to local control in higher education, is also a respected goal, but one which appears to be subservient to certain statewide prerogatives as exerted by the legislature.

A number of themes characterize legislative policymaking in Utah. These

elements have been stable, enduring through changes in specific issues of educational policy. Education in Utah is a high saliency issue. Despite much skepticism recently on the part of the public generally about the performance of schools and colleges, Utahans still seem to value highly their educational institutions. This is not to say that certain programs of those institutions are not questioned or that the behavior of certain instructors and administrators in those institutions has not come under scrutiny. But overall, the public and the legislature still have faith in the schools and colleges of the state. Education posts in the legislature are still preferred assignments.

The Mormon Church has a subtle but pervasive influence on the legislature and on its education leadership. For the most part, this is a cultural phenomenon and not an overt effort on the part of the top Church officials to exercise influence. Most legislators are Mormon and most of them have held and still hold official leadership posts in the Mormon Church. They support Church positions on moral and related issues.

There is a marked separation in policymaking and in operating procedures for public education and for higher education in Utah. This separation is clearly evident in the committee structure of the legislature, in the staff of the legislature, in the operation of the two education agencies, and in the existence of interest groups unique to each sector. Only in the Executive Committee of the Joint Appropriations Committee are the money demands of these two institutions brought together. Every member of the Utah Legislature serves on one of the Joint Appropriations subcommittees. This arrangement accentuates further the importance of the money committees over the non-fiscal committees. Legislators seem to prize membership on the joint subcommittees on public education and higher education more than they do membership on the non-fiscal committees dealing with these two functions. Moreover, as suggested above, the two legislators who serve as co-chairmen of the Executive Committee of the Joint Appropriations Committee are in a position to exercise great influence over appropriations for education, which represent about half of the state budget.

As in other states, there has been a substantial increase over the past decade in staff help available to the legislative committees. Staff assistance is supplied by four offices: Legislative Research, the Legislative Fiscal Analyst, Legal Counsel, and the Legislative Auditor General. While legislative staff assistance has been augmented, staff help in the governor's office, in the agencies, and in the institutions also has increased. Some concern with overdependence on staff is developing and questions of "how much is enough" will probably be raised soon.

Provisions for legislative oversight have grown considerably during the past decade. These provisions are of two kinds. There is the staff work that

goes on at the behest of the interim committees, which request staff studies. Also, there has been the establishment of a new office, the Legislative Auditor General, which is charged with auditing the performance of state programs and state agencies. With a sizable budget and a staff of trained auditors, the office has responded to requests from the legislature.

Utah is somewhat isolated from the main currents affecting legislatures in many other states. There is a geographical isolation; even with jet travel, attendance by Utah legislators at national meetings is more difficult in terms of time and money. Perhaps, too, Utah has considerable feelings of self-sufficiency. There is much about this self-reliance that is admirable; and there are times when it may appear parochial.

Chapter Six NOTES

1. Harmon Zeigler and Michael A. Baer, *Lobbying: Interaction and Influence in American State Legislatures* (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1969).
2. Legislative Auditor General, *Fifth Annual Report to the Utah State Legislature* (Salt Lake City, Utah, January 14, 1980), p. 1.

Chapter 7 New Hampshire

Susan Fuhrman

Legislative policymaking for education in New Hampshire must be understood in the context which defines all state services. Because of a strong belief in local control, the state takes a minimal role in service provision and aid to localities. In education, New Hampshire ranks last in the state share of education costs. Eighty-eight percent of funding for elementary and secondary education is borne by local school districts. The University of New Hampshire (UNH) is the state university in the nation most supported by tuition and least supported by state general revenue. Therefore, the stakes involved in legislative deliberations over education are small, relative to those in other states. Yet, underlying virtually every question the legislature considers is the crucial issue of whether the state role should be expanded; so even relatively minor initiatives can be very significant. In many senses, New Hampshire in the seventies and eighties is at a crossroads. It must redefine or at least reexamine the restrictions placed on state government in light of the growing service needs of its populace. This tension makes educational policymaking in New Hampshire a fascinating subject for study.

It is interesting that the state which has the least to say about educational policy in local districts has the most people in a position to say it. The New Hampshire legislature is the largest in the nation. Although there are only 24 senators, 400 representatives are seated in the General Court. There is no irony, however, in the juxtaposition of the large size and relatively limited role of the New Hampshire legislature. The House was intentionally designed to permit maximum local representation and maximum local control. It is almost direct democracy. When you are dealing with the House, in the words of one legislator, you are virtually dealing with the constituency itself. "You

are taking that guy off the street and putting him in a seat in a House, and he is voting."

The size of the House has important effects on the policymaking process. The role of committees is intensified. Their recommendations are more likely to be accepted, since chairmen are highly visible and the volume of bills to be processed is enormous. A lobbyist said, "Two thousand bills were filed in 1979, most of them garbage, really awful bills. Now part of them were awful in conception, but many were awful in draft too. That I think puts a terrible burden on the legislature." Size also exaggerates the power of leadership, since there are so many people to organize and such a flow of bills to control. The speaker's responsibility for appointing the committee chairmen takes on added significance when those chairmen and party leaders are perhaps only the representatives known to the whole House.

Another indication of the localistic culture is the amateur nature of the legislature. State business is not seen as very important. There is a general feeling that whatever does get done should be decided by ordinary working men and women who represent their towns' interests. Legislators are truly citizens, meeting for fewer than 90 days every biennium and receiving only $200 plus expenses for their legislative labors. Leaders receive $50 more. One senator explained that New Hampshire was a big contrast in this respect to its neighbor Massachusetts: "The man that has the job I have there makes $48,000 a year; we make $100 a year. He has secretaries, he gets an office expense. We pay our own phone bills and sometimes they're very heavy."

Despite a conscious effort to professionalize the legislature by providing regular committee meeting rooms and beefing up resources, there is still very little staff capacity. Legislators have access to the drafting and research services of the legislative services agency; there is a budget assistants office for budget analysis; and very recently the state library has acquired new computer software packages with extensive data bases. However, there remains very little assistance on substantive matters. One committee researcher in the House serves six standing committees, including education.

The local control principle also influences the partisan nature of the legislature. The legislature is Republican and always has been. But whereas in 1979–80 the Senate had a 12-to-12 Republican-Democratic tie, the more salient division was the 13-to-11 conservative-liberal split. Conservatives and liberals divide on many issues, and chief among them is the question of the size of the state role and the revenues to support state functions. New Hampshire is the only state without a broad-based tax, a general sales or an income tax. State revenues derive from a patchwork of special taxes and user charges. Anyone who supports the imposition of a more general tax source may be labelled a "broad-baser," an epithet which could serve as a filter for all

future pronouncements and seriously detract from the person's effectiveness.

One senator addressed the relative importance of partisanship:

> There has been only one partisan issue in the state of New Hampshire in the legislature in the ten years I've been in it and that was an election between two senators. Lines are not drawn on a partisan basis; they are drawn on the basis of what the philosophies of education ought to be.

Even though party caucuses take positions on major issues, there is little enforcement of the party position. The conservative-liberal dichotomy, particularly over state role and revenues, supercedes party, despite the strong organizational role played by party leadership in the legislature.

The limited nature of state government is apparent in the executive branch too. The governor is the only state official elected statewide, but he is elected every two years and must work with a five-member biennially elected executive council which confirms all his appointments. The State Board of Education, appointed by the governor and council, in turn appoints the Commissioner of Education. The commitment to local control of education and the belief in limiting state power is strikingly apparent to even a casual visitor to Concord, the state capital. The State Department of Education (SDE) is located in four different buildings which are separated from one another. There is no appearance of strong coordination or unified direction. As a lobbyist put it:

> It's spread all over the city. There's so little proximity for communication. I had contact with every single division and I serve on a number of committees for the department representing my association, so I know what's going on. People in the department don't. They're doing similar things, or they have information useful to someone else and they have no way of communicating.

Given the amateur nature of the legislature, the relatively small staff capacity and the department's limitations, including serious problems getting and managing data, it is not surprising that education lobbies play an important role in New Hampshire education politics. The major groups are the New Hampshire Education Association (NHEA), the New Hampshire Federation of Teachers (NHFT), the New Hampshire School Boards Association (NHSBA), the New Hampshire School Administrator's Association (NHSAA) and the New Hampshire Association of School Principals (NHASP). The latter three often speak as one on legislative issues through the Joint Educational Council.

All these groups capitalize on the legislator's need for information. A lobbyist felt she was perceived by the education committees as a resource. A senator said, "We use the lobbyists very heavily; I depend heavily upon

lobbyists to bring some of the facts." The record of the lobbyists supports these statements. In 1979 the Joint Educational Council supported 40 bills (in fact initiating 10), of which 34 passed. It opposed 17 bills of which 12 were killed and the other 5 were sent to study; none passed. On higher education, the legislature hears from the chancellor and, according to one legislator, "a very powerful unstructured alumni lobby, particularly in the House." On budget matters the university business manager is perceived as important.

Despite the role lobbyists play, their power in New Hampshire is curbed by the size of the House. A legislator said he would never vote to reduce the size of the House because it was relatively impervious to influence.

> You can't buy them. There's no lobbyist group that's going to buy 400 people. . . . The lobbyists get to a small body. They can get to the Senate if they have to, if the issue is right. There is no way they're going to get to that 400-member House.

Even more important in limiting the role of lobbies is the philosophy of local control. Very little gets done at the state level; the balance of power is clearly with the locals. There is some change in the direction of more state participation, but the trend is very gradual.

One final point needs to be made about state government and education in New Hampshire before proceeding to a discussion of leadership in education. The state of New Hampshire does not play a large role in any service area, the revenues are just too limited. What is said about education may apply in many respects to other policy areas, more so in New Hampshire than in other states where the local control tradition may have persisted in education but has no bearing on other services.

The Structure of Education Leadership

In the New Hampshire legislature education leaders are likely to occupy visible positions. None of the New Hampshire leaders identified in the initial informant survey were general members of the legislature. Two-thirds were committee chairmen or vice chairmen; the other third were party leaders. Leaders were in both houses, but more representatives were named than senators. Three-quarters of the identified leaders were representatives. Also three-fourths of all those named were Republicans. Leadership is fairly dispersed, with the money committees serving as important power centers, distinct and apart from the education policy committees, particularly in the House.

The size of the New Hampshire House accounts for many of these findings.

There are 23 standing committees in the House with an average of 17 members each. Since representatives serve on only one committee they specialize in the subject area. Their expertise is acknowledged by other members who tend to defer to committee judgment. One legislator said, "You don't fight a committee because a committee has access to good knowledge. The smart committee down there on the floor is a tough committee to fight." House committees are relatively informal, particularly the education committee, but it is the chairman who refers bills to subcommittees, schedules hearings, funnels research requests, leads mark-up sessions, and serves on conference committees. The chair have a great deal of authority. Their position is enhanced by the tendency to accept committee decisions within policy areas and the difficulty of gaining visibility in the House.

Party leaders also get recognition. A party leader in the House made sense of her nomination as an education leader in the following fashion. She was interested in education as she was a former educator. The leadership position gave her a platform for expressing that interest.

> I think my position as one of the party leaders helps me—it furthers anything I'm doing. It puts me out front quicker than it would just any legislator. So I think more people in the House know me.

Size also explains why most of the education leaders named serve in the House. There are simply more representatives to choose from and there is more of an opportunity to specialize in the House than in the Senate. In the latter body, where there are 17 committees and only 24 members, senators serve on at least three committees.

One legislator who has served in both chambers feels that it is harder to become an education leader in the Senate for another reason. The Senate is so small that it is difficult for a member to champion any unpopular legislation or buck a majority movement. Innovation may be stifled "because there is much more pressure on each individual person and a lot less creativity out of people. There's so few of them and you need them . . . you can never afford to make an enemy." Perhaps these reasons, as well as the persuasion of particular individuals in power, explain why the Senate is viewed as more conservative.

The dominance of Republicans among legislative education leaders reflects Republican control of the legislature. Republicans are in positions of authority. However, one Democratic leader in the House who is very active and has sponsored a great deal of education legislation was cited as an education leader, and the Chairman of the Senate Education Committee in 1979–80 was a Democrat. He is very senior and long involved in education. Democrats are also disproportionately sponsors of bills which are mentioned

as important policy initiatives in education. One Republican was struck by the heavy involvement of Democrats on some of these issues:

> In fact there were more Democrats on the $32 million voc-ed bill, more Democrats than Republicans. In the handicapped legislation, which picked up the excess costs of special education, there were more Democrats than Republicans again.

Some education leaders exercise leadership primarily in the policy realm. When it comes to fiscal issues, however, the important groups are the House Appropriations Committee and the Senate Finance Committee. Half the education leaders serve on one of these committees. Money issues are growing in importance in New Hampshire as in other states. In New Hampshire, however, there is so little state money that the expenditure of even a small amount can become a major issue. Because there is an increasing belief that the state should not mandate programs or standards on local districts without funding them, important mandates are often written into regulation without legislation. What remain for the legislature are either housekeeping bills or bills which carry an appropriation, and those, of course, go to the money committees. A prominent SDE spokesman said, "the finance people are very important to us. They are more important than really the education committees overall."

Virtually every legislator offered an opinion on the importance of the money committees and the necessity to fund what is mandated. A senator used an example of a competency testing program. In the 1979 session a prominent senator introduced his own version. The teachers opposed it strongly as did other educational interests who preferred the Commissioner's emerging plan. The senator discussing the issue opposed the testing program on other grounds, however:

> The most important point though, the reason that I fought it vigorously . . . was because the state was not going to send money back to the locals to be able to pay for the testing. And I thought that was very important. If we're going to mandate it, tell them they had to do it, I think we should pay for it.

The bill was killed; competency testing was left to departmental regulation. As this example illustrates, important education issues are often handled outside the legislature and those that come through the legislature are likely to involve money, no matter how small the amount.

In the Senate there are strong ties between the education and finance committees, primarily because the Senate Education Committee Chairman and Vice-Chairman both serve on finance. Although once on finance, "you've got to throw away your education hat more or less and be sympathetic of

welfare, health and other departments, look at all the priorities," there is no doubt that the overlap of membership enhances the chance of education legislation getting funded and enhances the role of the senators involved. A bill which gets through education can still be killed in appropriations if it is not funded. Similarly, an education leader can enforce his priorities by supporting the funding of those education bills he particularly favors and by favoring education legislation over other policy areas.

By contrast, in the House the appropriations committee is a distinct power center. There is little lobbying or informal interchange between the education committee and appropriations. Appropriations feels that if a bill gets to it, the education committee wants it funded; they rely on the "winnowing down process in the standing committee." They don't expect or need to be lobbied by education proponents because "there's no money around, anyway." On their part, education committee members will not go after a big initiative unless there is general knowledge that there will be some surplus funds. The handicapped legislation in the 1977 session came about when "someone mentioned that [then Governor] Thompson has got five or six million bucks in his pocket." It is not customary for a legislator to sponsor legislation with a price tag and then go to appropriations to try to find the money.

The structure of leadership is not heavily impacted by staff capacity in New Hampshire. The majority of legislative education leaders can control staff resources because of their positions, but staff is so scarce that legislators are used to functioning without it.

Staffers themselves feel that their impact is limited. They virtually never influence the agenda. The commiteee staff primarily supplies facts on the history of a bill and on what other states are doing. One staffer indicated that it is possible to exert some influence through the write-up:

> In my reports I always include a section of questions for the committee to ask in hearings. I'm very careful to put pro and con questions in. This is probably the biggest impact. . . . If you sat through the hearing and felt frustrated because as a staff person you can't ask that question, you can at least include it in your memo.

Staff may have a greater impact in very informal ways:

> I will sit with the full committee and then when we are alone, the committee might say "Well what do you think of this" and I can be very frank.

The very fact, though, that this individual staffs many committees, which have over 100 legislators as members, means that she cannot attend every

meeting or spend the time she would like on research. One education committee member is considering hiring her own legislative intern to do background work, such as gathering statistics on programs.

The structure of legislative education leadership has been rather stable in New Hampshire. The average leader has had at least six years of tenure in the legislature, a considerable period in a legislature which turns over a third of its membership every two years. Those who are recognized as legislative leaders in education are in positions of authority, positions which carry considerable weight and give an important podium to the individuals who inhabit them. The importance of these positions may gradually diminish, however. Sunshine laws which require open meetings expose more legislators to the media and public. Position may be a less essential prerequisite for visibility. The new computerized information systems give the individual legislator more resources. It may be that in the future a list of legislative education leaders in New Hampshire would include some ordinary members in addition to those with positions of influence.

The Composition of Education Leadership

Legislative education leaders in New Hampshire are involved in education because of their personal backgrounds and experiences. Interest does not develop as a result of legislative service; it is there upon election to the legislature. These legislators were teachers, school board members, or involved in some other education-related experience before running for legislative office.

One legislator explained how her background contributed to her choice of committee:

> Before I went to the legislature, I was a teacher and member of the board of education. The one thing led to the other. When I went to the legislature, in determining which committee I should be on, I thought I already had some expertise in educational law. It seemed logical that I should go on to the education committee, and I've been there ever since.

The Senate President, who is active in education, is a college professor. The Chairman of the Senate Education Committee had been a football, basketball and baseball official at the college level for most on his life. The Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee was a teacher and then executive director of the New Hampshire Education Association for eleven years. Some leaders even credit an interest in education with prompting them to run for the legislature. One, a school teacher, ran because of her concern about special education. She had lived in Vermont and worked in a residential treatment center that took New Hampshire children but had difficulty getting

paid from the state. When she moved to New Hampshire she ran for the House to work on a remedy for the situation.

House Education Committee members almost all have a background in education. Those who were not educators or school board members were university students or trustees. Because education committee members come to the committee with prior interest, they tend to stay on it, leaving only to move up to leadership, to appropriations or to leave the legislature. In fact, eight of the 20 members on the 1979 House Education Committee had served on it since 1975. An additional five served since 1977.

Another important reason to stay on education is that the committee is visible and active. Everyone back home cares deeply about education, and an education bill can bring important benefits to a local area. One legislator got funding for a regional vocational center in her home district, another was able to push through a large capital project for his home UNH campus. Both achievements brought the legislators publicity and kudos from constituents. Large injections of funding for capital projects are rare in New Hampshire, but locals care about legislative education policy even when there is no question of pork-barrel benefits. The issue of the size of the state role in education is very salient. It seems that locals expect legislative education leaders to protect them by preventing further mandating of programs which burden local districts. They pay a great deal of attention to what happens in education.

Visibility can mean increased vulnerability, but it does not in New Hampshire. Former education committee chairmen and members have risen to leadership positions. Former education committee members have been able to move onto appropriations, which is generally acknowledged as a more prestigious, important assignment because of the critical nature of money decisions. Those who do move on, however, maintain their interest in education because their interest was deeply rooted.

The education background of legislative education leaders does not necessarily make them specialists in education to the extent that they forsake other policy areas. House Education Committee members specialize the most in education. They serve on just one committee and consider education as their basic mission. Senate Education Committee members, however, are more likely to refer to other policy areas. One legislator ranked retirement policy and insurance as areas which were almost, though not quite, as important to him as education. Similarly, money committee members do not see themselves as specialists in education, even when they have a background in the area. Said one:

> Perhaps I might have a bit more natural interest in it than any other area, but

> you know when you're on appropriations you end up having to take a look at the whole picture. There are a lot of ball games in town beside the education one. It's like being at the bottom of a big funnel. All this stuff is stirring around but eventually it all comes down to the appropriations committee . . . to steer the course and we try to have an even hand for all legitimate concerns of state government. . . . People have intense levels of interest in a whole myriad of subjects and I don't try to support education any more than that.

Legislative education leaders do specialize within education. Even those who do not spend all their time on education may have certain areas of expertise. For example, a party leader in the house is seen as a "special ed person." A senator is interested in vocational education because his children graduated from vocational-technical schools and he thinks the economic future of New Hampshire depends on them.

Sometimes specialization in a subarea develops as a result of involvement in legislative issues. Working on an issue for a number of years makes for expertise. There are also occasions when a chairman will purposely create an expert:

> I push him into it, brow beat them into it. I say, "I need you guys to find out what (a particular subject) is all about. I'm going to have to draw on you. We're going to be in a floor fight and I'll need you." The floor fight is the key to it. They envision themselves standing up and defending that agency and they're not going to get caught with their drawers down.

The use of subcommittees, a relatively recent development, also tends to further subspecialization.

Special expertise can be a criterion in the choice of bill sponsors. When the Commissioner of Education has legislation he wishes sponsored the person he would choose would depend on the issue. For example, there is a member from the northern, most rural part of the state who is approached for legislation dealing with cooperative districts. However, subspecialization has its limits. It has not grown to the point where certain legislators are seen as gatekeepers on particular issues. There are people considered experts on certain issues whose allegiance would be appreciated but their failure to support a bill would probably not cause its sponsor to back down. A special education expert said that if others sponsored a special education bill, "they would come and talk to me about it and see how I felt about it. Usually they don't feel they have to clear it with me, and I don't feel that way."

In addition, the significance attached to expertise in a particular area can be transitory because issues gain and lose importance. A legislator can work on an issue for a while and then lose interest in the area out of frustration

from failure to accomplish a goal or a sense of completion upon accomplishment. Finally, political philosophy may be a much more important criterion than expertise in the choice of a bill's sponsor or the search for support. The State Department of Education identifies certain legislators as liberal and conservative, and it often seeks sponsors by those characteristics rather than substantive subspecialty. In summary, legislators do become known as experts on particular education issues, but that reputation is less important than a general credibility on education matters. Other factors, such as philosophy, outweigh specialization as traits by which legislators are characterized.

Although subspecialties come and go, and may not always be very important, a background in education and a deep interest in that area are likely to remain characteristics of New Hampshire legislative education leaders in the future. Some newer members of the House Education Committee have a particular interest in UNH governance, for example. The emphasis may change but not the history of commitment to education. Perhaps if the state took a major policy shift toward increased funding of education, the community of those specially interested in education would broaden to include more taxpayer, business, farm, and labor types. At the moment any foreseeable change is likely to be so gradual that it should not mean great change in the composition of legislative education leadership.

Linkages in Education Policymaking

The legislative education leaders in New Hampshire are strongly tied to outside groups within the state. They are linked to the State Department of Education, to educational interest groups and to local educators, relying on all three for information and for contacts.

The importance placed on communication with outsiders has two sources. First, citizens are encouraged to initiate contact with legislators. New Hampshire's founding fathers planned a legislature which comes closer than any other to direct democracy. That ideal lingers, and legislators are treated as ordinary citizens who are easily approachable. They are expected to welcome input from other New Hampshirites and, in fact, they do forge strong ties with groups and individuals outside the legislature. A second reason for the outward orientation of the legislature is the lack of staff capacity. Legislators must rely on agencies and lobbies for information, having little alternative.

The State Department of Education initiates much of what the state does in education. Most bills, although not some major ones like the 1977 special education bill, start in the department. SDE develops a shopping list of legislation at the beginning of each session and then seeks sponsors. One legislator estimated that of the 15 or so education bills she sponsored in the

1979 session, at least half were proposed by the department.

After identifying a sponsor, the department educates him and makes sure he is involved in the writing of the bill. "The deadliest thing," according to an SDE official, "is that you have a sponsor who just signs his or her name and then doesn't know the bill." This process is seen by the department as its most important role vis-à-vis the legislature. It feels its greatest input is in formal committee hearings where it testifies in detail. The hearings are critical for both policy matters and budget. In the latter case, the appropriations committee meets with heads of divisions and programs within the department as well as with legislative liaison personnel. SDE provides information in less formal ways as well. Each legislative education leader indicated that he often telephones or visits the department, seeking information on particular areas. In developing the special education legislation of 1977, one of the co-sponsors went to the department for data almost immediately after hearing that there might be some available funds in the budget. Another said:

> The Department of Education is marvelous. It provides any information I need. When I first started sponsoring the vocational bill I was really new to that. I went to the State Department and said "Give me everything you've got. I want to know how this bill was conceived, what the long range projections are, what you see in financing." They gave me all the stuff.

Despite legislative reliance, departmental data are not always accurate. The department admits to completely mispredicting special education costs and is very concerned with its poor performance in that area. Part of the problem is that SDE has had to rely on Central Data Processing which keeps its records. Distressed with that unit's failure to report out data appropriately, some of the divisions in the education department are rebuilding their own data capacity.

The department is a prime source of political contacts as well as information. Its staff lobby legislators on important bills before they even go to committee. Legislators indicate that they often talk informally about issues with department personnel, trying out ideas on them. Some observers feel that legislators do not always question department sources sufficiently. The tendency is to accept department data or testimony without challenge.

In the case of higher education, the legislature hears from the UNH chancellor and the presidents of individual institutions. Legislators feel that the chancellor's budgetary requests—the university gets a lump-sum budget—are usually treated with considerable respect, but that more scrutiny is given to other higher education issues. Some are skeptical of what UNH spokesmen tell them. While the State Department of Education speaks for all of those

in elementary and secondary education, the university trustees are not always seen as adequate representatives of faculty or students.

Reliance on the Department of Education does not preclude use of information supplied by educational interest groups. They are sources of analytical input—teacher data from the NHEA or a breakdown on PL 94-142 provided by the Coalition of the Handicapped. Lobbyists feel that interest groups are most adept at supplying information about local districts. The department gets its data on local districts from the forms it requires school officials to complete. If it needs information not requested on those forms, it may have a hard time getting it. The interest groups can contact membership in the field for information and supply legislators with district breakdowns and profiles that the department does not have.

Lobbyists exert their influence in formal testimony at hearings and sometimes are even invited to comment or respond to a question in committee executive session. A bill's sponsor may make a special effort to turn out representatives of small, less well-organized groups at a hearing. But the large, statewide associations have paid lobbyists who prepare position papers and testify regularly. Certain legislators can be relied on to sponsor bills for particular groups, but this practice arouses no suspicion. Their group allegiance is seen as a natural result of their backgrounds. For example, a former school board member would be expected to be receptive to NHSBA's requests for sponsorship.

A very important aspect of the legislative education leader's job is staying in touch with local school people in his district. For example, one legislator said that she must maintain contact because there are a variety of school districts contained in her legislative district. The school district she lives in is property rich but some of the others are property poor and she wants their insights on proposed legislation. Legislators often sponsor bills on the request of local educators. A senator gave an example of a bill he introduced to stagger school board terms:

> I talked with the school attorney to be sure that he gave me the wording. I came over here to what we call our legislative office. They have the lawyers in there and they write up the bill for me. And then I go back and talk with my superintendent or the school board and say "now is this exactly what you want?"

In contrast, the governor and his staff are not seen as important contacts on most education matters. On big bills, a sponsor will clear with the governor's office, but the governor takes a stand on only about a tenth of the education legislation that is considered. His approval is important, but his interest only sporadic.

While the ties between New Hampshire legislative education leaders and in-state groups are strong, links to those outside the state are much less important. This is true despite the fact that the 1979–80 Speaker of the House is the immediate past-president of the National Conference of State Legislators (NCSL). A few legislators go to the annual meetings. Most education leaders read national publications from groups such as NCSL and the Education Commission of the States (ECS), but not on a regular basis. It is more the pattern for legislators to phone these organizations and ask whoever answers for information on what other states are doing. Staff is sometimes the conduit to the outside world for legislators. A staffer said:

> Legislators are usually very busy people. A lot of times the brief newsletters and magazines from NCSL and the Council of State Governments will give me an idea as to something going on in another state that they ought to know about. So I will call up that other state and get a copy of the law or rules, the regulations or a report.

But sometimes it is the legislator who uncovers useful information about what another state is doing. "You think you're reading everything but they pick it up from one of their connections."

Sometimes strong state loyalty and a New England suspicion of outsiders will surface in conversations about outside groups. "Invariably 90 percent of what I'll learn at a national meeting won't work in my state," is the way one legislator put it. But the parochialism does not include the rest of New England. "I really enjoy sitting down with New England states because our legislation is comparable." Regional meetings are attended with relish.

Styles of Leadership in Education Policymaking

When legislators and close observers are asked to comment on the qualities which make for educational leadership, they point to a philosophy about education and candor in expressing it. Leaders are also said to work very hard, exhibit great credibility, and do their political groundwork.

Legislative education leaders take a stand on the question of the state role in education. All believe firmly that the local school districts, so heavily reliant on the property tax, are overwhelmed. They will not mandate any more policy without funding it. Some, known as "pro-education" or "liberals," think it is time the state drastically increased its share of educational costs, even if that were to mean only fully funding the existing aid formula. The foundation school aid program on the books is funded at less than one-tenth of the authorized level. Liberals argue that the underfunding seriously impairs New Hampshire's ability to educate its children. Said one House member:

> This local control of New Hampshire isn't the way I would like to see it done. I think too many children get shortchanged that way. I guess I think in terms of public financing of education at the state level . . . I'm probably as liberal as you could get on education.

A senator is even more outspoken:

> I've been an advocate of an income tax and I'm not bashful about it . . . there's a hue and cry out there from the cities and the towns to fully fund foundation aid. Well I agree with that; it certainly should be done. But they've got to give me money to do it. I mean they just can't sit there and say no new taxes.

The speaker is known as a "broad baser;" others feel his position damages his effectiveness and are wary about being so direct. They might speak about the need for more money but not mention the source.

Taking the opposite stance are a number of leaders who feel that local districts could handle their duty to support public education if the state stopped burdening them with additional mandates. Since education is a local matter, locals should pay for it. As one legislator said, "The local school board should completely control the school. The only thing the state should require is the basics."

Therefore, under the overarching banner of local control are two camps: (1) those who feel some districts are so resource poor that more state funding is essential, and (2) those who feel the funding situation is fine as it is. Both sides believe strongly that there should be no additional state mandates without additional funding. Says an observer, "I think they all—conservative or liberal—believe in local control. That's sort of a political given."

The "pro-education" group appears to be somewhat more aggressive than the conservatives. A state department spokesman feels the advocate usually gathers more information to support his position. "The conservative isn't coming, because they are against you anyway. They don't want any information."

The spokesman may have exaggerated somewhat. There is general agreement that legislative education leaders all work very hard at being legislators, regardless of philosophy. It's very important to "know the subject matter." Leaders are those who can get up in committee and defend a bill thoroughly. When they present it, they must know every facet of the proposed legislation. A legislator said, "You get on that floor one time and you shoot your mouth off and don't know what you're talking about, in essence you're lying and that's the end of your credibility." In a legislature with so little staff, legislators who want to be thoroughly prepared must do much of their own

homework. They themselves contact the state department, interest groups, local officials and other legislators for information.

Working hard, including sometimes drafting your own legislation, has its rewards. The State Department of Education responds more openly in terms of supplying information to acknowledged leaders. One way to become an acknowledged leader is to keep asking for information; the more one asks, the more one gets.

Hard work brings a legislator credibility as do honesty, openness, and consistency. There is great respect for those who speak out candidly, even if philosophies differ. One legislator, a liberal, indicated why she sought a certain conservative to cosponsor a bill she was working on: "He's very conservative but he is good reliable help if he's with you . . . and he'll never back away, once he tells you he'll do something, he'll do it."

The value placed on virtues that make for leadership—diligence, honesty, reliability—does not preclude respect for other qualities. A leader must be a good lobbyist, able to sell colleagues on the committee, other legislators, and the governor if necessary.

An important focal point in lobbying is the other house. Those who refer the most to the necessity of gaining the support of the other house are liberal representatives who want to make sure that the more conservative Senate does not prove a graveyard for House bills. One House education leader, himself not considered a liberal, indicated that it is important to find out in advance if "deals" have to be made to get a bill through the Senate. If too many bargains are necessary, the representative may decide not to "run with the bill."

The references to "deals" are jarring to the ear of one who spends time with New Hampshire legislators. For although everyone recognizes the need for trade-offs and lobbying, the essentially political nature of the legislature is not as apparent to the observer as its down-home, folksy culture. The citizen legislator might make many deals but he does not refer to them often; what he talks about is how he can work with his colleagues to best serve those constituents. Constituent demands are expected to shape a legislator's behavior. Any stance is understandable if it is taken on behalf of one's constituency. It is not unusual to hear a legislator say, "Well so and so's from X district so, of course, he won't support this bill."

Courtesy and access to constituents is very important. For example, as one legislator said:

> It's always been my belief that the people who take the time and come here to Concord to testify must be heard. I'll do anything I can to make sure everybody in that room has been heard at least once. I'll be sure that after everybody's been heard once that if they want to speak a second time, they

> have the right to do it, I ask them if they wouldn't be repetitive; you know, because we do have a long schedule. By the same token, I don't try to offend them at all. Some people have never testified before a committee before and may be a little bit nervous and so we go along with them. We like to think it's a citizen's legislature, the citizen should have a lot of input.

The culture of a citizen's legislature tends to promote consensus rather than controversy, even though there are rather sharp philosophical differences between legislators. Because there is a tendency to run committees informally and to allow a great deal of discussion, most education matters get settled in committee. The size of the House then works to promote acceptance of committee decisions on the floor of that body.

When legislators describe committee meetings, they speak of mutual respect, understanding, and courtesy. Everyone gets a chance to express his views and all members are actively involved in reaching a decision. Conservatives and liberals may argue with one another, but there are no hard feelings. Said a staffer, "It all seems to be done in very good humor."

Although members have a hard time remembering fights within the committee, it is relatively easy to pinpoint issues which are laden with controversy, both inside the committee and on the floor. Sex education, prayer in the schools, and other moralistic issues are very likely to arouse a furor. The Senate considered a controversial bill which would mandate the posting of the Ten Commandments on school walls. A bill to change the drinking age also aroused controversy. A bill to change the composition of the university board of trustees went to a floor fight. Any bill dealing with school district consolidation or changes in regional agreements between districts brings a lot of local district people down to Concord. But the major education issue in the state, that of local control, has the potential for causing the most conflict.

Because the narrow revenue base provides opportunities for new infusions of state funding only rarely when occasional revenue surpluses appear, the issue of the state role does not often surface into legislation. The no-mandates-without-funding dogma also serves to keep controversial issues out of the legislature. Recognizing the strong legislative commitment to this goal, the department tries to handle new mandates, particularly controversial ones like sex education, through State Board regulation and bypass the legislature. Therefore, although the issue of the state role is paramount, it is submerged and only on occasion surfaces within the legislature. Education politics hence appear relatively consensual.

The Impact of Legislative Education Leadership

New Hampshire is gradually moving toward an increased state role in education policy. Despite the unshakable, widespread belief in local control,

the state role is growing by small increments. The special education legislation and the increased funding of vocational education are two examples of growing state responsibility and represent a shift in state direction, even though they were enacted as a result of federal initiatives.

Just as the legislature was responsible for these changes in direction, it will be the legislature which ultimately determines the state-local balance. Service as a legislative education leader appears to socialize a person, making him aware that many local school districts in New Hampshire have insufficient resources. The conviction not to mandate without funding grows out of experience in the legislature; it comes from listening to testimony from overburdened district representatives. As one senator put it, "I think you become increasingly aware . . . you come to the legislature and see all the laws on the books that are all dusty, that have never been implemented because they lack funding."

The step beyond the realization that the locals are pressured toward providing more funds at the state level is a large one. The most conservative legislators will probably not take that transition, satisfied that the best they can do for overburdened locals is to stop mandating. But others, and not just the avowed "broad-basers," are beginning to make the connection. Legislative service exposes one to the link between lack of resources at the local level and the need for a larger state role. Some legislators believe that the question goes beyond adequacy to one of equity. The problem is not just that all locals need to rely too much on property-tax revenue; it is also that some districts have several times the property tax base of others.

A legislator who is a known conservative and a vocal supporter of local control expressed it this way:

> Legislators are starting to figure out what the responsibility is between state and local. They are spending too little money down there. They are starting to figure it out. We finally have legislators talking about the disparity between their school districts and other school districts. We'll do something, at least we are talking about it.

The awareness stems partly from the efforts of outside groups like the Center for Educational Field Studies at the University of New Hampshire, which has had Ford Foundation grants to educate legislators and citizens on school finance. There is also a coalition of educational interest groups and citizen groups dedicated to greater equity in school financing.

It will be legislative education leaders in New Hampshire who carve out a larger role for the state in education, not the department, which has played a weak leadership role. The department may initiate many bills, but those bills are largely housekeeping kinds of legislation. Change will not come

from the governor, who spends much of his short term in office getting ready to run again. The movement toward a larger state role may take a long time, but it will be legislators who steer the course.